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INTRODUCTION

Communities are protesting systemic racism, police killings, xenophobia,
rising unemployment, climate change, and widening economic inequality.
The immigrant rights movement is a critical part of these efforts to foment
change. 1 Despite ascendant nativism, immigrant communities continue to
achieve moments of remarkable change.2 The immigrant rights movement is
one of the leading edges in the current development of movement lawyering.
Lawyers and law students have renewed interest in creating a model of lawyering that will support the social change efforts of the moment.3 This Article

1. Communities organized around growing nativism and hostile policies such as the Trump administration's deployment of an elite tactical unit designed to support immigration arrest. See Caitlin
Dickerson & Zolan Kanno-Youngs, Border Patrol Will Deploy Elite TacticalAgents to Sanctuary Cities,
N.Y. TimEs (Feb. 14, 2020) (explaining that the elite tactical unit known as BORTAC, which acts essentially as the SWAT team of the Border Patrol, would be part of the units sent to help with interior enforcement. The unit carries additional gear such as stun grenades and has enhanced Special Forces-type
training, including sniper certification).
2. In addition to the advocacy that led to the demise of Secure Communities, which is the focus of
this Article, passage of the DREAM Act is another relatively recent moment of change. See
Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act of 2011, H.R. 1842, 112th Cong. § 1 (2011);
Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act of 2011, S. 952, 112th Cong. § 1 (2011).
3. In July 2020, we began a five-part course on Movement Lawyering titled, "Build Power, Fight
Power," created and taught by lawyers and activists that are part of the Movement Law Lab. At the most
recent session, over 4,000 participants joined. See Build Power, Fight Power: A Five Part Course on
Movement Lawyering, Movement Law Lab (2019), https://movementlawlab.org/mlcourse [https://perma.
cc/RY2T-YT3B]. The course explains that "Times of upheaval are also times of great opportunity and
change. Lawyers and legal workers of conscience are needed now more than ever to support the people's
resistance - be it the Movement for Black Lives, COVID-19 rapid-response, workers' rights, climate
change, immigrant rights, and more. Yet movement lawyering is not what most of us [] were exposed to
in law school or what we are trained and encouraged to do as legal practitioners. Some of us are ready and
willing to support these movements, but aren't sure how to help. Others of us don't know what movement
lawyering means, but know that doing case after case isn't going to solve the problems of our clients.
Finally, some of us are already connected and volunteering for movements, but this moment presents
new challenges that we haven't seen before. We believe, this moment asks us to think differently
about our work. To find new ways to approach our cases, new partnerships, new thought-partners and
new strategies. We created this course to help all legal advocates the experienced and the newly
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uses the context of deportation resistance to study a multi-layered campaign
involving lawyers, organizers, advocates, and clients, and from that extrapolates an innovative approach to movement lawyering.
A rich body of literature subjects social change lawyering to critical examination.4 The traditional concept of lawyers using litigation to effectuate
social change largely grew after World War II, between the 1950s and 1970s,
as lawyers filed strategic cases to combat legalized segregation 5 and reform
public prisons, welfare systems, and mental hospitals.6 As enticing as it was
to view litigation as a panacea to the large range of existing social ills, scholars and activists questioned the effectiveness of litigation as a tool for lasting
social change.'
The ensuing debate in legal scholarship surrounding the role of lawyers
involved in social change centers on the connected issues of the efficacy of
lawyers' remedies and lawyer accountability. The efficacy of remedies issue
questions how the legal system transforms disputes-funneling core political
conflicts into legally cognizable issues that are divorced from marginalized

&

-

committed learn and reflect together on how we can use our skills to support movements fighting for
transformative change rooted in people power." Id.
4. Scott Cummings has become the de facto participant-historian of the intellectual history of social
movement lawyering. See Scott Cummings & Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice: Looking Back,
Thinking Ahead, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 485 (2017) [hereinafter Cummings & Rhode, Access to
Justice]; Scott Cummings, Thematic Overview: Community Development Law and Economic Justice
Why Law Matters, 26 J. AFFORDABLE HOuS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 35 (2017) [hereinafter Cummings,
Thematic Overview]; SCOTT CUMMINGS & ALAN K. CHEN, PUBLIC INTEREST LAWYERING: A
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE (John Devins ed., 13th ed. 2013) [hereinafter CUMMINGS & CHEN, PUBLIC
INTEREST LAWYERING]. While we cannot do justice to his contributions over the past few years, we hope
to situate our research project within this body of literature and summarize his contributions sufficiently
to demonstrate the intentions of our research methods.
5. Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, A CriticalReflection on Law and Organizing,48 UCLA L.
REV. 443, 444 (2001) [hereinafter Cummings & Eagly, A Critical Reflection] (describing this part of the
movement during the 1950s and 1960s).
6. Id. at 444-45 (describing the public litigation that took place in the 1970s).
7. Early advocates, like Stephen Wexler and Gary Bellow, offered a more nuanced role for lawyers.
See Stephen Wexler, PracticingLaw for Poor People, 79 YALE L. J. 1049, 1053 (1970) (arguing that
rights enforcement by lawyers would not have a significant impact upon poor people and urging practicing poverty lawyers to organize communities). Gary Bellow posited a model of legal-aid practice that
emphasized political action and viewed litigation as ancillary to a broader social change strategy. See
Gary Bellow, Turning Solutions into Problems: The Legal Aid Experience, GARYBELLOW.ORG (Aug.
1977), http://www.garybellow.org/garywords/solutions.html [https://perma.cc/U4Y2-KQP9] [hereinafter
Bellow, Turning Solutions into Problems] (arguing for a broader conception of lawyering that included a
"political perspective, directed toward specific changes in particular institutions that affect the poor" and
"focused case" pressure in combination with community organizing and legislative advocacy). For an
example of an early on-the-ground advocate of movement lawyering, see TOMIKO BROWN-NAGIN,
COURAGE TO DISSENT: ATLANTA AND THE LONG HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 187-88
(Dave McBride ed., 2011) (describing the "volatile alliance" forged and destroyed between lawyers and
demonstrators between 1961-64).
8. Often the literature distinguishes efficacy and accountability (sometime described as autonomy),
but we, along with a smaller group of observers, find them inseverable. See generally Scott L. Cummings,
The Puzzle of Social Movements in American Legal Theory, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1554 (2017) [hereinafter
Cummings, Puzzle of Social Movements]; Scott L. Cummings, Rethinking the FoundationalCritiques of
Lawyers in Social Movements, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987 (2017) [hereinafter Cummings, Foundational
Critiques]; Scott L. Cummings, Movement Lawyering, 2017 U. OF ILL. L. REV. 1645 (2017) [hereinafter
Cummings, Movement Lawyering]; Scott L. Cummings, The Social Movement Turn in Law, 43 LAw
SOC. INQUIRY 360 (2018) [hereinafter Cummings, Turn in Law].
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peoples' core concerns and are not amenable to enforceable judicial decrees.9
The accountability problem encompasses lawyers' power to overwhelm individual clients and activists and the difficulty in determining the intentions
and preferences of group clients, particularly those as large, multi-faceted,
and diverse as those making up social movements.10
While these critiques combine to form the central concerns of relevant lawyering and constitutional scholarship, the literature still lacks a core group of
in-depth examples that could help clearly define and theorize this type of lawyering."1 Detailing actual movement lawyering experiences allows for the exploration of critical new questions. First, assuming that litigation or traditional
lawyering roles, more generally, cannot provide the answer alone,12 how
do other plausible competitors-lobbying for legislative or administrative
changes, electoral strategies, direct action, playing the media, community and
labor organizing, social entrepreneurship, or mass social movementscompare?" Second, can we develop a vision of progressive lawyering that
enables lawyers involved in social movements to evaluate which tools to use

9. Cummings, Movement Lawyering, supra note 8, at 1655, 1704; Cummings, Foundational
Critiques, supranote 8, at 1988.
10. Cummings, Turn in Law, supra note 8, at 374-75.
11. See Purvi & Chuck: Community Lawyering, ORGANIZING UPGRADE 4 (June 1, 2010, 7:20 PM),
http://archive.organizingupgrade.com/index.php/modules-menu/community-organizing/item/71-purviamp-chuck-community-lawyering [https://perma.cc/6MUJ-996J]; Interview by Joseph Phelan with Purvi
Shah, and Chuck Elsesser, Co-founder, Cmty. Justice Project Inc., in Miami, Fl. (June 15, 2010) ("Also,
though there are a number of lawyers across the country engaged in the practice of community lawyering,
the theory on community lawyering is at best, embryonic. Those of us engaged in the practice have
simply not been able to effectively distill and document our experiences in a cohesive and clear theory.").
12. Michael W. McCann, Reform Litigation on Trial, 17 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 715, 727 (1992)
[hereinafter McCann, Reform Litigation]; Thomas F. Burke & Jeb Barnes, Is There an Empirical
Literature on Rights, 48 STUD. IN L. POL. & SOC'Y 69, 74-75 (2009) [hereinafter Burke & Barnes,
Empirical Literature on Rights]; Samuel R. Bagenstos, Social Change Litigation as Just Another
PoliticalTool, NEW RAMBLER REV. (2015) [hereinafter Bagenstos, Social ChangeLitigation] (Review of
JEB BARNES & THOMAS BURKE, HOw POLICY SHAPES POLITICS: RIGHTS, COURTS, LITIGATION, AND THE
OVER INJURY COMPENSATION (2015)), http://newramblerreview.com/book-reviews/law/
social-change-litigation-as-just-another-political-tool [https://perma.cc/HGC8-MVQK] (last visited
Aug. 21, 2019).
13. A notable exception is Cummings, who both raises the question of whether litigation is any more
ineffective in producing social change, inspires greater backlash, diverts more resources from other strategies or is less respectful of the autonomy of marginalized groups than its available alternatives, principally social movements. See Cummings, FoundationalCritiques, supra note 8, at 1992-2000; Scott L.
Cummings, Law and Social Movements: Reimagining the Progressive Cannon, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 441
(2018); see also Sameer M. Ashar, Movement Lawyers in the Fightfor ImmigrantRights, 64 UCLA L.
REV. 1464 (2017) [hereinafter Ashar, Movement Lawyers for Immigrant Rights]; GERALD P. LOPEZ,
STRUGGLE

REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992). Some litiga-

tion critics take time to note that other means to social change might face similar difficulties. However,
while these critics generally identify that legal strategies face barriers, such as entrenched legal bureaucracies, costs, deferral to elite decision-making and giving up control over framing and agendas to legal
experts, they simply assume that other strategies are not similarly burdened. See, e.g., Michael Diamond,
The Transpositionof Power:Law, Lawyers and Social Movements, 24 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. AND POL'Y
319, 350 (2017); Catherine Albiston, The Dark Side of Litigation as a Social Movement Strategy, 96
IOWA L. REV. BULL. 61 (2011). There is also a failure to rigidly define which alternatives to litigation are
under consideration mass social movements, grassroots lobbying, direct action, electoral strategies,
exploiting political vulnerabilities, self-help, ideological appeals, affecting cultural attitudes, imposing
structural barriers or incentives, social entrepreneurship and market strategies seem to be some obvious
examples. Id.
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in specific contexts to most effectively further their clients' goals?1 4 These are
both important questions not yet fully developed in the literature, and they
remain central concerns of those engaged in lawyering for social change.
To address these questions, we designed a case study around a multifaceted campaign against the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS),
administratively created immigration enforcement program known as Secure
Communities (S-Comm). S-Comm compels state and local law enforcement
agencies to send fingerprints they collect to DHS to identify and take action
against persons with an immigration history. Although the program purportedly targets "criminal aliens" who have been convicted of serious offenses,
S-Comm applies to immigrants regardless of guilt or innocence, how or why
they came into contact with law enforcement, and whether their arrests, if
any, were pretexts for checking immigration status based on racial or ethnic
profiling." By embellishing threats of criminal immigrants as its putative justification, S-Comm revolutionized the relationship between federal and local
law enforcement agencies, conflating criminal and civil law enforcement and
altering political debates about immigration.
The campaign against S-Comm-involving lawyers, activists, politicians (at
the federal, state, and local levels), and organizers-was mounted on several
levels. The campaign's flexible and dispersed nature allowed it to evolve to
meet the shifts in the larger immigrant rights movement and the political landscape. The campaign's larger strategic design involved litigation, direct action,
media, social science engagement, electoral pressures, exploitation of political
vulnerabilities, and ideological appeals to power holders with decision-making
authority on S-Comm. Lawyers were intimately involved in many of the strategic decisions and actions related to the campaign, of which litigation was but
one part. Lawyers, organizers, activists, and impacted communities worked together and were welcomed into what once had been thought of as strategic decision-making within lawyers' exclusive domain.
The case study relies upon examining the 23,411 internal government documents obtained through Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) litigation and

14. Our answer at present is ultimately, no. But we seek to outline here, and develop further in a follow-up article, an approach towards understanding and defining movement lawyering that might guide an
understanding of why it might be a valuable approach on the measures we outline above. We can contribute to what we hope will become a trove of richly described stock stories about movement lawyering in
action from which we all can draw to synthesize the still nascent picture of what movement lawyering is
and how one moves in and adjacent to that role. We focus here on progressive social change, both because
that is the focus of nearly all the relevant literature, and because, as we develop further at notes 53-55 and
accompanying text, legal action in support of conservative or regressive social change might entail different barriers and facilitators and hence might fare differently according to the efficacy measure at least,
even if lawyering for conservative or regressive causes is vulnerable to the same accountability critique.
See JEFFERSON DECKER, THE OTHER RIGHTS REVOLUTION: CONSERVATIVE LAWYERS AND THE REMAKING
OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 224-27 (2016).

15. See DHS's "Secure Communities": No Rules of the Road, NAT'L IMMIGR. L. CTR. (Mar. 2011),
https://www.nilc.org/issues/immigration-enforcement/scomm-no-rules-of-road-2011-03-0/
[https://
perma.cc/4V2D-GH3C] (last visited Aug. 4, 2020) (describing problems underlying S-Comm).
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organizing, 16 thirty interviews with administrative officials, congressional
actors, organizers, clients, activists, and lawyers," and a thorough review of
mainstream media. This case study is unique because it draws upon an internal
paper trail documenting the Obama administration's influences and deliberations leading to critical decision-making about the program.18 The data allowed
us to reverse the vector of analysis used in previous studies. Unlike other scholarship that examines the efficacy and autonomy-enhancing effects of lawyering
modalities from the top-down judicial perspective (did a given court decision
change the outcome?),19 or the ground-up movement perspective (did lawyering
impact activists' work?),20 or lawyering perspectives (how can lawyers shift the
modality of their work to be most effective?),21 we explore the question from
the perspective of internal government deliberations to evaluate how (if at all)
actions by lawyers impacted institutional decision making.
16. The litigation component began in 2010 when the National Day Laborer Organizing Network
(NDLON), the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR), and the Immigration Justice Clinic at Cardozo
Law School filed a FOIA lawsuit in federal court in order to uncover information about S-Comm and its
operations. See, e.g., Nat'l Day Laborer Org. Network v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enf't Agency,
811 F. Supp. 2d 713 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Nat'l Day Laborer Org. Network v. U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enf't Agency, 827 F. Supp. 2d 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Nat'l Day Laborer Org. Network v. U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enf't Agency, 877 F. Supp. 2d 87 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).The lawsuit spanned a period of three years, at the conclusion of which the federal government was ordered to turn over thousands
of internal government documents related to the program and its implementation and ultimately pay $1.2
million dollars in attorneys' fees to the plaintiff. Document 209, Nat'l Day Laborer Org. Network v. U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enf't Agency, Case 1:10-cv-03488-SAS (S.D.N.Y. filed July 3, 2013) (stating
in the stipulated settlement, that "[i]n consideration for the release of Plaintiffs' claims related to attorneys' fees and costs, Defendants agree to pay Plaintiffs $1,212,500 in compensation for attorneys' fees
and costs (the "Settlement Amount")).
17. We include interviews as part of the case study because it seems more than a little unfair to critique progressive lawyering for failing to achieve objectives not intended by the lawyers involved, the clients they represent, or the movements they support, and because we want to situate progressive lawyering
within diversely coupled multi-modal movements for social change. To do this effectively, we need to
understand the advocates' intentions, goals, and strategies and their consciousness of the part each strategic move was designed to play in the larger movement.
18. Nat'l Day Laborer Org. Network v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enf't Agency, 811 F. Supp.
2d 713 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Nat'l Day Laborer Org. Network v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enf't
Agency, 827 F. Supp. 2d 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Nat'l Day Laborer Org. Network v. U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enf't Agency, 877 F. Supp. 2d 87 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
19.

See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOw HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL

CHANGE? (Benjamin I. Page ed., 2d ed. 2008) [hereinafter ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOw HOPE] (examining
the role of courts in producing major political and social change).
20.

See, e.g., MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF

LEGAL MOBILIZATION 2-3 (John Tryneski ed., 1994) [hereinafter MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK] (examining through empirical research the movement to challenge wage discrimination).
21. See, e.g., Jennifer Gordon, The Lawyer Is Not the Protagonist: Community Campaigns, Law, and
Social Change, 95 CAL. L. REv. 2133 (2007) (questioning the role of the lawyer in relation to community
groups serving as protagonists); William H. Simon, Lawyers and Community Economic Development, 95
CAL. L. REv. 1821 (2007); Anthony V. Alfieri, Faith in Community: Representing Colored Town, 95
CAL. L. REv. 1829 (2007); Sameer M. Ashar, Public Interest Lawyers and Resistance Movements,
95 CAL. L. REv. 1879 (2007) [hereinafter Ashar, Public Interest Lawyers]; Scott L. Cummings, Law in
the Labor Movement's Challenge to Wal-Mart: A Case Study of the Inglewood Site Fight, 95 CAL. L.
REv. 1 (2007); Sheila R. Foster & Brian Glick, Integrative Lawyering: Navigating the PoliticalEconomy
of Urban Redevelopment, 95 CAL. L. REv. 1999 (2007); Angela Harris, Margaretta Lin, & Jeff Selbin,
From the Art of War to Being Peace: Mindfulness and Community Lawyering in a Neoliberal Age, 95
CAL. L. REv. 2073 (2007); Jennifer Gordon, We Make the Road by Walking: Immigrant Workers, the
Workplace Projectand the Strugglefor Social Change, 30 HARV. C. R.-C. L. L. REv. 407 (1995) [hereinafter Gordon, We Make the Road].
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Examining a program that was implemented and subsequently discontinued
within a relatively constrained time period allows us to provide a contextually
rich description of one particular instance that encompasses the kinds of legal
and public policy battles that marginalized communities, lawyers, and activists
collaboratively struggle against every day.22 We resist the assumption that litigation is engaged in a zero-sum game with competing advocacy efforts.2 3 This
case study bore out this resistance and allowed us to examine the effects of not
only legal doctrine and arguments based on it, but also how movement actors
assessed power systems and developed timely strategies and tactics. The movement actors' coordinated efforts led to success on the micro level (achieving immediate goals), the meso level (effecting broader policy change), and the macro
level (organizing communities around narrative identities).
Through this case study, we identify a deficit (but not a disconnect) between
what happened in the context of this campaign and the academic literature on the
role of lawyers in social change. While the literature treats the questions of
"accountability" and "efficacy" as separate elements, this case study illustrates
that accountability and efficacy are inextricably intertwined. These questions are
inter-related, both in that it is hard to define successful social change in terms
other than those embedded in social movements, and because of the potential
that movement lawyering can disempower the people it is designed to help while
legitimizing the oppressive hierarchies that lead social movement actors to seek
lawyers' help. In combining the accountability and effectiveness queries, we
identify, test, and then develop an approach to lawyering for social changeaspects of which are invoked by labels such as "movement lawyering," "liberal
movement lawyering," "solidarity lawyering," "democratic lawyering," "demosprudence," "community lawyering," "cause lawyering," "rebellious lawyering,"
or "law and organizing." We use these terms interchangeably, with the idea of
fleshing out elements shared among these visions of the lawyer's role and distinguishing what we have seen that is different or additional. The approach to lawyering we describe allows lawyers a more substantive role, along with

22. At the same time, we offer up this thick description of a relatively constrained moment in immigrant rights movements for others to consider in a growing base of stories of social change. Compare
Clark Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking about Law as Language. 87 MICH. L. REv. 2459,
2493-94 (1989) [hereinafter Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients] with Richard Delgado, Storytelling for
Oppositionists and Others: A Pleafor Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2411 (1989) [hereinafter Delgado,
Storytelling for Oppositionists].
23. JEB BARNES & THOMAS F. BURKE, How POLICY SHAPES POLITICS: RIGHTS, COURTS, LITIGATION
AND THE STRUGGLE OVER INJURY COMPENSATION (2015) [hereinafter BARNES & BURKE, How POLICY
SHAPES POLITICS]. See also United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (decrying how equal marriage litigation diverted resources that would have more effectively been focused on
legislative innovation); ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE, supra note 19, at 427 (describing litigation as
political 'flypaper,' a trap for unwary activists who invest scarce resources monetary, political, and
human in wasteful litigation).
24. Effective movement strategies adapted to systemic power, in turn leveraging, inter alia, the
quantity, qualities and spread of networks, guiding movement narratives, and the nature of relationships
within and exterior to the movement as well as the repertoire of deployed tactics to identify and respond
to what, and who, influenced the exercise of government discretion in the context of S-Comm.
25. Cummings, Puzzle of Social Movements, supra note 8, at 1621.
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organizers and activists, in envisioning power structures, imagining ways to
affect power relations, identifying leverage points, and selecting the most effective levers to pull from their collection of possible moves or legal strategies.2 6
In the campaign we examine, collaboratively inclined lawyers built a nimble, adaptive, and modular strategy to enhance concerted power from the
ground up. The coalition relied upon recursive, interactive, and synergistic
play among tools, roles, institutions, resources, and established repertoires of
contention." Within this model, legal interactions and discourse are important constitutive elements of an array of which the movement's relationship
with legal rules, roles, and institutions are a byproduct.2 8 This construct of
lawyering envisions lawyers' engagement with activists and movement
actors to develop ways of collaboratively and synergistically exploiting the
advantages of various social-change strategies, producing strengthened relationships and lasting investments in organized resistance.
We identify a substantive, non-subservient, equal role for lawyers in
assessing power. With other movement actors, lawyers identify leverage
points and select among a dispersed, ground-up generated array of options
and implementation strategies for pulling on the levers of power. This model
of lawyering finds advantages in employing lawyers from different orientations and contexts to extend networks, leverage credibility, and complete narratives of the nature of power relations. The approach we observed utilized
lawyers with different skill sets and strengths strategically throughout the
various levels of the movement. On the micro level, lawyers in various localities throughout the country were brought in to be "lawyers for the situation."
If a lawyer was needed to describe opt-out possibilities to a local city council,
a local lawyer with ties to the immigration community was employed to support that piece of the project. On the meso level, outside lawyers were
brought in to be "lawyers for the campaign." Because the FOIA litigation
involved vast amounts of documents and a technically challenging discovery
issue, the campaign sought assistance from pro bono lawyers with expertise
in the substantive issues and establishment credibility. On the macro level,
"lawyers for the movement" built a narrative framework for sustainable
organizing. Lawyers often worked or coordinated the work of specializedrole lawyers at all three levels. The campaign used FOIA litigation, known in
advocate circles as "advocacy through inquiry," to obtain information

26.

See CHARLES TILLEY AND SIDNEY TARROW, CONTENTIOUS POLITICS (2d ed. 2015); MARIO DIANI

& DONATELLA

DELLA PORTA, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: AN INTRODUCTION (3d ed. 2020).
27. The idea being that social movements, institutions, and law both change and are changed in the
process, even as each constructs the assumptions on which each is built. See generally ANTHONY
GIDDENS, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY: OUTLINE OF THE THEORY OF STRUCTURATION (1984) [hereinafter ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY].
28. See MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK, supra note 20, at 2-6; see also FRANCESCA POLLETTA, IT WAS
LIKE A FEVER: STORYTELLING IN PROTEST AND POLITICS 52 (Doug Mitchell ed., 2006) [hereinafter

POLLETTA, IT WAS LIKE A FEVER]; Doug Smith, Order (forFree) In the Courtroom: Re-conceiving Law
as a Dynamic Complex Adaptive System, 7 EMERGENCE: COMPLEXITY IN ORG. 53 (2005) [hereinafter
Smith, Order (for Free)].
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necessary to advocate for localities' opting out of S-Comm and develop the
larger narrative that eventually led to S-Comm's demise. Local demonstrations supported the FOIA proceedings, and the success of the FOIA litigation
helped bind movement organizing. This multilayered approach to movement
lawyering utilized each layer in support of the other, creating a whole that
was more effective than the sum of the individual pieces.
We also inquire into how this strain of movement lawyering developed and
how the law-trained activists we studied came to embody their peculiar roles.
We talked with lawyers who were inspired by law-clinic reflections inward toward relationships 29 and outward to storying. 30 At its core is the notion that the
locus for change shifts the focus from judicial orders to developing looselycoupled relationships among legal institutions, lawyers, movement leaders, and
the communities they represent through legal storytelling, mobilized activists,
and organized efforts that channel community priorities. 31
To greatly oversimplify our observations, traditional lawyers' stories conventionally narrate how an individual client's claims are idiosyncratic so that
granting a client the relief she seeks will not disturb existing power relationships (and indeed will only reinforce established hierarchies and privileges). 32 Organizers tell stories that tie their clients' predicaments to the
inevitable churning of existing orders, emphasizing that there is no way to
resolve any single member's problem without examining, if not changing, that
existing order. 33 Traditional lawyers attack the most immediate and addressable
29. Reflection on relationships between attorney and client began in earnest with the first wave of
clinical scholarship on lawyering and focused on reframing the role of attorneys and clients through the
introduction of client-centered lawyering. See GARY BELLOW & BEA MOULTON, THE LAWYERING
PROCESS: MATERIALS FOR CLINICAL INSTRUCTION IN ADVOCACY (1978) (Foundation Press) [hereinafter

BELLOW & MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS] (encouraging reflection on the appropriate role of the
lawyer in relation to the client); DAVID BINDER, PAUL BERGMAN, PAUL TREMBLAY & IAN WEINSTEIN,
LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (4th ed. 2019) [hereinafter BINDER ET AL,

LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS] (articulating a "client-centered" vision of lawyering and techniques for students to adopt). For an argument that relationships with client constituencies are not critical to movement
lawyering so long as lawyers can piggy-back off of organizers' preexisting relationships, see Ashar,
Movement Lawyersfor Immigrant Rights, supra note 13, at 1504. Professor Ashar characterizes the effort
as a retreat (at least temporarily) from the legal professions' social engineering project, while others see it
as a supportive and necessary stage in the development of that project. Id. at 1491.
30. See generally RUTH ANNE ROBBINS, STEVE JOHANSEN & KEN CHESTER, YOUR CLIENT'S STORY
(2013) [hereinafter ROBBINS ET AL., YOUR CLIENT'S STORY]; Binny Miller, Telling Stories About Cases
and Clients: The Ethics of Narrative, 14 GEO. J. LEG. ETHICS 1 (2000) [hereinafter Miller, Telling
Stories]; Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Client Narrativeand Case Theory, 93 MCH L.J. 485
(1994) [hereinafter Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives].
31. For closely related analysis of social change, see DUNCAN GREEN, HOW CHANGE HAPPENS
(2016) [hereinafter GREEN, HOW CHANGE HAPPENS]; MICHAEL J. PAPA, ARVIND SINGHAL, & WENDY H.
PAPA, ORGANIZING FOR SOCIAL CHANGE: A DIALECTIC JOURNEY OF THEORY AND PRAXIS 233-242

(2006).
32.
ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 73-182, 192-93 (2000) [hereinafter AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW].

33. Ashar, Movement Lawyers for Immigrant Rights, supra note 13, at 1498. What we term here the
organizer's story is more fully described by Margaret Levi as "communities of fate": the idea of a community organized around a common ideal, a common threat, a common enemy or a shared goal that comprehends a deeply-felt understanding that the community is bound by a common fate. See generally JOHN
S. AHLQUIST AND MARGARET LEVI, IN THE INTEREST OF OTHERS: ORGANIZATIONS AND SOCIAL ACTIVISM
475-77 (2013).
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symptoms; organizers seek out root causes least amenable to change. 4 The conception of movement lawyering we identify is to meld these two approaches to
create novel ways to overcome the atomization of interests that traditional lawyering is said to inherently promote. The lawyers we interviewed found ways to
tell the organizer's story to powerholders in different contexts and at different
levels. We ultimately posit that twenty-first-century movement lawyering
anticipates, tracks, or has grown up alongside coincident developments in social
change movement practices, including (trans)local, emergent, open-source, integrative, and distributed organizing models.35
Part I of this Article details the evolution of literature that focuses on lawyers' effectiveness in promoting social change and lawyers' accountability to
clients. On the efficacy front, generally, this research finds that lawyers, litigation, and judges' rulings effect little direct or indirect positive change in
the real world. And test-case litigation is more likely to harm than to help
when people and movements rely on lawyers to shape movement stories.
Conversely, significant empirical research and critical theory question
whether at least some models of movement lawyering might have significantly positive indirect effects in building capacity for social movements by
coalescing divergent interests around shared narratives. 36 On the accountability front, social movement theory offers the potential of social change lawyering to alter individual consciousness and collective cultures through
motivation and creation of a base upon which social movement storying
operates. Critics point out that this potential is not often realized. Instead,
turning social change opportunities over to lawyers strips movements of their
vitality, alienates activists from their grassroots sources of power, and
obscures power relations in order to seek change within an institution neither
equipped nor inclined to deliver on the promise of change. When the efficacy
critique is paired with the transformative effects of legally translating clients'
stories by and for the benefit of elites, the perils of social movement lawyering might seem overwhelming.

34.

Ashar, Movement Lawyers for ImmigrantRights, supra note 13, at 1499.

35.

See,

e.g., ADRIENNE

MAREE BROWN, EMERGENT STRATEGY

(2017)

[hereinafter

BROWN,

EMERGENT STRATEGY]; Interview with Pablo Alvarado, Co-Executive Director, National Day Laborers
Organizing Network (Feb. 23, 2020) (interview on file with the authors) [hereinafter Interview with
Alvarado]; Carolina Martinez et al., An Integrated Organizing Approach as a Tool in the Fight for
Workers Rights: The Case of Sara Lee Workers, UCLA LABOR CTR. (2012); see also LESLIE R.
CRUTCHFIELD, HOw CHANGE HAPPENS: WHY SOME SOCIAL MOVEMENTS SUCCEED WHILE OTHER'S
DON'T (2018); GREEN, HOw CHANGE HAPPENS, supranote 31. But see JANE MCALEVEY, NO SHORTCUTS:
ORGANIZING FOR POWER IN THE NEW GILDED AGE (James Cook ed., 2016) (noting that effective new

organizing models harken back to early twentieth century labor strategies). The new lawyering models
examined likewise have venerable roots but are informed by the cognitive revolution and its offshoots,
new media and complexity science, as well as clinical lawyering, critical legal traditions, and the experience of the past century.
36. See Victor Narro, Finding the Synergy Between Law and Organizing: Experiences from the
Streets of Los Angeles, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 339 (2008) (describing lawyers' ability to talk story about
identity in the service of organizing).
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Part II describes why the case study presents a unique opportunity to explore
questions of social change lawyering. Part III situates advocacy efforts against
S-Comm within the context of the larger immigrant rights movement to expose
early and effective strategies of the team. Part IV identifies and exposes the internal, yet untold, story of S-Comm's rise, revision, and termination. Weaving
together internal government documents with interviews of key informants and
media accounts, we document the (trans)local movement to "Uncover the
Truth" that formed the nucleus of the campaign. We link efforts at the (trans)
local level, the FOIA litigation, and the larger movement to illustrate how they
fed each other in a deftly orchestrated campaign.
Finally, in Part V, we describe what we observe to be remarkable lawyering in the peculiar context of the immigrant rights movements from 2008 to
2016, and we identify and explain a new innovative approach to lawyering
for social change. The model we describe is tracked on the micro, meso, and
macro levels and illustrates the collaborative, fluid, and multi-dimensional
ways lawyers supported the movement. With the levels stacked upon each
other as a whole, this Part situates where and how the concepts of "accountability" and "efficacy" are inextricably linked and synergistically interdependent. We then weave together what we learned from documents and
interviews to illustrate how lawyers can effectively address the "efficacy"
and "accountability" questions together, consistently and in collaboration
with their partners, as they move toward their shared social change goals.
Most important, we offer a relatively thick description of a brief and constrained struggle in which lawyers and organizers, immigrant communities,
impacted leaders, government officials, journalists, and social scientists collaborated to achieve a limited but nevertheless remarkably impactful moment
of progressive social change.3 7 We hope that the result of our research will
inspire others to continue to flesh out models for effective lawyering within
social movements so that clients, communities, and the lawyers who serve
them will have important information when deciding which tools to best
employ as part of a productive and supportive strategy for social change. 38
37. Our initial goal was to create a tactical typology matching community lawyers' moves to political obstacles in order to devise best practices for different types of struggles. However, we soon realized
that such an effort was doomed. Scott Cummings, for example, has indicated an intention to create a
movement lawyering effectiveness typology. If anyone could produce on that mission, our bets would be
with Professor Cummings. See Scott Cummings, Mobilizing Low Wage Workers-Evidence from Los
Angeles, YOUTUBE, (June 17, 2010), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TayF9v8PffQ. Any chances for
success, however defined, for tactics within campaigns, campaigns within movements, and movements
within overall projects for social change, are too bound by initial conditions, internal adaptations, and
external events, too context dependent and too constrained by personalities and historical contingencies
for any individual decision to be preconfigured in advance. The struggles engaged in by marginalized
groups and discounted people take place on terrain that is hostile and complicated, constantly changing
and dynamically complex. BELLOW & MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS, supra note 29 (warning that
this effort was quixotic, that operating in the similarly complex, but not universally hostile, adaptive
space of lawyering was too complex to script out in advance but too consequential to be left to chance).
38.

See LEVERAGING THE LAw: USING COURTS TO ACHIEVE SOCIAL CHANGE (David A. Schultz ed.,

1998) [hereinafter Schultz, ed., LEVERAGING THE LAw]. We realize that social change is too dynamic,
contextual, complex, and emergent to be captured in a chart of moves against a given adversary or within
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After more than 60 years, the archetypal narrative of lawyering for social
change remains one culminating in Brown v. Board of Topeka,39 in which brilliant, brave, and tireless attorneys under Charles H. Houston and Thurgood
Marshall identified doctrinal contradictions that were exploited in a series of test
cases. These test cases ultimately set the stage for Brown, in which the Supreme
Court effectively sounded the death knell for the Jim Crow South. This archetype, labeled "legal liberalism," is defined as the stock story involving alliances
between activist courts and crusading lawyers working to advance progressive
political and social change through legal doctrines. 40 It was never an entirely
accurate description of how activist lawyers, many of whom understood their
constrained roles within larger social movements, did their work. It submerged
earlier movement lawyering models, placed the Supreme Court at the locus of
substantive change, placed changes in legal doctrine at the locus of movement
efforts, denigrated the place of social movements in desegregation, and assumed
that the blood, sweat, and defeats that came thereafter were just administrative
cleanup. Whether or not "legal liberalism" accurately described the inner worlds
of progressive legal work, it did operate as a story around which lawyers, social
movement activists, and counter-mobilizing social movements organized their
expectations and led generations of law school graduates to pursue "white
knight" remediation of chosen societal ills. The first section within this Part
documents the rich literature that critically examines social change lawyering on
accountability and efficacy grounds, while the second section details the newer
models of social change lawyering that emerged in response. 41
A.

The Critique of Lawyers as Agents for Social Change

The diffuse critical strands of lawyering for social change have ancient
roots.42 Skepticism of the efficacy of litigation appears in very early Marx 43

a given context. We are reaching, at our most ambitious, to develop a thick description of the internal
workings of institutions, roles, moves, and especially, the relationships and feedback loops among them.
This, in combination with other such stories, might allow for the refinement of lawyering's identity and
role in social change. As such, our effort is shared in the tradition of the rich library of organizing stories
as well as the effort by clinical lawyers to develop a way to talk about our work and pass the dialogue on
to others. See, e.g., Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients, supranote 22, at 2493-94; Delgado, Storytelling
for Oppositionists, supra note 22.
39. See Brown v. Bd. of Ed. of Topeka, Shawnee Cty., Kan., 74 S. Ct. 686 (1954).
40. Cummings, Puzzle of Social Movements, supra note 8, at 1556.
41. See, for example, authorities cited supra notes 4, 8.
42. FRED RODELL, WOE UNTO You LAWYERS (1939) (quoting Luke, 11:52, 11:56 in which Jesus
said, "Woe unto you, lawyers! for ye have taken away the key of knowledge. And you experts in the law,
woe to you, because you load people down with burdens they can hardly carry, and you yourselves will
not."), https://www.constitution.org/lrev/rodell/woe unto-you_lawyers.htm
[https://perma.cc/KJ3R4AWC]) (last visited Feb. 20, 2020).
43. Duncan Kennedy, The Critique of Rights in Critical Legal Studies, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT
CRITIQUE, 178-228 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley, eds., Duke University Press 2002) [hereinafter
Kennedy, The Critiqueof Rights].
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and the construction of the United States Constitution. 44 The early critiques
evolved into a contentious dispute in the literature that touches upon the efficacy of rights talk45 and the accountability of lawyers that rely upon rights
talk to address social change. In terms of efficacy, on theoretical grounds,
rights talk is too indeterminate, too limited, and too backward-looking a basis
upon which to ground cognizable social change. Scholars question the efficacy of rights talk for marginalized groups with few political resources. 46
Courts lack implementation powers, and any court-wrought change of significance is likely to motivate counter-mobilization and backlash that would
undermine the change. 47 In terms of autonomy, lawyers, armed with the
allure of sufficiently mystifying legal change, have the power to overwhelm
grassroots movements, tend to divert causes to those most amenable to court
resolution, and leave decision making in the hands of a limited elite.4 8 The

44. See DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977); STUART A. SCHEINGOLD,
THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS (1974); JOEL HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM (1978);

Austin Sarat, Special Issue; Social Movements/Legal Possibilities,54 STUD. IN L. POL. & SOC'Y (2011).
45. See, JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS 149-50 (2005)
[hereinafter GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS] ("Some scholars have argued that even when it happens in a
social movement, talking about rights actively undermines the possibility of meaningful collective action for
social change, because of the ways that a quest to win individual rights can atomize movement participants,
because a battle for rights channels a movement's energy from the streets to the courts and because of the way
a focus on winning new rights leads to passive reliance on the state to grant those rights rather than a broad
struggle for social justice."). Classic formulations of this critique of rights talk include STUART A.
SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY AND SOCIAL CHANGE 5 (Univ. of Mich.

Press 2nd ed. 2004) (finding that the "myth of rights," "tunnels the vision of both activists and analysts leading
to an oversimplified approach to a complex social process an approach that grossly exaggerates the role that
lawyers and litigation can play in a strategy for change," because, inter alia, judges cannot be counted on to
find a right to fit all social goals or a remedy even when a coherent right can be formulated, leading lawyers to
seek targets of opportunity based on their amenability to rights talk rather than social imperatives or community demands); see also Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TExAS L. REV. 1363, 1371-82 (1984) (finding
that "rights talk is so indeterminate, it can provide only momentary advantages in ongoing political struggles."). To the extent that rights talk provides such momentary advantages, our concern is with how those momentary advantages are secured through use of rights talk versus other frames and how and when rights talk
supports more lasting organizing for social change.
46.

LANI GUINIER, LIFT EVERY VOICE: TURNING A CIVIL RIGHTS SETBACK INTO A NEW VISION OF

SOCIAL JUSTICE (Michael Korda ed., 1998); MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION,
EXCLUSION AND AMERICAN LAW 310 (1990); LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER'S CANARY:
ENLISTING RACE, RESISTING POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY (Susan Wallace Boehmer & Kathleen

McDermott eds., Harvard Univ. Press 2003) [hereinafter GUINIER & TORRES, THE MINER'S CANARY];
Shannon Portillo, Social Equality and the Mobilization of the Law, 5 SOCIOL. COMPASS 949, 955 (2011).
47. Cummings, Turn in Law, supra note 8, at 363; see generally Michael J. Klarman, How Brown
ChangedRace Relations: The Backlash Thesis, 81 J. OF AM. HIST. 81 (1994); Michael J. Klarman, Brown
and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REV. 431 (2004).
48. One of the better-known examples of the empirical testing of courts' powers to affect societal
relations was Gerald Rosenberg's THE HOLLOW HOPE, see supra note 19. Its main thesis is that litigation
is an ineffective means to achieve social change in most instances; worse yet, litigation, at least the issueoriented litigation with which Rosenberg is mostly concerned, predictably, and all too often, actually
leads to results at odds with what the public interest lawyers leading it, or at least at odds with the interests
of the causes and movements those lawyers purport to represent. In particular, litigation is normally ineffective because courts have few implementation powers, even where they support change, and that support is often lacking because courts are inherently backward-looking institutions controlled by societal
elites. But litigation is counterproductive because (successful?) litigation generates backlashes and
because handing over the litigation reins to elite lawyers tends to suck the subversive energy from grassroots groups, while lawyers tend to divert social movements to issues the law will recognize rather than
those that drive movements from the start.
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result is that grassroots subversives get overlooked, their energies depleted,
and their authentic voices turned over to establishment-bound elites. 49
That doctrinal change doesn't correlate to changes on the ground wouldn't
come as a surprise to social movement activists, including: Wobblies at the turn
of the twentieth century; civil rights and anti-war activists at its midpoint; conservative leaders in that century's last quarter; and anti-global institutionalists at
the beginning of the twenty-first century. Each has loudly presaged suspicions
of the efficacy of litigation as the driving force for social change.50
Another critique is bottomed in writers' emphasis on major issue-oriented
cases before the Supreme Court; indeed, on cases that impinge upon major
public issue fissures in political and popular discourse.51 While a few legal
theorists might expect lower court issues to more predictably effect changes
demanded by logical extensions of legal doctrine,52 fewer lawyers struggling
on behalf of poor and marginalized clients would be surprised by academic
findings that Supreme Court victories rarely result in systemic change.53 And
49. The Constitutional law scholar Mark Graber, in a 2007 posting on the Balkanization blog, called
THE HOLLOw HOPE, "simply put, the most important work on law and the courts published in the last
quarter century." https://balkin.blogspot.com/search?q=hollow+hope (last accessed 3/12/2021). Reading
lists in political science or law cannot safely exclude the book or its standing challenge to the social
change possibilities in lawyering. Gerald Rosenberg has described initially strong opposition among
social sciences, but nothing like the reaction in the legal academy, where he remembers having casebooks
and even a garbage can thrown at him; "I had people screaming at me, interrupting, walking out,
slamming doors . . . . [t]he vehemence, it was really stunning." Interview with Gerald Rosenberg, in
PATRICK D. SCHMIDT & SIMON HALLIDAY, CONDUCTING LAW AND SOCIETY RESEARCH: REFLECTIONS ON
METHODS AND PRACTICES 10-171 (2009).

50. Compare Edward Rubin, Passing Through the Door: Social Movement Literature and Legal
Scholarship, 150 U. PA L. REv. 1 (2001); William Forbath, The Shaping of the American Labor
Movement, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1109 (1989); Cummings, Movement Lawyering, supra note 8, at 1668
(quoting Charles Hamilton Houston, "nobody needs to explain to a Negro the difference between the law
on the books and the law in action.") with Ashar, Movement Lawyers for ImmigrantRights, supra note
13, at 1500.
51. Tomasso Pavone, Beyond THE HOLLOW HOPE: The Promiseand Challenges of Studying Gradual
Social Change (2014), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/6463/9f39a818ea8267a23b7e637c52a598df1c75.
pdf [hereinafter Pavone, BEYOND THE HOLLOw HOPE].
52. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOw HOPE, supranote 19, at 427.
53. For example, various descriptions of United States landlord-tenant courts, and the outcomes of
the so-called revolution in tenants' rights, are found in: Steven Lubet, ProfessionalismRevisited, 42
EMORY L. J. 197 (1993) [hereinafter Lubet, ProfessionalismRevisited]; Mark H. Lazerson, In the Halls of
Justice the Only Justice is in the Halls, Richard Abel, POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE, VOLUME 1 122-26
(Academic Press 1982); Barbara Bezdeke, Silence in the Court: Participationand Subordinationof Poor
Tenants' Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REv. 533 (1992) [hereinafter Bezdeke, Silence in the
Court]; Gary Blasi, How Much Access? How Much Justice?, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 865 (2004); H.
Lawrence Ross, Housing Code Enforcement and Urban Decline, 6 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND
COMMUN. DEv. L. 29 (1996); David Nelkin, Legislation and Constraints: A Case Study of the 1965
British Rent Act, LEGAL SYSTEMS AND SOCIAL SYSTEMS 70-86 (Adam Podgorecki et al. eds., 1985);
Marilyn Miller Mosier & Richard A. Soble, Modern Legislation, Metropolitan Court, Miniscule Results:
A Study of Detroit'sLandlord-Tenant Court, 7 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 8 (1973); J. M. Fitzgerald, The
Contract Buyers League and the Courts: A Case Study of Poverty Litigation, 9 L. & SOC'Y REV. 165
(1974); Anthony J. Fusco, Nancy B. Collins, Julian R. Birnbaum, Chicago'sEviction Court: A Tenant's
Court of No Resort, 17 URB. L. ANN. 93 (1979); Irwin J. Nebron, & Allan Ides, Landlord-TenantCourt in
Los Angeles: Restructuringthe Justice System, 11 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 537 (1978); Leonard N. Cohen, The
New York City Housing Court:An Evaluation, 17 URB. L. ANN. 27 (1979); Mark C. Rutzick & Richard L.
Huffman The New York City Housing Court: Trial and Error in Housing Code Enforcement, 50 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 738 (1975); Carroll Seron et. al., The Impact of Legal Counsel on Outcomes for PoorTenants in
New York Housing Court:Results of a Randomized Experiment, 35 L. & SOC'Y REV. 419 (2001); Erica L.
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there is littler still beyond anecdotal study of the effectiveness (much less the
counter-mobilizing and/or resource-diverting differential) of coordinated
small case strategies of the kind advocated by some of our most systemicthinking social change lawyers.54
To the above-outlined critiques, we add one of our own. The efficacy of
lawyering for social change literature is largely concerned with progressive,
liberal, or radical left social causes. It is entirely possible that litigation is an
effective strategy for conservatives' or elites' favored causes." There are
good reasons to believe that might be so. They are exactly some of the commonly expressed reasons supporting contentions that courts are unlikely to be
effective forums for social change for marginalized groups: the backwardlooking predilection of law; its limited remedies; its elitism; and especially
its inability to address root causes of social issues. Conservative or reactionary causes might be furthered in litigation, even when the law is designed to
ruthlessly attack superficial problems, especially to the extent those problems
can be attributed to changes in existing social ordering. If that is so, there
might be creative and effective lawyering strategies to resist the traditional
litigation-based strategies of power-holding elites in the context of conservatives' favored causes. 56 Critiques of litigation for social change focus on
changes in government actions, 7 as we do in this Article. It might well be
that even if litigation is of limited efficacy in affecting government policies,
that litigation-or its threat-might have significantly more pull on private
corporate defendants and foundation funders.
Even with these legitimate and extensive critiques, we are mindful of the
many great and thoughtful lawyers who have devoted themselves to social

Fox, Alone in the Hallway: Challenges to Effective Self-Representation in Negotiation, 1 HARV.
NEGOTIATION L. REv. 85 (1996); Richard H. Chused, Saunders (A.KA. Javins) v. FirstNationalRealty
Corporation, 11 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 191 (2004); Russell Engler, Out of Sight and Out of
Line: The Need for Regulation of Lawyers' Negotiations with UnrepresentedPoorPersons, 85 CAL. L.
REv. 79 (1997); Steven Gunn, Eviction Defensefor PoorTenants: Costly Compassion or Justice Served?,
13 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 385 (1995). See 144 Woodruff Corp. v. Lacrete, 585 West N.Y. Supp. 2d 956,
960 (1992) (litigants in 400,000 cases filed yearly received less than five minute's attention each from the
Housing Court judges). For the most part, these studies were designed to show the gaps between law and
practice; between the law in action and the ideals of a particular statutory scheme. Although the authors
were not seeking out patterns, patterns emerge nevertheless as an unwelcome surprise. Ross observed
analogous dynamics in administrative enforcement of housing codes: discretion is guided not by formal
law, but by informal priorities, neighborhood contexts and resource availability. Ross, Housing Code
Enforcement and Urban Decline, supra.
54. Bellow, Turning Solutions into Problems,supra note 7, at 8-9. Deborah E. Anker, Legal Change
from the Bottom Up: The Development of GenderAsylum Jurisprudencein the United States, GENDER IN
REFUGEE LAw: FROM THE MARGINS TO THE CENTRE 46-73 (Efrat Arbel, et. al. eds., 2014).

55. See Stephen L. Carter, Do Courts Matter?, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1216, 1221 (1992) [hereinafter
Carter, Do Courts Matter?] (explaining that courts might not be effective agents for progressive social
change, but they can effectively block it). The role of movement lawyers, in this view, might be to defend
activists and forestall attacks on changes wrought elsewhere.
56. We plan to explore this tension by testing the immigrant rights advocacy strategies during the
Obama administration against those being utilized in the Trump Era in the third article of this series.
57. The focus of our case study is also on changes in government actions and policies, but we thought
it important to note the possibility of a distinction for conservative, corporate causes.
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change litigation5 8 and the social movement leaders who sought them out to
pursue litigation on behalf of social movements. 59 These critiques are not as
tautological as they might first appear. After all, generations of public interest
lawyers, inspired by Brown, have pursued public interest litigation on behalf
of social movements they dearly believe in and individuals and groups with
which they share deep commitments. These are lawyers who have been,
by and large, stewed in Critical Legal Studies' (CLS) critique of rights, and
through them Marxists' critiques, as well as that of twentieth-century
Realists. If such leaders, activists, and litigators, who were well-versed in the
dangers and limitations of legal remedy, continue to include litigation in their
repertoire of contention, who are we to disrupt?
The literature of social change lawyering moved to support well-wrought
critiques of rights talk and skepticism of legal institutions as loci of change
with cold empirical evidence. 60 While the litigation deck will always be
stacked against efforts at immediate social change, 61 many critics foresee that
litigation may be effective under certain limited circumstances. For example,
Rosenberg finds that social change through court action is possible where
established precedents exist for the remedies sought by plaintiffs and where
there is elite and popular support for the sought remedy. 62 However, in those
cases, it is likely that social change through other means would be available,
even inevitable. 63 Similarly, Cummings allows that litigation might be effective in circumstances in which individuals can monitor compliance with legal

58. Rosenberg, a conscientious reviewer who periodically responds to critics, himself notes this as
among the most common responses he receives from the legal academy. GERALD N. ROSENBERG,
Ideological Preferences and Hollow Hopes: Responding to Criticism HOLLOW HOPE, http://www.press.
uchicago.edu/books/rosenberg/index.html [https://perma.cc/C3BR-LHCW] (last visited Aug. 5, 2020).
Malcolm Feeley concurs, but would examine the source of such feelings to reveal the institutional drags
that inhibit change. Malcom M. Feeley, Hollow Hopes, Flypaperand Metaphors, 17 L. & SOC. INQUIRY
745, 757-58 (1992) [hereinafter Feeley, Hollow Hopes].
59. Richard Delgado, A Comment on Rosenberg's New Edition of The Hollow Hope, 103 Nw. U. L.
REV. COLLOQUY 147 (2008); Feeley, Hollow Hopes, supra note 58.
60. See generally ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOw HOPE, supra note 19, at 427 (supporting its thesis that
U.S. courts can almost never be effective producers of significant social reform through broad analysis of
the effects of key cases in civil rights, abortion, women's rights, and (briefly) to each of environmental litigation, reapportionment, and what he terms, "the reform of criminal law").
61.
See BARNES & BURKE, How POLICY SHAPES POLITICS, supra note 23.
62. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE, supra note 19, at 36. Professor Rosenberg, for example, posits
that litigation may well be an effective means to achieve social change where (1) there is established precedent for the social change enacting result; (2) there is support for that result among the elected branches;
(3) there is some public support for that result; and at least one of the following three factors are present:
(4) other (non-court) power holders offer positive incentives or are willing to impose costs to induce compliance with courts' directives; (5) when markets produce incentives or impose costs for compliance with
court directives; or (6) courts' roles are limited to providing protection to agents of change. Id.
63. Id. at 427 (Incorporating the object lesson of equal marriage litigation. Rosenberg, admittedly
before Windsor and Obergefell, but following the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decision in
Goodridge, was unmoved to alter the basic thesis of THE HOLLOW HOPE. State courts' affirmance of equal
marriage rights had not furthered such rights beyond what popular culture would demand, nor had it significantly impacted popular discourse on acceptance of GLBTQ issues or inspired more effective action
in support. Instead, equal marriage litigation created its own backlash, which was more intense and more
effective than the backlash that would have accompanied other means towards this social change).
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doctrine and little non-mechanical bureaucratic implementation is required.
Equal marriage is a contemporary example.6 4
More sophisticated research is required to measure the significant indirect
positive effects of court victories (or even defeats) such as opening policy
windows 65 to other issues or inspiring activists and grassroots members to
actions of other sorts. 66 McCann, for example, through extensive interviews
of activists and marginalized peoples affected by litigation, draws meaning
from litigation that sustains their efforts on other fronts.6 7 Similarly, Stephen
Carter bemoans ignoring the confidence-building effects of litigation (win or
lose?) on activists' fighting on most inhospitable terrain,68 no matter the array
of their repertoires of change. 69 Relatedly, some recoil at the assumption that
a linear causal analysis will reveal a single simple cause for any given-or
desired-institutional change. 70 The causal bundle for an identifiable change
is too fragmented, interrelated, and knotty to be untangled. The entirety of
the early body of literature provides a critical and necessary foundation to
academics that continue to explore questions of social change lawyering in
an ever-changing social and political context.
B.

Newer Models of Social Change Lawyering

As social and political realities shift so do articulated models of social
change lawyering. More recent literature on law and social change uses a
range of labels including, "movement lawyering," "liberal movement lawyering," "solidarity lawyering," "democratic lawyering," "demosprudence,"
"community lawyering," "cause lawyering," "rebellious lawyering," or simply lawyering for social change. 71 The literature regarding law and social
64.

See Scott L. Cummings, Law and Social Movements: An InterdisciplinaryAnalysis, HANDBOOK
&

OF SOC. MOVEMENTS ACROSS DISCIPLINES, HANDBOOKS OF SOCIO. AND SOC. RES. 253 (C. Roggeband

B. Klandermans eds., 2017).
See generally JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES AND PUBLIC POLICIES (2d ed. 1995).
66. Ashar, Movement Lawyersfor Immigrant Rights, supra note 13, at 1502 (noting how the combination of plenary powers over immigration policy, instability in support and legislative gridlock provided
an opening, as well as inducement, for immigrant activists to focus on local advocacy on ground level immigration enforcement).
67. See MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK, supra note 20.
68. Carter, Do Courts Matter?, supranote 55, at 1221.
65.

69.

SIDNEY TARROw, POWER IN MOVEMENT: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND CONTENTIOUS POLITICS (2d

&

ed. 1998) [hereinafter TARROw, POWER IN MOVEMENT].
70. McCann, Reform Litigation, supra note 12, at 727; Pavone, BEYOND THE HOLLOW HOPE, supra
note 51.
71. For some examples of terms used by academics to describe lawyering for social change, see "rebellious lawyering." See, e.g., GERALD P. LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF
PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992) [hereinafter LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING] (using rebellious lawyering as an example of a term used by academics to describe lawyering for social change); Cummings
Eagly, A CriticalReflection, supra note 5 (using "law and organizing"); Sameer M. Ashar, Law Clinics
and Collective Mobilization, 14 CLINICAL L. REV. 355 (2008) [hereinafter Ashar, Law Clinics and
Collective Mobilization];Scott Cummings, Mobilization Lawyering: Community Economic Development
in the Figueroa Corridor, 17 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 59 (2008) [hereinafter
Cummings, Mobilization Lawyering] (using "mobilization lawyering"); Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres,
Changing the Wind: Notes Toward a Demosprudence of Law and Social Movements, 123 YALE L. J. 2740
(2014); Ascanio Piomelli, The Challenge of Democratic Lawyering, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1383 (2009);
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change continues to evolve. The legal profession and legal education also
changed significantly in the past two decades. Most importantly, for our purposes, are increasing diversity among lawyers;73 the development, implementation, and assessment of new models of movement lawyering; the emphasis
on social movements in legal academia; and the spread of clinical legal education as a location for training and experimentation for the next generation
of social change lawyers. 74
For the most part, the visions of social change lawyering75 we briefly summarize here are not new. In subtle, but perhaps critical, respects, the newer
models that are being adopted today hold the potential to address, but not
nearly eliminate, the concerns regarding interference with autonomy and
inefficacy that plagued even the most innovative and movement-deferential
models for social change lawyering in the past. Concerns about lawyers being
part of social movements still exist. Handbooks for community organizers
frequently describe the ideal relationship between lawyers and organizers as
cautious, or simply, "don't." 76 Suspicion of lawyers' involvement in social
Ascanio Piomelli, Appreciating CollaborativeLawyering, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 427, 441-42 n.62, 442
nn.63, 66 (2000) [hereinafter Piomelli, Appreciating CollaborativeLawyering] ("political lawyering");
Lucie E. White, CollaborativeLawyering in the Field? On Mapping The Pathsfrom Rhetoric to Practice,
1 CLINICAL L. REV. 157 (1994) [hereinafter White, CollaborativeLawyering] (using "collaborative lawyering"); Cummings, Puzzle of Social Movements, supra note 8, at 1635-40 (using a variety of terms for
the same or similar model including "new movement lawyering," "legal mobilization," the approximately
similar "integrated lawyering" and, in essentially similar form, as a theory of legal practice, "movement
liberalism").
72. For example, Rosenberg's analysis of lawyering's relationship with social movements apparently
ended sometime in the mid-1980s. Citing few authors writing after that date about the nature of lawyering, most of Rosenberg's lawyering descriptions originated half a century or more ago. See ROSENBERG,
THE HOLLOw HOPE, supranote 19.
73. In relative terms, of course. There seems to be a much-too-slowly increasing diversity in the bar.
Am. Bar Assoc., PRESIDENTIAL INITIATIVE COMM'N ON DIVERSITY, PRESIDENTIAL DIVERSITY INITIATIVE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, RACE AND ETHNICITY, GENDER, SEXUAL ORIENTATION, DISABILITIES

(2010) (finding that while the profession has become more diverse there is still much work to be done);
DIVERSITY IN LAW FIRMS, U.S. EQUAL EMPL. OPP. COMM'N (2003) (examining the employment status of
women and minorities at law firms required to file EEO-1 reports); DIVERSITY IN PRACTICE: RACE,
GENDER, AND CLASS IN LEGAL AND PROFESSIONAL CAREERS (Spencer Headworth, et al., eds., 2016),

http://alliance-primo.hosted.exlibrisgroup.com/UW:gallagher:CP71243279920001451
(Expressions of
support for diversity are nearly ubiquitous among contemporary law firms and corporations.
Organizations back these rhetorical commitments with dedicated diversity staff and various diversity and
inclusion initiatives. Yet, the goal of proportionate representation for people of color and women remains
unrealized).
74. Cummings, Puzzle of Social Movements, supra note 8, at 1608; Cummings, Movement
Lawyering, supra note 8, at 1647; see Margaret Martin Barry, Jon C. Dubin & Peter A. Joy, Clinical
Educationfor This Millennium: The Third Wave, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 1 (2000).
75. See generally Karen Tokarz, Nancy L. Cook, Susan Brooks & Brenda Bratton Blom, New
Directions in Clinical Legal Education: Conversations on "Community Lawyering": The Newest
(Oldest) Wave in Clinical Legal Education, 28 WASH. U. J. L. & POL'Y 359 (2008) [hereinafter Tokarz et
al., Conversationson "Community Lawyering"].
76.
KIM BOBO & MARIEN CASILLAS PABELLON, THE WORKERS CENTER HANDBOOK: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE TO STARTING AND BUILDING THE NEW LABOR MOVEMENT 262 (2016) ("Historically, there are ten-

sions between lawyers and attorneys. Some attorneys, leaning too much to legal caution, have discouraged organizers from using a variety of legitimate tactics. Organizers, on the other hand, have accused
attorneys of disempowering workers, undermining organizing campaigns, siphoning off leaders, and
operating arrogantly towards workers and organizers. Sometimes these accusations have been accurate.").
Compare GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS, supranote 45, at 185 ("Such legal claims tend to be deeply
individual, dependent on a lawyer as an intermediary, tightly scripted in terms of how a client can behave
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issues goes beyond the threats, real or imagined, described previously.7 7
More fundamentally, lawyering may represent an existential threat to social
movements because of the difference in the stories that lawyers and organizers tell. Our so-called "lawyer's story" posits that many successful lawyers
are used to telling stories of individual clients that effectively reinforce the
established order, assuring powerholders that granting a client the relief she
seeks will only reinforce established hierarchies and privileges. 78 In what we
call "an organizer's story," social movement organizers habitually tell stories
that tie individuals' predicaments to the inevitable churning of existing orders
so that there is no way to relieve any member's problem without changing
the existing order. 79 Lawyers attack the most immediate and addressable
symptoms; organizers seek out root causes that are often least amenable to
change. 80
The newer social change lawyering model, in its various forms, seeks to
re-work lawyering relationships to halt the replication of power hierarchies
that have drawn communities to seek their help and to retell lawyering stories
through non-legal channels. The underpinnings for this model of social
change lawyering came in the 1970s from scholarship that focused on limiting the attorney's role and creating a client-centered approach to lawyering. 81
Lawyering to enhance social movements reached a zenith of sorts through
the law communes and movement lawyering of the 1960s, the Legal Services
Organization experiments in multi-dimensional advocacy, and early law
school clinics of the 1970s. The need to address perceived deficiencies of the
rights talk as a way to effectuate social change was a central motivating force
behind CLS and its progeny in the latter half of the twentieth century, including Critical Race Theory, Critical Class Theory, Queer Theory, and Feminist

&

and what she can demand, and limited in outcome to the law's definition of justice. Much of this is antithetical to organizing's belief in self-reliance and collective action.") with id. at 218-36 (Gordon's
descriptions of her creative use of lawyering in the service of organizing.) and with Lani Guinier
Gerald Torres, Changing the Wind: Notes Toward a Demosprudence of Law and Social Movements, 123
YALE L. J. 2740,2781-82 (2014) [hereinafter Guinier & Torres, Changing the Wind].
77. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOw HOPE, supra note 19, at 427 (arguing that lawyers may coopt the
most subversive elements of social movements; divert resources and issues to those most amenable to
legal process; or cause activists to turn over decision making to elite professionals); see also MICHAEL W.
MCCANN, LAW AND POLITICAL STRUGGLES FOR SOCIAL CHANGE: PUZZLES, PARADOXES, AND PROMISES
IN FUTURE RESEARCH, IN LEVERAGING THE LAW: USING COURTS TO ACHIEVE SOCIAL CHANGE

319-49

(David A. Schultz ed., 1998).
78.

AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW, supra note 32.

79. Ashar, Movement Lawyersfor ImmigrantRights, supra note 13, at 1498.
80. Id. at 1499.
81. See BELLOW & MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS, supra note 29, at 11-12 (asking students
to reflect on the appropriate role of the lawyer); see also DAVID A. BINDER & SUSAN C. PRICE, LEGAL
INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1977) (providing a "client-centered"
vision of lawyering that advocated for clients playing the central role in the representation and encouraged lawyers to enhance their interpersonal skills in order to engage in effective problem-solving with the
client); Cummings, Puzzle of Social Movements, supra note 8, at 1585-86 (explaining that in the 1970's
Stephen Wexler and Gary Bellow, among many others, were teaching us about deficiencies in litigation
as a tool for social change and advocating for experimentation in models of lawyering for grassroots bottom-up capacity building).
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Studies in the twenty-first century,82 and reactionary new Federalism academic movements of the 1980s.83 These disparate movements shared: skepticism of the determinative value of rights talk; skepticism of the efficacy of
law to effectuate social change; a critique of the authenticity of lawyering
voices on behalf of the poor and marginalized, and a commitment to making
the legal process accessible.8 4 This new model of lawyering seeped unevenly
into the academy through what Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres call
"demosprudence." 85
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, literature on lawyering for social change
was shepherded into the legal academy by scholars exploring the lawyering
relationship in the context of low-income or marginalized communities.
Anthony Alfieri, 86 Gerald Lopez, 87 and Lucie White 8 each contributed
greatly to a new conception of the lawyer-client relationship that did not perpetuate power hierarchies between lawyers and low-income, marginalized

82. KENNEDY, THE CRITIQUE OF RIGHTS, supra note 43, at 178-228 (explaining that even as scholars
writing in these post-CLS traditions turned on CLS's denunciation of rights talk, they recognized the important narrative force of rights talk to marginalized communities).
83. Cummings, Puzzle of Social Movements, supra note 8, at 1585-86; Cummings, Movement
Lawyering, supra note 8, at 1677 (explaining that in the United States, perhaps the real push for a movement-conducive lawyering began in earnest at the beginnings of the last century. It developed along with
Marxist notions of lawyering on behalf of peoples and was informed by Realist theorist-lawyers such as
Rodell, Cohen, and Frank, and reached its zenith of a sort through the law communes and movement lawyering of the 1960s, the Legal Services Organization innovations, law clinics of the 1970s and the Critical
Legal Studies and reactionary new Federalism academic movements of the 1980s).
84. Cummings, Puzzle of Social Movements, supra note 8, at 1697.
85. Guinier & Torres, Changing the Wind, supra note 76.
86. See Anthony V. Alfieri, The Antinomies of Poverty Law and a Theory of Dialogic Empowerment,
16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 659 (1988) [hereinafter Alfieri, Antinomies of Poverty Law]; Anthony
V. Alfieri, The Politics of Clinical Knowledge, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 7 (1990); Anthony V. Alfieri,
Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107 (1991)
[hereinafter Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice]; Anthony V. Alfieri, Speaking Out of Turn:
The Story of Josephine V., 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 619 (1991) [hereinafter Alfieri, Speaking Out of
Turn]; Anthony V. Alfieri, Stances, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1233 (1992) [hereinafter Alfieri, Stances];
Anthony V. Alfieri, Disabled Clients, Disabling Lawyers, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 769 (1992) [hereinafter
Alfieri, Disabled Clients]; Anthony V. Alfieri, Impoverished Practices, 81 GEO. L.J. 2567 (1993);
Anthony V. Alfieri, Practicing Community, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1747 (1994).
87. See Gerald P. Lbpez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1984); Gerald P. Lbpez, A
Declaration of War by Other Means, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1667 (1985); Gerald P. Lbpez, Reconceiving Civil
Rights Practice: Seven Weeks in the Life of a Rebellious Collaboration, 77 GEO. L.J. 1603 (1988); Gerald
P. L6pez, Training Future Lawyers to Work with the Politically and Socially Subordinated: Anti-Generic
Legal Education, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 305 (1989); Gerald P. Lbpez, The Work We Know So Little About,
42 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1989); LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING, supra note 71; Gerald P. Lopez, Economic
Development in the "Murder Capital of the Nation," 60 TENN. L. REv. 685 (1993); Gerald P. Lbpez, An
Aversion to Clients: Loving Humanity and Hating Human Beings, 31 HARV. C. R.-C. L. L. REv. 315
(1996).
88. See Lucie E. White, Mobilization on the Margins of the Lawsuit: Making Space for Clients to
Speak, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 535 (1988); Lucie E. White, To Learn and Teach: Lessons
from Driefontein on Lawyering and Power, 1988 WIs. L. REv. 699 (1988); Lucie E. White,
Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF.
L. REV. 1 (1990) [hereinafter White, Sunday Shoes]; Lucie E. White, Goldberg v. Kelly on the Paradox of
Lawyering for the Poor, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 861 (1990); Lucie E. White, Representing the "Real Deal,"
45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 271 (1990); Lucie E. White, Seeking ". . .The Faces of Otherness...": A Response
to Professors Sarat, Felstiner, and Cahn, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1499 (1992); Lucie E. White, Paradox,
Piece-Work, and Patience, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 853 (1992); White, Collaborative Lawyering, supra note
71.

2021]

AN

INNOVATIVE APPROACH TO MOVEMENT LAWYERING

451

clients. Instead of seeing clients as victims that are helpless and subordinate,
these new models of lawyering focused on ways to involve clients as partners
in problem-solving and to encourage clients' participation in individual and
collective efforts to improve their situations. 89 This vision for lawyering is
not without critics who find the work to be: inaccessible to those unfamiliar
with postmodern theory; 90 unlikely to persuade lawyers to adopt new models
of practice given the critical description of their current practices; 91 focused
on small-scale, one-on-one interactions between individual lawyers and individual clients;9 2 and inappreciative of the structural and institutional explanation of clients' oppression outside of the lawyer-client relationship. 93 But
scholars continue to push back on these critiques 94 and refine what it means
to engage in social change lawyering. 95

&

89. See Piomelli, AppreciatingCollaborativeLawyering, supra note 71 (noting that "[t]hese scholars
also share certain conceptions of the nature of power. Influenced by Michel Foucault, they do not view
power as a static resource that some have and others completely lack. Rather, they conceive of power as a
shifting dynamic acted out in relationships.").
90. See Gary Blasi, What's a Theory For? Notes on ReconstructingPoverty Law Scholarship, 48 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 1063, 1074 n.29 (1994) [hereinafter Blasi, What's a Theory For?] (stating, "[t]he import
of this discourse is often buried in a prose that seems to value most highly subtlety, nuance, suggestion,
gesture, and indirect reference to other even more obscure works. Like much of legal scholarship, it seems
mainly designed to impress other scholars .... That tendency is amplified in this particular genre by the
inaccessibility of the work of those masters of postmodern thought upon which it draws.").
91. See Blasi, What's a Theory For?, supra note 90, at 1088-89 (describing a focus on the practice
of others that mirrors the stance the scholars accuse lawyers of adopting toward less powerful clients).
92. See Joel F. Handler, Postmodernism, Protest, and the New Social Movements, 26 L. & SOC'Y
REV. 697, 715, 724 (1992) (finding that the stories told by postmodernists are about individuals, engaging
in very small acts of defiance where very little of consequence, outside of that individual, happens);
William H. Simon, The Dark Secret of ProgressiveLawyering: A Comment on Poverty Law Scholarship
in the Post-Modern, Post-ReaganEra, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1099, 1099-1100 (1994) (finding that the
scale of practice is typically small often one on one and the benefits are often as much psychological
as they are material).
93. See Blasi, What's a Theory For?,supra note 90, at 1091 (arguing that avoidance of structuralist
explanations dooms effective progress of systemic issues).
94. See Ascanio Piomelli, The Democratic Roots of CollaborativeLawyering, 12 CLINICAL L. REV.
541, 546 (2006) [hereinafter Piomelli, Democratic Roots] (explaining that those who view collaborative
lawyering through the postmodernist label fail to "accentuate the core values and vision driving this lawyering. Indeed, the link to postmodernism has contributed to widespread misunderstanding and underappreciation of this approach to practice.").
95. For thoughtful contributions and discussions of community lawyering and its challenges, see
Susan D. Bennett, On Long-Haul Lawyering, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 771 (1997); Michael Diamond
Aaron O'Toole, Leaders, Followers, and Free Riders: The Community Lawyer's Dilemma When
RepresentingNon-Democratic Client Organizations,31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 481 (2004); Christine Zuni
Cruz, [On The] Road Back in: Community Lawyering in Indigenous Communities, 5 CLINICAL L. REV.
557, 568 (1999); Michael Diamond, Community Lawyering: Revisiting the Old Neighborhood, 32
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 67, 67 (2000); Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental
Protection: The Need for Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619 (1992); Luke W. Cole,
Macho Law Brains, Public Citizens, and GrassrootsActivists: Three Models ofEnvironmental Advocacy,
14

VA. ENVTL.

L.J.

687

(1995);

LUKE COLE

&

SHEILA

FOSTER, FROM

THE

GROUND

UP

ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM AND THE RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT (Richard Delgado
& Jean Stefancic eds., 2001); JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS, supra note 45; Gordon, We

Make the Road, supra note 21; Shauna I. Marshall, Mission Impossible?: EthicalCommunity Lawyering,
7 CLINICAL L. REV. 147 (2000); Dean Hill Rivkin, Lawyering, Power, and Reform: The Legal Campaign
to Abolish the Broad Form Mineral Deed, 66 TENN. L. REV. 467 (1999); Louise G. Trubek, Critical
Lawyering: Toward a New Public Interest Practice, 1 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 49 (1991); Louise G. Trubek,
Embedded Practices:Lawyers, Clients, and Social Change, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 415 (1996);
Alfieri, Antinomies of Poverty Law, supra note 86; Alfieri, Disabled Clients, supra note 86; Alfieri,
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Newer critiques of lawyering's efficacy include implementation barriers,
channeling concerns to those most amenable to judicial decision making,
storying in inauthentic voices, and deferral to elites coupled with a resulting
failure to identify and foster community leaders. 96 Newer critiques of lawyering's accountability problems include lawyerly domination of clients and
groups that privilege certain voices within diverse social movements.
More recent social change lawyering scholarship purports to address these
concerns by adjusting lawyering roles to the social movement's needs. These
conceptions of "movement lawyering" explore multimodal problem solving
as one small part of a social movement, one wary of the threat of legalism,
respectful of the power of social movements, and committed to seeing the
real change demanded by social movements affected on the ground. 97
The "movement lawyering" approach to practice encourages lawyers to
work collaboratively, or obediently, with low-income, marginalized, and ofcolor communities and clients, to effectuate social change and to avoid the
type of subordinating relationships that clients are asking lawyers to help
combat. 98 While this approach has been explored in many different contexts, 99 nowhere has the "movement lawyering" model taken hold more
strongly in recent years than among lawyers for irregular migrant
communities.'
Reconstructive Poverty Law, supra note 86; Alfieri, Speaking Out of Turn, supra note 86; Alfieri,
Stances, supra note 86.
96. See Guinier & Torres, Changing the Wind, supra note 76, at 2756; see also Ashar, Movement
Lawyersfor Immigrant Rights, supranote 13, at 1497.
97. See Scott L. Cummings, Law and Social Movements: An Interdisciplinary Analysis, in
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS ACROSS DISCIPLINES, HANDBOOKS OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL

RESEARCH 233 (Conny Roggeband & Bert Klandermans, eds., 2017); Scott L. Cummings, The Social
Movement Turn in Law, 43 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 360 (2018); Renee Hatcher, Solidarity Economy
Lawyering, 8 TENN. J. OF RACE, GENDER, & SOC. JUST. 23 (2019); Ashar, Movement Lawyers for
ImmigrantRights, supra note 13.
98. See Piomelli, Democratic Roots, supra note 94, at 547-48 (2006) (identifying that "[c]ollaborative lawyers have two key inter-related aims for their work with lower-income clients. One, highlighted
through a postmodernist lens, is to avoid re-enacting the very sort of subordinating relations clients seek
help in combating. The second goal, which is not as readily accentuated by a postmodernist frame, is to
encourage collective action in which lawyers, clients, community groups, and other allies work together,
in legal, political, social, and other spheres, to change social conditions.").
99. See Bellow, Turning Solutions into Problems, supra note 7 (advocating for attorneys to undergo
self-scrutiny to identify troubling patters; enhance client education and participation; and be more explicitly political to address inequality); Cummings & Eagly, A Critical Reflection, supra note 5 (identifying
practical difficulties with the law and organizing movement and calling for additional research);
Cummings, Mobilization Lawyering, supra note 71 (describing the role of lawyers in a context where
community economic development principles were applied and experimented with); Tokarz et al.,
Conversations on "Community Lawyering," supra note 75, at 363-65 (identifying the core principles of
community lawyering as "first, community lawyering involves formal or informal collaborations with client communities and community groups to identify and address client community issues.... Second,
community lawyering clinics are focused on empowering communities, promoting economic and social
justice, and fostering systemic change .... Third, the work of community lawyering clinics involves collaborative, and frequently interdisciplinary practice.").
100. See GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS, supra note 45; Gordon, We Make the Road, supra note
21 (finding that individual lawsuits did little to correct systemic issues and in response designed a clinic
that included community outreach and education program on workers' rights; grassroots organizing and
worker participation in exchange for help from the organization); Ashar, Law Clinics, supra note 71
(advocating for grassroots organizations made up of poor and working class people to act to oppose
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Cummings locates this innovation in lawyering within social movements
as a natural professional and academic response to lawyers' coming of age in
the political and legal environment of the Obama Era, 101 and defines the elements of this "new movement lawyering" to include: (1) a critical view of the
role of law and lawyers in moving social change; (2) multidimensional
problem-solving strategies aided by newer technologies; 1 2 (3) appreciation
of distributed control mechanisms for change and legal skills fashioned in
response; (4) effecting mobilization of legal rules, institutions and roles both
inside and outside of traditional legal forums; and (5) deliberately planned
and interconnected advocacy by role-cognizant lawyers who are accountable
to marginalized constituencies. Ideally, this will build power in marginalized
communities to produce and sustain social change goals as the community
defines them.

3

Betty Hung similarly defines this new type of "movement

lawyering" as "the building and exercise of collective power, by those most
10 4
directly impacted, to achieve systemic institutional and cultural change."
Sameer Ashar frames "movement lawyering" in terms of its reliance on
"legal tactics that emphasize the development of grassroots and activist
105
agency in justice campaigns."'
These incipient typologies of instances in which lawyering promises real,
progressive advances seem both limited and more amenable to after-the-fact
justification than a real aid to social movements considering legal action. One
of the more telling critiques of both the litigation inefficacy and lawyer disempowerment literature is the persistent failure to ask, much less rigorously
test, "compared to what?"'106 How do other tools for social change-such as
lobbying (for legislative or administrative changes), electoral strategies,
direct action, social entrepreneurship, playing the media, or mass social
movements-compare to litigation? Many skeptics of lawyers' role in effecting change merely assume that social movements, generously defined, are
the obvious alternative to traditional lawyering as a medium for social change
neoliberalism and focus on local action while thinking globally); Ashar, PublicInterest Lawyers, supra
note 21; Muneer I. Ahmad, Interpreting Communities: Lawyering Across Language Difference, 54
UCLA L. REv. 999 (2007); Brenda Montes, A For-ProfitRebellious Immigration Practice in East Los
Angeles, 23 CLINICAL L. REv. 707 (2017) (confronting the challenge of rebellious lawyering in the forprofit immigration world by injecting empathy into collaboration with clients); Bill Ong Hing,
Contemplating a Rebellious Approach to Representing Unaccompanied Immigrant Children in a
Deportation Defense Clinic, 23 CLINICAL L. REv. 167 (2016) (identifying seven principles that helps
Hing practice rebellious lawyering with students).
101. See Ashar, Movement Lawyers for ImmigrantRights, supra note 13, at 1497 (attributing the ascendancy of a new form of movement lawyering in the immigrant rights community to the political environment of the late Obama Era in which immigration policy change, wrought large, had stalled, a
politically vulnerable population was at risk from largely unpublicized locally centered enforcement
actions).
102. See Cummings, Movement Lawyering, supra note 8, at 1652.
103. Id. at 1690.
104. Betty Hung, Movement Lawyering as Rebellious Lawyering: Advocating with Love, Humility
and Courage, 23 CLINICAL L. REv. 663, 664 (2017).
105. Ashar, Movement Lawyers for ImmigrantRights, supranote 13, at 1497
106. See McCann, Reform Litigation, supra note 12, at 727; see also Burke & Barnes, Empirical
Literatureon Rights, supra note 12, at 74-75; Bagenstos, Social ChangeLitigation, supra note 12.
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for marginalized groups. 107 A notable exception is Cummings, who raises the
question of whether litigation is any more ineffective in producing social
change, inspires greater backlash, diverts more resources from other strategies, or is less respectful of, or accountable to, marginalized groups than its
available alternatives. 108 Other critics generally assume that legal strategies
face barriers, such as entrenched legal bureaucracies, costs, deferral to elite
decision-making, and loss of control over framing and agendas to legal
experts-problems that do not burden many other strategies. 109 However,
these early critics fail to rigidly define alternatives to traditional legal strategies. To explore the "compared to what" question, we designed a case study
around the campaign against S-Comm, which employed many alternatives to
traditional lawyering.
II.

THE RISE AND FALL OF S-COMM AS AN EFFECTIVE CASE STUDY

The choice of the means and object of our study is no less an operationalization of-or at least influenced by-our shared conceptions of how lawyers
engage with others in campaigns to effectuate social change. The S-Comm
case study provides us a rare opportunity to conduct an in-depth exploration
of one campaign that engaged lawyers, organizers, activists, clients, federal,
state, and local government officials, law enforcement officers, foundation
funders, and social scientists. Social movement theory instructs us to attend
to how mass social movements translate activism into institutional change,
the importance of rights talk as a vehicle for translating contention from the
language of excluded groups into change in societal institutions and roles,
and the courts as a forum to frame discourse to make societies' institutions
listen. 1 0
This case study presents us with an example in which law and lawyers
were but one piece of a larger strategy to effectuate change. We do not purport to use this case study to identify the cause and effect of different lawyering actions."1 Instead, through interviews, the examination of internal

107. CompareCummings, FoundationalCritiques,supra note 8, at 1994-2005 (comparing litigation
alleged deficiencies with other tactics, often finding little proof of any differential between the-admittedly small impact of litigation on producing social change, engendering backlash, resolving intragroup conflicts or diverting resources and subversive energies, with that of social movements) with Karen
J Pita Loor, A Study on Immigrant Activism, Secure Communities and Rawlsian Civil Disobedience, 100
MARQ. L. REV. 565 (2016) (speculating that marches and sit-ins by organized social movement actors
motivated both litigation and the eventual demise of S-Comm).
108. See Cummings, FoundationalCritiques,supra note 8, at 1994-2009.
109. Id. See generally ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOw HOPE, supra note 19.
110. TARROW, POwER IN MOVEMENT, supra note 69; McCann, Reform Litigation, supra note 12, at
733-34. See generally JACKIE SMITH AND DAWN WEIST, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN THE WORLD-SYSTEM:
THE POLITICS OF CRISIS AND TRANSFORMATION (2012).

111. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK, supra note 20, at 11 (relying on Althusser who "implied by his important but misleadingly labelled argument about the 'overdetermination' of revolution: that every radical
movement is unique product of myriad factors whose exact development is impossible to determine in
advance" and stating "it is important to remember that social action is generated out of ever-changing
processes of human conceptualization. Even if contextual complexity could be fully accounted for by
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government documents disclosed as a result of FOIA litigation, an analysis
of mainstream media, and the examination of court decisions and transcripts,
we identify a new approach to movement lawyering and articulate a preliminary theory arising from this case study.
The campaign against S-Comm is a particularly well-suited vehicle to
explore the question of the lawyer's role in social movements. First, unlike
long-standing politically volatile issues such as desegregation, abortion, or
equal marriage, this Article utilizes a discrete but impactful federal immigration enforcement program that was never addressed by the Supreme Court1 1 2
and never became the subject of wide public discourse. Most studies of lawyering's impacts on doctrinal, social and/or cultural change focus on messy,
longstanding, very public issues of subordination in which it is very challenging to tease out the role of lawyers. Were social or cultural changes the product of longer-term social dynamics quite separate from any identified legal
strategy? To what extent did the resources of time, money, political capital,
or public attention get expended or replenished by instances or combinations
of litigation, public action, organizing, political strategy, administrative advocacy, or education campaigns? Debates over S-Comm, while very intense,
were largely limited to relatively discrete political communities: law enforcement, state and local government leaders, immigrants, immigrant advocacy
organizations, and limited Nativists groups. Because of this limited reach, the
case study allows for the identification of the relevant actors to interview and
permits us to get a more accurate understanding of the entire campaign.
Second, the case study allows us to examine the critiques of lawyers as
agents of social change that we identify in Part I because lawyers were
involved in multi-modal coordinated campaigns in which they used litigation, direct action, media, and organizing efforts to challenge S-Comm. In
collaboration with lawyers, organizers adopted a (trans)local strategy
designed to enlist support from state and local politicians and law enforcement authorities to opt out of participation. The wide array of tools used in
the S-Comm campaign and the close relationship between lawyers, organizers, and activists, permit us to explore the multitude of ways lawyers can
engage with organizers and activists to effect social change.
Finally, the case study involves a single, discrete policy initiative allaying
some concerns over the difficulties of specifying winners and losers based on

social scientists (which it cannot), future subjects will inevitably act from understandings of their situation different from those available to us in the present.").
112. While legal efficacy critics tend to assume that data regarding seminal Supreme Court decisions
extend at least as far as lower federal and state court decisions, there may be good reasons to expect that
different possibilities for change exist at more local or accessible bureaucratic levels. In particular, with
ground-level, relatively unpublicized decisions there might well be more amenability to exploit or convince sympathetic power holders, greater ability to monitor effects, larger possibilities to translate community concerns into the language of bureaucratic change, and greater potential to bring matters to public
consciousness so as to construct or impact both the narrative of public discourse and that held by movement activists themselves.
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the diffuse effects of policy consequences." 3 Even though the policy initiative is discrete, the program was the subject of concerted organizing, political
action, community education, and litigation. In addition, the policy at issue
was directed and implemented by a central command structure whose internal communications at critical junctures are available through government
documents released as a result of the FOIA litigation. But that central command was vulnerable to local law enforcement and dispersed activists as the
consequences of the S-Comm policy-including the apprehension, detention,
and deportation of those identified-implicated local agency cooperation. 1 4
III.

THE IMMIGRANT RIGHTS LANDSCAPE PRIOR TO S-COMM

The story of S-Comm's rise and fall is only a piece of the larger, longstanding, and ongoing struggle for immigrant rights. To understand the strategic decisions made and actions taken by advocates in the campaign to
dismantle S-Comm, it is critical to contextualize S-Comm within the larger
immigrant rights movement.
A.

The Local/NationalFight Over Immigration

As perceptions of rising crime rates during the 1990s and September 11,
2001, linked immigration to national security, the federal government reasserted its traditional authority over immigration and citizenship through a series of legislative and administrative changes." 5 In 1996, the Clinton
administration began this push with the passage of the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) which allocated more
resources to enforcement, expedited deportation procedures, restricted judicial discretion during removal proceedings, reduced possibilities for appeals,
and expanded the list of deportable offenses. 116 That same year, Congress
passed, and President Clinton signed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act (AEDPA)," 7 adding provisions that enhanced the country's ability to "detect and remove immigrants while restricting judicial review."'118
Following this lead, the Bush administration used the newly-created DHS to
expand the geographic and temporal area for expedited removals to all
unlawful entrants found within 100 miles of the border, within 14 days of

113. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK, supra note 20, at 186.
114. Ashar, Movement Lawyers for ImmigrantRights, supranote 13, at 1502.
115. Philip Martin, Proposition 187 in California, 29 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 255 (1995) (describing
California Proposition 187, the "Save Our State" (SOS) initiative).
116. WALTER J. NICHOLLS, THE IMMIGRANT RIGHTS MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE OVER NATIONAL
CITIZENSHIP 112 (2019) [hereinafter NICHOLLS, IMMIGRANT RIGHTS MOVEMENT].

117. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, S. 735, 104th Cong. (1996) (expanding
the offenses that could be considered as a basis "aggravated offenses" even if not felonies).
118.

See NICHOLLS, IMMIGRANT

RIGHTS MOVEMENT,

supra note 116, at 113 (explaining that

President Clinton's impact on the lives of immigrants also included the passage of the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) that restricted the receipt of public
assistance to undocumented immigrants).
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entry into the country, leaving this class of immigrants no practical way to
contest their removal in court. 119
In an attempt to expand enforcement resources, the IIRIRA created 287(g), a
program that gives local police the ability to interview individuals to determine
their immigration status, search for and enter data into the U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement's (ICE) database, and issue ICE detainers permitting
local law enforcement to hold a person for ICE pick up.120 The 287(g) program
is voluntary, requires state or local agencies to enter into agreements to participate, and mandates local police training before implementation. 12 1 While
the 287(g) program was designed to target undocumented individuals
accused of "violent crimes, human smuggling, gang/organized crime activity, sexual offenses, narcotics smuggling, and money laundering," 12 2 the program led to racial profiling, civil rights violations, isolation of immigrant
communities, and family separation-consequences that have largely been
attributed to a lack of adequate training, oversight, or an institutional mission
that otherwise might have avoided these dire results.1 23
119. Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. 48,877, 48,880 (Aug. 11, 2004). In
July 2019, the Trump administration's DHS issued notice of regulations further expanding the reach of
expedited removal to anyone found anywhere in the country who could not show that they had entered
the country more than two years ago. See Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 84 Fed. Reg.
35,409 (July 23, 2019). That regulation, expanding the scope of expedited removal to the full extent
allowed under the Clinton Era AEDPA, is as of this writing enjoined by Federal Court Order. Make the
Rd. New York v. Wolf, 962 F.3d 612 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
120. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-828, at 16-17 (1996) (amending the INA to add § 287(g) which allows
local law enforcement officials to be deputized as immigration enforcement officials after training and for
issuance of detainers to hold a person up to 48 hours after they are lawfully eligible for release in order to
allow ICE to pick up individuals and transport them to detention centers); see also NICHOLLS, IMMIGRANT
RIGHTS MOVEMENT, supra note 116, at 116.
121. Immigration & Nationality Act § 287(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (authorizes the Director of ICE to
enter into agreements with state and local law enforcement agencies, that permit designated officers to
perform limited immigration law enforcement functions). Agreements under § 287(g) require the local
law enforcement officers to receive appropriate training and function under the supervision of ICE. See
U.S.

IMMIGR.

AND CUSTOMS

ENF'T, DELEGATION

OF

IMMIGRATION AUTHORITY

SECTION 287(G)

IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT (2021).

122. See Randy Capps, Marc R. Rosenblum, Cristina Rodriguez & Muzaffar Chishti, Delegation
and Divergence: A Study of 287(g) State and Local Immigration Enforcement, MIGRATION POL'Y INST.
(2011), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/287g-divergence.pdf.
123. Id.CAPPS ET AL., DELEGATION AND DIVERGENCE (explaining that studies find about half of immigration detainers used in 287(g) jurisdictions were for people arrested in connection with only misdemeanors and
traffic violations). Further study found that when local police operate under 287(g) agreements, they are more
likely to stop and harass Latinx residences, leaving immigrants to withdraw from their communities and move
away from using police to protect the community. See N.Y. OFFICE OF THE ATT'Y GEN., OFFICE OF THE
ATT'Y. GEN. OF CAL., OFFICE OF THE ATT'Y GEN. OF D.C., STATE OF OR. OFFICE OF THE AT'Y GEN., STATE
OF R.I. OFFICE OF THE ATT'Y GEN., & WASH. STATE OFFICE OF THE ATT'Y GEN., SETTING THE RECORD
STRAIGHT ON LOCAL INVOLVEMENT IN FEDERAL CIVIL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: THE FACTS AND THE

LAw 13 (2017) https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/setting the recordstraight.pdf [https://perma.cc/85UW6QVS] [hereinafter ICE, Setting the Record Straight] (finding that "State and local governments and LEAs are
closer to the communities they serve than the federal government and thus are in a better position to assess the
needs of those communities, including how best to use their limited resources to ensure public safety. These
assessments include determining how and when to become involved in federal civil immigration enforcement,
as permitted by law, and how to build the trust of immigrants in their communities to ensure that victims and
witnesses come forward to report crimes."); see also Nik Theodore, DEP'T OF URBAN PLANNING & POLICY, U.
OF ILL. CHI., INSECURE COMMUNITIES: LATINO PERCEPTIONS OF POLICE INVOLVEMENT IN IMMIGRATION ENF'T

(2013), https://greatcities.uic.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Insecure_CommunitiesReportFINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3M7L-3HYQ].
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In the early 2000s, it was widely recognized that the immigration system
needed repair. Upon election in 2001, President Bush began high-level talks
with the President of Mexico, seeking broad-scale immigration reform opportunities." These talks were abruptly impeded by the September 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks on the United States. With an emerging and overwhelming
narrative that linked terrorism to immigrants,1 25 the federal government funneled tremendous resources into immigration enforcement and passed laws
to detect, detain, and deport unauthorized immigrants. 126
Conversations about immigration, including the potential for
21
moved to the forefront of
Comprehensive Immigration Reform (CIR),2

the national dialogue. Nativist issue entrepreneurs like Kris Kobach and
Sheriff Joe Arpaio were staunchly pushing enforcement-only measures.
In 2005, a federal-enforcement-only-bill in Congress, sponsored by
Wisconsin Representative James Sensenbrenner, led to what were, at the
time, the largest public demonstrations in the country's history. 1 2
Importantly, the demonstrations were generated and, in most instances, led
by impacted individuals, including many who were at risk of deportation. 129
Discussions around CIR focused on policy trade-offs requiring stricter
enforcement in exchange for limited legalization. In 2006 and 2007, the
Senate considered proposals that provided a limited path to legalization
for undocumented immigrants along with increased criminal penalties
for unlawful immigration, stricter employer verification requirements,
and the development of physical barriers to entry at the U.S.-Mexico
border. 130
For advocates working with day laborers, 2007 provided the stark realization that all proposals for amnesty excluded and criminalized day laborers, as

124.
125.

See NICHOLLS, IMMIGRANT RIGHTS MOVEMENT, supra note 116, at 114.
See NICHOLLS, IMMIGRANT RIGHTS MOVEMENT, supra note 116, at 115.

See NICHOLLS, IMMIGRANT RIGHTS MOVEMENT, supra note 116, at 115-16.
127. David A. Super, The Future of U.S. ImmigrationLaw, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 509, 521 (2019)
(explaining that while CIR is used as a term of art, "no consensus exists as to what it means.").
128. Kathryn Hoban, The Emergence and Obstacles of the Immigrant Rights Movement, ADVOC. F.,
2008, at 1-2.
126.

129.

DANIEL DENVIR, ALL-AMERICAN NATIVISM: HOW THE BI-PARTISAN WAR ON IMMIGRANTS

EXPLAINS POLITICS AS WE KNOW IT 189-191 (2020) [hereinafter DENVIR, ALL-AMERICAN NATIVISM]

(explaining that soon thereafter, in December 2006, the Bush administration conducted the largest work
site raids in the country's history); Leo R. Chavez, THE LATINO THREAT: CONSTRUCTING IMMIGRANTS,

CITIZENS, AND THE NATION 152-75 (Stanford Univ. Press 2d ed. 2013).
130. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act, S. 2611, 109th Cong. (2006) (sponsored by Sen.
Arlen Specter); Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act, S. 1348, 110th Cong. (2007) (sponsored by
Sen. Harry Reid). Efforts for immigration reform were attempted the year prior in 2005; see also
Comprehensive Enforcement and Immigration Reform Act, S. 1438, 109th Cong. (2005) (co-sponsored
by Sens. John Cornyn and Jon Kyl); Secure America and Orderly Immigration Act, S. 1033, 109th Cong.
(2005) (co-sponsored by Sens. John McCain and Ted Kennedy). For an interesting analysis of the "crimmigration complex" in the context of comprehensive immigration reform attempts see Mary Fan, The
Casefor CrimmigrationReform, 92 N.C. L. REV. 75 (2013).
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did many local initiatives.131 Realizing that day laborers had bigger concerns
than a possible amnesty bill, advocates for this community focused their concerns on the ways police and sheriffs engaged in immigration enforcement.132
Day laborer advocates were acutely aware that "if police have the power to
act as immigration officials, then they [will] be able to disappear our street
corners." 133 In response, the National Day Laborers Organizing Network
(NDLON) decided to prioritize the fight against devolved immigration
enforcement, which at that time was being played out through 287(g) and the
proposed CLEAR Act of 2007.134
Debates over immigration were increasingly polarizing. Anti-immigrant
sentiment grew in localities where community members perceived a lack of
federal enforcement at the border and an ever-growing population of unlawful entrants into the country.1 3 5 In some localities, this anger and animosity
toward immigrants manifested itself in state and local initiatives designed to
take control of immigration in the absence of federal action. 136 Sheriff Joe
Arpaio of Maricopa Country, Arizona, became the lightning rod and epicenter of the local government anti-immigration cause, as he "diverted resources
away from basic law-enforcement functions to highly publicized immigration
sweeps." 137

Fearing that Arizona's anti-immigration sentiment would spread, 138
NDLON sought to disentangle police from immigration enforcement by

131. Interview 2 with Jordan, Attorney, Non-Profit Immigrant Workers' Rights Organization (Sept.
10, 2019) (transcript on file with authors) [hereinafter Interview 2 with Jordan].
132. Id.
133. Interview with Blake, Immigrant Rights Community Organizer (Nov. 4, 2019) (transcript on
file with authors) [hereinafter Interview with Blake].
134. CLEAR Act, H.R. 842, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007) (the Clear Law Enforcement for Criminal Alien
Removal (CLEAR) Act of 2007 proposed that: state and local law enforcement had inherent authority to
investigate, apprehend, or transfer to federal custody aliens in the United States in order to assist in the
enforcement of U.S. immigration laws; and that states that prohibited such law enforcement assistance
would be denied some federal money).
135.

DENVIR, ALL-AMERICAN NATIVISM, supranote 129, at 203-21.

136.
AM. IMMIGR. LAWYERS ASSOC'N, NAVIGATING THE IMMIGRATION DEBATE: A GUIDE FOR STATE
AND LOCAL POLICYMAKERS AND ADVOCATES 1-7 (2009).

137. William Finnegan, Sheriff Joe, THE NEW YORKER, July 20, 2009, https://www.newyorker.com/
magazine/2009/07/20/sheriff-joe [hereinafter Finnegan, Sheriff Joe] (Arpaio is an outspoken antiimmigrant champion who advocated for some of the most restrictive actions against immigrants in the
country); Clint Bolick, Mission Unaccomplished: The Misplaced Priorities of the Maricopa County
Sheriff's Office, THE GOLDWATER INST. (Dec. 2, 2008), https://goldwaterinstitute.org/wp-content/
uploads/2019/02/Mission-Unaccomplished-Misplaced-Priorities-of-the-Maricopa-County-Sheriff%E2%
80%99s-Office.pdf [https://perma.cc/AC3D-4DJG] (finding that at the same time resources were
increased to target immigrants, Sheriff Arpaio's deputies failed to investigate 400 sex crimes that
occurred during his time as sheriff between 2005 and 2007. Between 2007 and 2008, the Maricopa
County Sheriff's Office had a total of 77,949 outstanding warrants, including 42,297 felony warrants,
because the sheriff's office prioritized immigration enforcement over other law enforcement efforts).
138. Interview with Blake, supra note 133. The roots laid by Arpaio locally, took hold on a statewide level in April 2010 with the passage of Arizona Senate Bill 1070, Support Our Law Enforcement
and Safe Neighborhoods Act: the broadest and strictest anti-immigration measure passed by a state. The
law was to go into effect on July 29, 2010, but legal challenges sought to enjoin its implementation,
including a challenge filed by the United States Department of Justice. On June 2012, the U.S. Supreme
Court upheld the provision requiring immigration status checks during law enforcement stops but struck
down three other provisions finding that they violated the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.

GEORGETOWN

460

IMMIGRATION LAW

JOURNAL

[Vol. 35:431

engaging and persuading sheriffs and police. In a series of strategic moves
that would reap benefits in the long run, NDLON capitalized on connections
with a former immigrant rights lawyer turned Ford Foundation Officer, working with the National Police Foundation Project. 139 As an initial step,
NDLON's Executive Director, Pablo Alvarado, was placed on the advisory
board of the Police Foundation Project. 14 0 In 2008, NDLON advocates participated in the Police Foundation 14 1 conference that brought together law
enforcement agencies, policymakers, academics, and community stakeholders to work collaboratively on the implications of local law enforcement of
immigration laws. 142

Local law enforcement opposed taking on immigration enforcement for
two reasons: it ultimately undermined community safety as immigrants did
not provide information or seek assistance from the police, and local police
did not want the burden of utilizing discretion to decide who would stay or
go. 143 The large majority of sheriffs were in favor of local enforcement of immigration laws. 14 4 Unlike police, sheriffs were focused on finances and the
need to "fill the beds." 145 This striking contrast was illuminated during a particularly memorable conference exchange between the Police Chief from
Sacramento, Arturo Venegas, Jr., and the Sheriff of Mecklenburg County,
North Carolina, Jim Pendergraph. 146 During a debate about the use of 287(g),
Sheriff Pendergraph explained that "[i]f [law enforcement agents] don't have
enough evidence to charge someone criminally, but you think he's illegal, we
can [use 287(g) to] make him disappear." 14 7 Observing how Police Chief
Venegas stood up to Sheriff Pendergraph provided organizers a connection to

139. Interview 2 with Jordan, supra note 131; Interview with Garret, Senior Program Officer at
Foundation (Feb. 5, 2020) (transcript on file with authors) [hereinafter Interview with Garret]. The Police
Foundation is a national, nonpartisan, nonprofit organization dedicated to supporting innovation and
improvement in policing. See Nat'l Police Foun. (Feb. 27, 2020, 8:30 PM) https://www.policefoundation.
org/ [ https://perma.cc/7VV8-BN3B].
140. Interview with Garret, supra note 139; see also ANITA KHASHU, THE ROLE OF LOCAL POLICE:
STRIKING A BALANCE BETWEEN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND CIVIL LIBERTIES xi (2009) (acknowledgments) [hereinafter KHASHU, THE ROLE OF LOCAL POLICE].

141.

The conference was funded by the Ford Foundation. See Interview with Garret, supranote 139.
KHASHU, THE ROLE OF LOCAL POLICE, supranote 140.
143. Interview 9 with Jordan, Attorney, Non-Profit Immigrant Workers' Rights Organization (Jan.
31, 2020) (transcript on file with authors).
144. Id.
142.

145.

Id.

146. Josie Duffy Rice, "We Can Make Him Disappear": The Power of County Sheriffs, THE APPEAL
(May 7, 2018), https://theappeal.org/we-can-make-him-disappear-the-power-of-county-sheriffs-b27de57
061e4/ ("[Sheriff] Pendergraph was maniacal about his dislike of immigrants, intent on ridding America of
them. 'We've got millions of illegal immigrants that have no business being here.. .. These people are
coming to our country without documents, and they won't even assimilate,' he said in 2006. 'Every person we
remove from the county is one person you and your family won't meet on the highway,' he stated that same
year. Eventually, Pendergraph dropped the pretense of safety altogether, simply setting up checkpoints in
neighborhoods with large immigrant populations and arresting people for violating civil immigration law).
147. Id.; see also Interview 7 with Jordan, Attorney, Non-Profit Immigrant Workers' Rights
Organization (Jan. 3, 2020) (transcript on file with authors) [hereinafter Interview 7 with Jordan].
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someone who later became a critical ally and a stock story feasted upon by
anti-S-Comm coalitions. 148
While there were certainly differences of opinions, conference attendees
reached an overarching consensus that "the costs of participating in the
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) 287(g) program outweigh[ed] the benefits.'' 14 9 This consensus culminated in the publication of
a report that was a collaborative effort between members of the legal, academic, and public policy communities." NDLON's presence and high
visibility on the project provided the organization access to the law
enforcement community, "credentials" with other immigrant rights organizations,151 and insights into potential future allies and collaborators, all of
which proved to be critical in the later fight against S-Comm.15 2
B.

The Start of S-Comm and the Transitionfrom the Bush to Obama
Administration

While much of the immigrant rights community was focused on combating
the ills of 287(g), the Bush administration was working on S-Comm, a new
enforcement program that relied upon the intra-agency sharing of biometric
identification information. On December 26, 2007, Congress passed the
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008 that provided ICE with $200 million
to improve and modernize efforts to identify incarcerated criminal aliens.1 5 3
S-Comm was the Bush administration's answer to this modernization effort. 154

148. Interview 7 with Jordan, supranote 147.
149. KHASHU, THE ROLE OF LOCAL POLICE, supra note 140, at xii (Findings include: "Police officers
should be prohibited from arresting and detaining persons to solely investigate immigration status in the
absence of probable cause of an independent state criminal law violation; If a local agency nevertheless
enters the 287(g) program, its participation should be focused on serious criminal offenders and should be
limited to verifying the immigration status of criminal detainees as part of the 287(g) Jail Enforcement
Officer program; Local and state authorities participating in federal immigration enforcement activities
should develop policies and procedures for monitoring racial profiling and abuse of authority; In order to
preserve the trust that police agencies have built over the years by aggressively engaging in community
oriented policing activities, local law enforcement agencies should involve representatives of affected
communities in the development of local immigration policies; There is a need for empirical research on
ICE's 287(g) program and other methods of police collaboration with federal immigration authorities so
that we have more objective data by which to better understand the way in which these programs are carried out in the field and their impact on public safety and civil liberties; Local law enforcement agencies
should employ community-policing and problem-solving tactics to improve relations with immigrant
communities and resolve tension caused by expanding immigration; Local law enforcement leaders and
policing organizations should place pressure on the federal government to comprehensively improve border security and reform the immigration system, because the federal government's failure on both issues
has had serious consequences in cities and towns throughout the country.").

150.

See id.

151. Interview 7 with Jordan, supra note 147 ("NDLON was able to start punching a bit out of their
weight class and met many important law enforcement officials at the big convening, including, importantly, Arturo Venegas, Jr. who at the time was the Chief of Police of Sacramento, CA.").
152. Id.
153. See generally Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, H.R. 2764, 110th Cong. (2007). In 2006,
a precursor pilot to S-Comm, known as the Interim Data Service Model (iDSM), was offered in Suffolk
County, MA and Dallas County, TX.
154.
U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF'T, SECURE COMMUNITIES: A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN TO IDENTIFY
AND REMOVE CRIMINAL ALIENS (2009), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/securecommunities/
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In April 2008, the Bush administration defined the overall strategic goals of SComm to include: identifying and processing all removable criminal aliens;
enhancing detention strategies so removable criminal aliens were not released
into the community; expediting removals, and deterring the return of criminal
aliens back into the United States.15 5
S-Comm's initial rollout, which proceeded without public announcement, 156 was first piloted in seven jurisdictions and extended to an additional
fourteen jurisdictions by October 2008.157 In the first quarterly status report
for S-Comm, ICE detailed outreach efforts made to state and local Law
Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) designed to culminate in voluntary agreements known as Memoranda of Agreement (MOAs). 158 In 2008, ICE perceived that the support for S-Comm was vast and that the main outreach
challenge would be "managing rapidly growing interest from LEAs seeking
to initiate immediate collaboration efforts with ICE."159 In late 2008, little
evidence showed that low-wage labor or immigrant rights advocacy communities were conscious of S-Comm, and no evidence showed any concerted
effort to dismantle or retard the growth of the nascent S-Comm project during
this period.
During the initial start-up phase of the program, ICE made a strategic decision to focus outreach on states, as opposed to localities, to "simplify relationship complexity by limiting the number of agreements that ICE [was]
participating in" and "encourage state leadership" to develop "consistent
working relationship with LEAs throughout the state." 160 In the absence of

securecommunitiesstrategicplan09.pdf. [hereinafter U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF'T]. The final plan
was submitted to Congress on April 7, 2008. See AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, SECURE COMMUNITIES: A
FACT SHEET (2011), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/secure-communities-factsheet [hereinafter AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL].
155. See U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF'T, supra note 154; see also AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, supra
note 154.
156.

See U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF'T, SECURE COMMUNITIES: QUARTERLY REPORT (2011),

&

https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/secure_communities/congressionalstatusreportfyl 04thquarter.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7N8B-TBV6]. In the initial stages of the program, ICE made clear that implementation
of S-Comm at the local level required two steps: (1) execution of a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
with the state; and (2) signed statements of intent from county and local agencies. U.S. Immigr.
Customs Enf't, Memorandum of Understanding between Dep't of Homeland Sec., ICE, and Cal. Dep't of
Just., Bureau of Criminal Identification and Information (Jan. 23, 2009), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/
securecommunities/securecommunitiescaliforniamoal0april2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/W7AZ-VM9H]
[hereinafter ICE Secure Communities MOA].
157. The pilot initially included the following jurisdictions: Boston, MA; Dallas County, TX; Harris
County, TX; Wake County, NC; Henderson County, NC; Buncombe County, NC; and Gaston County,
NC. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf't, SECOND CONGRESSIONAL STATUS REPORT COVERING THE FOURTH
QUARTER FISCAL YEAR 2008, FOR SECURE COMMUNITIES:
REMOVE CRIMINAL ALIENS 8 (2008).

A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN TO IDENTIFY AND

158.
U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF'T, 1ST QUARTERLY STATUS REPORT (2008) for SECURE
COMMUNITIES: A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN TO IDENTIFY AND REMOVE CRIMINAL ALIENS 2 (2008) [herein-

after ICE, 1st Quarterly Status Report]. In the initial stages of the program, ICE made clear that implementation of S-Comm at the local level required two steps: (1) execution of a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) with the state; and (2) signed statements of intent from county and local agencies. ICE
Secure Communities MOA, supra note 156.
159. ICE, 1st Quarterly Status Report, supra note 158, at 12.
160. Id.
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public engagement, many advocates and even elected officials were not
aware of the program's implementation until after state agreements were
signed. 161
While the Bush administration was creating the S-Comm machinery,
immigrant rights legal advocates focused on detainers as the weak link
between criminal justice and immigration detention systems.1 6 2 "The primary
strategy was to get people out of detention so they would not wind up in the
criminal alien program. If [we] kept people out of detention [we] could stop
the immigration repercussions.'' 163 But the enforcement landscape was already changing behind the scenes. While advocates were focused on 287(g), the
Obama transition team was being briefed on S-Comm. Government officials
saw S-Comm as an opportunity to address advocates' concerns that 287(g) was
infused with racial profiling, bias, and intimidation by law enforcement officials." Bush officials presented S-Comm as "a program that [would] solve a
lot of problems" related to discriminatory enforcement because it was rooted in
technology that was objective, namely fingerprints. 165 In fact, during the transition, the Obama administration "[a]ssumed all would be on board ... [we]
166
didn't anticipate push back.''
Some immigrant rights advocates were concerned with the selection of
Janet Napolitano as the Secretary of DHS, who they perceived normatively
believed in police as part of the immigration enforcement scheme. 167
Secretary Napolitano's record of permitting Sheriff Joe Arpaio, the country's
most hostile, anti-immigrant sheriff, to engage in constitutionally questionable

161. Christopher Strunk & Helga Leitner, Resisting Federal-Local Immigration Enforcement
Partnership: Redefining 'Secure Communities' and Public Safety, 1 J. TERRITORY, POLITICS,
GOVERNANCE 62, 70 (2013) (stating, "In late 2009, advocates in Washington, DC were shocked to find
out that the District of Columbia's police chief had signed a Secure Communities Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA) with ICE because of the city's long-standing opposition to local immigration enforcement." The authors cited an interview with a community activist in Washington, DC in September 2010
that explained little was known about Secure Communities at this point, and local organizations only
learned of the program through the National Day Laborer Organizing Network (NDLON)).
162. Interview with Taylor, Attorney on NDLON FOIA Case (Dec. 9, 2019) (transcript on file with
authors) [hereinafter Interview with Taylor].
163. Id.
164. Interview with Avery, Former DHS Official (Jan. 17, 2020) (transcript on file with authors)
[hereinafter Interview with Avery] (Government officials were concerned about racial profiling with 287
(g) after a report issued by the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), concluding that
ICE needed better program controls to ensure that the program was operating, as intended, by focusing on
individuals involved in "serious crime"). See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-09-109,
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: BETTER CONTROLS NEEDED OVER PROGRAM AUTHORIZING STATE AND
LOCAL ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAWS 4 (2009).

165. Interview with Avery, supranote 164.
166. Id. ("I mean, it's interesting that at the time that was thought to be well, that's a good idea and
that'll help again contain overeager police officers, they'll just be enforcing their own laws. And, and then
DHS will step in and decide what to do with individuals who show up through this fingerprint check as
being here unlawfully." Issues of racial profiling generated by targeted police arrests and the undermining
of community policing strategies weren't "so much in the picture early on, nor in those early briefings
when I was on the transition team.").
167. Interview 1 with Jordan, Attorney, Non-Profit Immigrant Workers' Rights Organization (Sept.
4, 2019) (transcript on file with authors) [hereinafter Interview 1 with Jordan] ("normatively Napolitano
believed in police as part of the immigration enforcement scheme.").
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behavior supported this concern. 168 There was a sense that Napolitano "understood that Arpaio was the cost" of the 287(g) program in Maricopa County. 169
And, Napolitano made it clear that ending 287(g) was not on the table. 170
These concerns only grew as the Obama administration moved aggressively
on enforcement efforts. 17 1

In an attempt to start a dialogue with immigrant rights advocates,
Secretary Napolitano hosted an invitation-only meeting for approximately
130 immigration advocates.1 7 2 President Obama entered the room late into
the meeting and delivered some general talking points from what appeared to
be notes prepared by others. 173 Most attendees were swept up in the proObama feeling and didn't press him on why he was leaving 287(g) in place,
while others left feeling unsettled. 174
C.

The Tradeoff of IncreasedEnforcementfor CIR

Initially, President Obama's election provided immigrant rights activists
hope that CIR might become a reality. 175 Cecilia Munoz, the twenty-year
168. See generally Finnegan, Sheriff Joe, supra note 137 ("[Napolitano] was the U.S. Attorney for
Arizona when conditions in Arpaio's jails were first investigated by the Justice Department, in the midnineteen-nineties. Her performance then was memorably weak. Despite receiving a devastating federal
report on brutality inside the jails, she held a friendly press conference with Arpaio . .. [and] [1]ater, as the
state's attorney general, she stood by as Sheriff Joe ran his jails any way he pleased.").
169. Interview 5 with Jordan, Attorney, Non-Profit Immigrant Workers' Rights Organization (Oct.
17, 2019) [hereinafter Interview 5 with Jordan]. This concern has a basis in Napolitano's past actions surrounding the work of Sheriff Joe Arpaio. The New Yorker ran a profile of Joe Arpaio and reported "Janet
Napolitano, President Obama's Secretary of Homeland Security, has a history with Arpaio. She was the
U.S. Attorney for Arizona when conditions in Arpaio's jails were first investigated by the Justice
Department, in the mid-nineteen-nineties. Her performance then was memorably weak. Despite receiving
a devastating federal report on brutality inside the jails, she held a friendly press conference with Arpaio
in which she announced the settlement of the case against him and, according to the Arizona Republic,
passed the time "trading compliments with the sheriff." Later, as the state's attorney general, she stood by
as Sheriff Joe ran his jails any way he pleased. Then, when she ran for governor in 2002, Arpaio returned
the favor by crossing party lines Napolitano is a Democrat and making a last-minute campaign commercial for her that, by all accounts, helped her eke out a victory."
170. Finnegan, Sheriff Joe, supra note 137 ("In 2008, in her second term as governor, Napolitano, a
moderate on immigration, finally opposed Arpaio, ordering that $1.6 million in state funds going to his
office be used not for immigration sweeps but for the investigation of felonies. Arpaio was furious and
later got his funding reinstated. His opponents in Maricopa County wonder privately about Napolitano's
willingness to defy him again, even from a Cabinet position. Last week, she announced a revision of the
287(g) program, intended to make local agencies more accountable. But, according to her office, ending
Homeland Security's partnership with Arpaio is not under consideration.").
171. Julia Preston, Firm Stance on Illegal Immigrants Remains Policy, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3 2009),
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/04/us/politics/04immig.html; Press Release, Dept. Homeland Sec,
Sec'y Napolitano Announces New Agreement for State and Local Immigration Enforcement Partnerships
and Adds 11 New Agreements (July 10, 2009), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2009/07/10/secretary[https://perma.cc/75RP-NX8L]
announces-new-agreement-state-and-local-immigration-enforcement
(announcing that DHS granted 11 new jurisdictions 287(g) immigration enforcement powers).
172. Seth Hoy, The President and Secretary Napolitano Reaffirm Commitment to Immigration
Reform, IMMIGRATIONIMPACT.COM (Aug. 21, 2009), https://immigrationimpact.com/2009/08/21/thepresident-and-secretary-napolitano-reaffirm-commitment-to-immigration-reform/#.YEP1 Bi2ZPGI.
173. Interview 1 with Jordan, supranote 167.
174. Id.
175. Ivy O. Suriyopas, Program Officer, Open Soc'y Found., Portfolio Review: The 2013 Pursuit Of
Comprehensive Immigration Reform, in OPEN SOCIETY U.S. PROGRAMS BOARD MEETING, OPEN SOCIETY

FOUNDS. 42 (May 6, 2016), http://freebeacon.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/soros-board-book-2016.
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Senior Vice President at the National Council of La Raza, was appointed to
Obama's senior staff176-giving immigrant rights advocates one of their own
on the "inside." 17 7 During a trip to Mexico in 2009, President Obama indicated that immigration reform would have to wait until after health care and
energy bills passed in Congress. 178 Upon returning to the U.S., Obama tried

to reassure over 100 immigration reform backers that work on CIR would
begin in 2009.179 According to one high-level government official, there was
a lot of "behind the scenes" work happening on CIR during 2009.180 But, the
economic crisis and the health care debate got in the way of CIR being "front
and center in the political process."181
It was thought that the Administration needed to show real seriousnesssome bona fides-about immigration enforcement in the hopes that this
would gain some Republican support for legalization.18 2 In November of
2009, Secretary Napolitano made a speech at the Center for American
Progress that some advocates saw as the Obama administration's campaign
to launch S-Comm. 183 Celebrating the first anniversary of S-Comm,

.

pdf [https://perma.cc/Q6NE-RF4Q] (explaining that while there was strong verbal support, "[t]he first
four years of the Obama administration was marked by a ramp up in immigration enforcement, operating
under the assumption that increased enforcement against unauthorized immigration would create
conditions amendable for legislative reforms.").
176. Cecilia Munoz served first as the Director of Intergovernmental Affairs and subsequently as the
Director of the Domestic Policy Council. See Cecilia Muhoz, NEWAMERICA.COM, https://www.
newamerica.org/our-people/cecilia-mu%C3%Bloz/ [https://perma.cc/8GRQ-CANH] (last visited Feb.
28, 2020).
177. A common theme among immigrant advocates we interviewed was disappointment over the
inability to capitalize on an effective "inside/outside" strategy. Interview with Sydney, Community
Organizer (Oct. 21, 2019) (transcript on file with authors) [hereinafter Interview with Sydney]; Interview
5 with Jordan, supra note 169.
178. Josh Gerstein, Obama Addresses ImmigrationReform, POLITICO (Aug. 20, 2009) https://www.
politico.com/story/2009/08/obama-addresses-immigration-reform-026308.
179. Id.
180. Interview with Sam, US Department of Homeland Security Official (Jan. 28, 2020) (transcript
on file with authors) [hereinafter Interview with Sam].
181. Id. ("[I was] working very extensively on comprehensive immigration reform and drafting, uh,
participating in team, leading a team that was drafting what we hoped would become a kind of administration bill that could feed into the overall process of getting very complicated interagency, being in interagency meetings to get agreement on what approach we take on a lot of detailed issues that would go into
that bill. So ironically, this is during the time when a lot of people say, 'Oh, the Obama administration
didn't do anything during their first year, first couple years on comprehensive immigration reform.' There
was a lot going on behind the scenes. There were a few other things that got in the way of it actually
becoming front and center in the political process, mainly the economic crisis and the health care. The
plan had been to do health care early in the first few months of the [A]dministration and then turn to comprehensive immigration reform. And of course, to deal with an economic crisis along the way as it was
necessary, but health care didn't get done in a few months, it took, I think, 13 months. And by then the political scene had changed. And so, we didn't really get to make full use of what it was that we'd been
working on.").
182. Id. (explaining "it never was really spelled out all that clear, but particularly looking at recent,
new violators ... we said okay, yes, we can agree [if we can] win support from some Republicans [with]
.. a track record of solid enforcement and with some ... innovations [such as] E-verify ... that that would
create the better framework to get Republican support for a comprehensive immigration reform bill.").
183. Interview 1 with Jordan, supranote 167.
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used by 95 jurisSecretary Napolitano boasted that the program was "being
18 4
diction[s] and [had] identified 111,000 criminal aliens.''
Instead of taking advantage of a Democratic majority in Congress during
his first two years, President Obama ramped up internal enforcement in line
with the Senate leadership's "get-tough" strategy. 185 As one Obama administration official explained, "[t]here was certainly a thought early on that
[enforcement] needed to be part of the balance-serious enforcement focused
on recent violators. And that would lay the groundwork for getting comprehensive immigration reform." 186 Even Cecilia Munoz defended S-Comm on
the grounds that if Obama was tough on enforcement, it would help gain support from Republicans for CIR. 187 But, congressional House Democrats had a
different view. As one Senior Counsel to the Immigration Subcommittee of
the House Judiciary Committee said, "[t]he narrative of we need to give in on
enforcement to get CIR was what the Administration was pushing as a narra188
tive, but not what [c]ongressional Democrats thought."
The first year of the Obama administration came and went without an immigration bill. While Obama's team cited the healthcare debate and the financial crisis of 2008 as reasons for the delay, 189 advocates decried the
President's unwillingness to lead on the issue.1 90 The result was an enforcement strategy that legitimated anti-immigrant prejudices and fostered a
splinter in the immigrant rights movement. 191 On one side were the national,
Beltway CIR advocates who were willing to trade the "undeserving" for the
"deserving" immigrants and ramp up enforcement in the hopes that they

184. See A Discussion on Immigration Policy with Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano,
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Nov. 13, 2009), https://www.americanprogress.org/events/2009/11/13/16871/
a-discussion-on-immigration-policy-with-homeland-security-secretary-janet-napolitano/
[hereinafter
Immigration Policy].
185. NICHOLLS, IMMIGRANT RIGHTS MOVEMENT, supra note 116, at 121; see also Immigration
Policy, supra note 184 (expressly linking the possibility of passing CIR to "serious enforcement at the
border" by referencing members of Congress who conditioned enforcement on consideration of immigration reform).
186. Interview with Avery, supra note 164 (explaining that the intent was to focus on recent arrivals
to the US in order to help gain Republican support for legalization).
187. Interview with Sydney, supra note 177.
188. Interview with Quinn, Chief Counsel, House Cong. Subcomm. (Jan. 10, 2020) (transcript on file
with authors) [hereinafter Interview with Quinn].
189. Interview with Avery, supra note 164 (explaining that, "ironically, this is during the time when
a lot of people say, 'Oh, the Obama administration didn't do anything during their first year, first couple
years on comprehensive immigration reform.' There was a lot going on behind the scenes. There were a
few other things that got in the way of it actually becoming front and center in the political process,
mainly the economic crisis and [healthcare]. The plan had been to do [healthcare] early in the first few
months of the [A]dministration and then turn to comprehensive immigration reform. And of course, to
deal with an economic crisis along the way as it was necessary, but [healthcare] didn't get done in a few
months, it took, I think, 13 months. And by then the political scene had changed. And so, we didn't really
get to make full use of what it was that we'd been working on.").
190. Ginger Thompson and David M. Herszenhorn, Obama Set for First Step on Immigration
Reform, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2009) ("Aides to Mr. Obama say he does not intend to get out in front of
any proposal until there is a strong bipartisan commitment to pass it. That stance has the potential to paralyze the process, since lawmakers are looking to him to use his bully pulpit, and high approval ratings, to
help them fend off any political backlash among their constituents.").
191. NICHOLLS, IMMIGRANT RIGHTS MOVEMENT, supra note 116, at 121.
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would gain something in terms of legalization in return. 19 2 National CIR
advocates tried to bring all immigrant rights activists under the same umbrella to support what was dubbed "Obama's flagship immigration project." 193 Those inside the Obama team didn't want local activists to take on
S-Comm because it was seen as a necessary trade-off. 194
On the other side were advocates for those left out in the binary "deserving,
undeserving" split, including so-called "in the field" advocates.195 These activists saw power coming from the local level, in movements built from the
ground up. 196 Locally-focused activists understood that their community of
"undesirable" immigrants would be the first sacrificed and that a movement
that sacrificed any part of impacted communities would be weaker overall. 19 7
As one advocate put it, "we kind of knew in the back of our heads that when
CIR does really get going, that the first people that will be thrown under the
bus will be people with criminal convictions or those even with arrests." 198
Locally-focused organizers recall that there was "a little bit of push back"
from national organizations concerned that local fights against S-Comm
would be a distraction from the larger CIR efforts. 199
The Administration's prime strategy of "felons, not families," as a smart
enforcement tool began to fall apart when S-Comm started picking up people
that would be prime candidates for legalization. 200 Government officials, in
hindsight, realized that the launch of S-Comm was tied in a very unfortunate
way to a tsunami of state law changes that forbid the issuance of driver's
licenses to undocumented immigrants. 201 While the offense of driving without a license typically would not be a priority for S-Comm, it is an offense
that typically leads to arrest and fingerprinting. The fingerprints were then
automatically shared with ICE to check against their database. 20 2 As a result,
many sympathetic cases of people who otherwise would have been very clear

192.

DENVIR, ALL-AMERICAN NATIVISM, supranote 129, at 231-37.
193. Interview with Blake, supra note 133 (explaining that CIR advocates did not want them going
after S-Comm because it required them to defend "criminals" and this advocacy might undermine the
national CIR efforts).
194. Interview with Josh, Attorney on NDLON FOIA Case (Nov. 19, 2019) (transcript on file with
authors) [hereinafter Interview with Josh]; Interview with Taylor, supra note 162 ("That is kind of what
we did, we did just said, 'We're gonna [get] to work on this. We're happy to keep you informed. And you
know, you can keep working on comprehensive immigration reform or lay the groundwork for it and
keep us informed.' But we also we kind of knew in the back of our heads that when CIR does really get
going, that the first people that will be thrown under the bus will be people with criminal convictions or
those even with arrests. And so, we've kind of we have kept in mind that although these two tracks can operate at the same time, there will be a time where one is given up for the other. And that's more of the reason why we needed to move as quickly as possible.").
195. Interview 3 with Jordan, Attorney, Non-Profit Immigrant Workers' Rights Organization (Sept.
12, 2019) (transcript on file with authors) [hereinafter Interview 3 with Jordan].
196. Interview with Sydney, Community Organizer (Oct. 21,2019) (transcript on file with authors).
197. Interview with Blake, supra note 133; Interview 2 with Jordan, supranote 131.
198. Interview with Taylor, supra note 162
199. Interview with Sydney, supranote 177.
200. Interview with Avery, supranote 164.
201. Id.
202. Id.
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candidates for legalization got swept up in the S-Comm deportation process. 20 3 In the end, the attempts to gain some legalization in exchange for
increased enforcement "polarized so badly that the [A]dministration didn't
get a lot of credit [and] eventually got hammered as ... 'deporter-inchief. "'204
IV.

THE UNTOLD, MULTI-DIMENSIONAL STORY OF THE CAMPAIGN

TO

UNDERMINE S-COMM

This Part provides an in-depth narrative of the campaign against S-Comm
by weaving together into a coherent whole the interplay between administrative actors that sought to implement the program, congressional actors that
funded and oversaw the program, advocates that sought to dismantle the program, and lawyers who supported the client's campaign. The tools used and
the strategic decisions made to further the campaign are identified, and the
lawyer-client relationship from the perspective of organizers, advocates, clients, and the lawyers themselves is exposed. This Part traces the narrative
from the initial idea to tackle S-Comm through to the advocacy approach after compliance with S-Comm was federally mandated.
A.

The Seed of the Campaign to End S-Comm

In July 2009, a group of immigrant rights advocates hosted a Soros
Foundation retreat designed to bring together people working at the intersection of immigration and criminal justice. 205 While much of the retreat conversation focused on 287(g), one advocate identified S-Comm as being the "next
big issue." 206 But, S-Comm was viewed as an Obama program, and there
"was a sense of incredulity that Obama could be doing something so damaging," 207 even "laugh[ing] and mock[ing] at the idea that S-Comm was the
issue of the "future." 208 Despite a lack of concern by some, several advocates
continued to explore the difference between 287(g), the "street enforcement"
program, and S-Comm, the "jail enforcement" program.20 9 The retreat

203. Id.
204. Id. (stating, "I think the deporter-in-chief narrative is the result of how [ICE] acted in this time
frame, how they tried to keep things from, you know, the White House and from the Department, how
they started to limit the information flow and, and were not afraid to mislead people just to keep, you
know, so they could maintain autonomy over, over an agency they were not autonomous over.").
205. Email from Jordan, (Jan. 25, 2020) (on file with authors). This conference was hosted from July
8 to July 10, 2009). Interview with Jamie, Attorney on NDLON FOIA Case (Nov. 19, 2019) (transcript on
file with authors) [hereinafter Interview with Jamie]. This conference was organized by Judith Greene,
Aarti Shahani and Sunita Patel. Green and Shahani have just published a report on 287(g) in Maricopa
County. See Aarti Shahani & Judith Greene, LOCAL DEMOCRACY ON ICE: WHY STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS HAVE NO BUSINESS
STRATEGIES REPORT (2009).

206.
207.
208.
209.

IN FEDERAL

Interview 1 with Jordan, supranote 167.
Id.
Id.
Interview with Jamie, supra note 205.
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created the space for momentum-building conversations around S-Comm, 2 10
and several advocates made a conscious decision to pivot away from 287(g)
toward S-Comm advocacy. "There was a moment of debate ... when it came
to it-do we try to put a nail in the coffin of 287(g) and finish that fight or do
we need to pivot because the fight has changed?" 21 1
The campaign to dismantle S-Comm was forged as an alliance between
immigrant rights organizers on the ground and organizations including
NDLON, the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR), and the Benjamin
Cardozo School of Law Immigration Justice Clinic (IJC). 212 Taking on SComm presented a set of unique challenges for the advocacy community.
The program was being pushed by the first African American president who
spoke from a pro-immigration posture and promised to champion CIR. The
express focus of S-Comm was to deport the worst of the worst, serious criminals and create secure communities. 213 Advocates were concerned about the
optics of opposing such a policy. As one advocate said, "it's like saying you
are against happiness."2" Advocates felt bound by this "linguistic propaganda tautology; to merely utter the words Secure Communities, is to reify a
frame you are opposing." 215 Despite these challenges, several advocates
started to host monthly conference calls to talk about S-Comm. During the
initial months, "there were not many people on the calls," 2 1 6 but the campaign soon started to expand. 217
Anti-S-Comm advocates understood that their "theory of change" in the
Obama Era had to be different. 2 81 "We were trying to invert the whole theory

210. Id. ("And you know, what was really nice is it was just an opportunity to build intentional community and intentional relationships, which is so critical to, you know, really thinking about how to do
meaningful work, and how to interpret, like cross, cross-issue around the challenges that we all face and
from a really intentional, like, racial justice perspective.").
211. Interview with Blake, supranote 133 ("Or do we need to pivot, and he was really, I think one of
the people who is saying that the fight has changed. And, if we're not fighting S-Comm now, then we're
going to be missing the opportunity or like before the cement or the paint dries, or however you would
say it.").
212. The CCR had a track record of engaging in FOIA litigation, was looking to do more work at the
intersection of mass incarceration and immigration enforcement, and sought a community-based client.
Interview with Jamie, supra note 205 ("[W]e have a history and a track record of doing FOIA litigation.
And there were a lot of internal conversations about how to do more or more at the intersection of mass
incarceration and immigration enforcement since that was, that's also a core area that we had been litigating for a long time. . . . It felt like it was important to work on something that not that many, that folks
were looking at, at the time and also squarely within other areas of interest and engagement, where we
have a history and some, you know, some track record."). The IJC was looking to collaborate with exciting people or groups as a way to build out their docket and was connected to NDLON through a mentor.
Interview with Taylor, supra note 162 (explaining that in talking to a clinical mentor NDLON was mentioned as an exciting group to work with). CCR and the IJC worked together previously and were familiar
with each other. Interview with Jamie, supranote 205.
213. Interview 3 with Jordan, supranote 195.
214. Id.
215. Interview 4 with Jordan, Attorney, Non-Profit Immigrant Workers' Rights Organization (Sept.
17, 2019) (transcript on file with authors) [hereinafter Interview 4 with Jordan].
216. Interview 3 with Jordan, supranote 195.
217. Interview 1 with Jordan, supranote 167.
218. Interview 6 with Jordan, Attorney, Non-Profit Immigrant Workers' Rights Organization (Nov.
18, 2019) (transcript on file with authors).
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of change and advocacy during the Obama years." 219 Because the bigger,
mainstream immigrant rights groups were supporting Obama and CIR, we
had to be "scrappier, more sanctimonious, progressive, and more strategic to
build power and exert leverage on adjacent, powerful allies."220 S-Comm
advocates rooted the movement locally, recognizing that they lacked power
as outside resisters at the national level but believing that they could gain
ground from within locally.221 Advocates saw the failure of CIR as a "power
angle" for the local movement.222 Many immigrant rights advocates focused
all their energy on CIR at the national level, where local organizing was less
critical. But this campaign "felt different because there were local goals and
local targets and that was energizing ... in a way that the comprehensive immigration reform [fight] wasn't."23
Major mainstream national immigration social movement organizations
resisted attacks on S-Comm, and hence they had little impact on emerging
narratives around which the struggle against S-Comm played out. In fact,
DC-insider advocates told the local advocates that "S-Comm was going to be
untouchable. That it would be a waste of time to advocate around it, and that
[we] would be causing problems for the President and problems for the larger
project of CIR." 2 4 The local-level vacuum created space for a distributed
campaign in which local organizing would advocate that states and localities
opt-out. This strategy, combined with the Administration's embarrassing
efforts to cover up mandatory implementation, was largely responsible for
the success of the effort to terminate S-Comm on terms favorable to the
(trans)local campaigners.
B.

The Campaign'sThree Pillars:Local Organizing,Litigation, and

Publicity
The campaign was based upon three pillars: local organizing, litigation,
and publicity.22 Each pillar worked in conjunction with and supported the
others. The organizing work around S-Comm was built off the sanctuary
movement of the 1980s.22 6 The cities that were active around the 1980s sanctuary movement were the cities that engaged the most in resisting

219. Id.
220. Id. (explaining that "leverage was needed to bring in the bigger mainstream groups. That was
done through shaming techniques, and explicitly saying that is what we were doing. You know, forcing,
creating sign on letters that made you know kind of [inaudible] some of, you know, the Obama ally adjacent organizations, you know, forcing, 'are you going to sign this letter or not?' And methodically sort of
like we got everybody eventually to go from, like I said, literally laughing at us, because like I think by
the time it ended like everyone was at that point on record against, being against Secure Communities at
the very end.").
221. Interview with Sydney, supranote 177.
222. Interview with Josh, supranote 194.
223. Id.
224. Interview with Blake, supra note 133.
225. Interview with Sydney, supranote 177.
226. Id.
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S-Comm. 227 Organizers needed a broad coalition of labor unions and traditional civil rights organizations because they had more power than NDLON
in the localities. 228 The (trans)local organizing strategy was built upon the
concept of "starting locally, building resistance at the state level and then
translating those gains to the federal level." 2 29 The ability to connect local
groups and create systems that enable organizers from different cities and
localities to share time, resources, knowledge, and experiences was essential
to success. 230 Through previous 287(g) advocacy, NDLON had contacts with
interested advocates all over the country.231 The first step was to "sound the
alarm bell and let people know what was coming down the pipeline." 232
Litigation, organizing, and publicity were all part of sounding the alarm.
First, advocates renamed the program S-Comm, instead of Secure
Communities. They did not want the words "secure" and "communities"
uttered in the same sentence 23 and instead decided on S-Comm as an
"Orwellian" title that sounded futuristic.234 Second, the initial round of advocacy was designed around transparency because not much was known about
the program, and condemning S-Comm out of the box was too big of a bridge
to cross.235 If S-Comm was a key component of the President's enforcement

program, the advocacy community needed to know more about it. 236 The
approach, termed "advocacy through inquiry" by one of the lawyers, brought
together the organizing and litigation teams to work in concert. 237 Finally, the
team understood that grassroots participation from the initial stages was
critical.238
As a component of the larger campaign to dismantle S-Comm, the team
launched the "Uncover the Truth Campaign," hoping that just as it was hard
to be against "secure communities," it would be hard to be against a truth and
transparency campaign.239
227. Id. (identifying these cities as Washington, DC, Cambridge, MA, San Francisco and Los
Angeles, CA, and Seattle, WA).
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Interview 4 with Jordan, supranote 215.
234. Id.
235. Interview with Blake, supranote 133 (explaining, "I think that's where you so the incremental
approach of well, if it was going to be the flagship project, shouldn't we know what it is? Shouldn't we
understand what S-Comm is? And so that's why the first round of advocacy was about transparency.
Because if organizers are there to expand the political will and expand what's possible, in that initial
moment, just condemning S-Comm was a bridge too far for where a lot of that advocacy community was
in the Beltway because the Beltway always lags behind where people are actually having to deal with
the impact of enforcement. Yeah." ... "So we said we need to uncover the truth about what is SComm.").
236. Id.
237. Interview with Josh, supra note 194 (a lawyer joining the team in 2010 saw the "advocacy
through inquiry" approach as very successful in slowing down the program implementation and finding
out more about the program).
238. Interview with Taylor, supra note 162.
239. Interview with Jamie, supra note 205.
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The campaign kicked off by filing FOIA litigation against DHS, ICE, and
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 240 and a week of rallies and press
conferences in fourteen cities to denounce an ICE-Police collaboration program and engage mobilization on the ground. 2 41
The lawyers understood that the FOIA litigation was not an end in and of
itself. 242 The litigation "was a tool, but the really important part was the local
organizing effort." 2 43 As one advocate stated, "it was not lost on any of us
that the power of the litigation was going to be what the organizers could turn
it into." 2 44 The filing of the lawsuit, which was accompanied by a protest
march and a press release, 2 4 "was designed to help the organizing effort and
give the local campaign something of a runway." 2 46 Press coverage was a key
component of the campaign launch, and all the allied local groups were
encouraged to push stories to the press.24 7 Advocates wanted to capitalize on
the fact that a localized and decentralized campaign would be difficult for
ICE to combat. 2 4 8
C.

The "Groupo Duro" and the Use of Narrativeto Mobilize

The organizing team created "Groupo Duro," a crew of approximately
eight organizers and lawyers around the country who volunteered to review

240. Nat'l Day Laborer Org. Network v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf't, 877 F. Supp. 2d 87 (S.
D.N.Y. 2012). Uncover the Truth Campaign, http://uncoverthetruth.org/campaign/ (designed to expose
the lack of information about the S-Comm program. The campaign notes that S-Comm is moving toward
nationwide implementation "without the public, elected officials, and sometimes police chiefs themselves
knowing. Indeed, the program has been advanced in secrecy despite significant public attention paid to
the devastating consequences to communities where police enforcement of immigration law has been
piloted."); see also Interview with Sydney, supra note 177 ("[T]he immigrants' rights movement has
been focused on a national movement for so long that the trans(local) campaign breathed in life to the
immigrants' right movement in places that had been pro immigrant it allowed the immigrant rights
movement to flex its muscle and have some concrete victories."); see also Ashar, Movement Lawyers for
ImmigrantRights, supra note 13, at 1480 (describing through interviews with various actors the desire to
get ahead of the issues and fight a new battle).
241. NationalDay Laborer Organizing Network (NDLON) v. U.S. Immigration And Customs Enf tHistoric Case, CTR. FOR CONST. RIGHTS, https://ccrjustice.org/home/what-we-do/our-cases/national-daylaborer-organizing-network-ndlon-v-us-immigration-and-customs [https://perma.cc/4A9V-7EX9] (describing
the timeline of events related to the FOIA litigation). Interview 4 with Jordan, supra note 215 (combining
FOIA litigation to strengthen organizing campaigns is a strategy that was used historically by NDLON dating
back to efforts to organize around Redondo Beach).
242. Interview with Sydney, supranote 177.
243. Id. (explaining, "[m]ost FOIA cases are never heard about-without the local groups organizing
[S-Comm] would not have gotten that far and would not have gotten the press coverage it got.").
244. Interview with Taylor, supra note 162.
245. Interview 4 with Jordan, supra note 215 (explaining that whenever doing public records litigation, we organize groups to march down to the place of service, organize press, serve them with the summons and complaint in front of the press and protest.). Interview with Jamie, supra note 205 (explaining
that anytime CCR filed in court the organization did a corresponding press release and there were some
conversations about how to leverage CCR's communications resources for things that were happening in
court or for documents that were going to be released. CCR had the ability to coordinate a press briefing
call with thirty reporters and getting out information about the program really influenced the public).
246. Interview with Jamie, supra note 205.
247. Interview with Sydney, supranote 177.
248. Id.
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the FOIA documents. 2 49 Groupo Duro participants read through documents,
annotated them, and reported back to a website staff support team made up of
NDLON and CCR staff.250 This small tech team put together a website titled
"Uncover the Truth" and started uploading and posting all relevant FOIA
documents. 2 1 "There was a sense of us against the world with Groupo Duro
... [we] were really motivated, committed and working incredibly hard." 252
The first set of FOIA documents released identified quick deployment of
the program in states and localities, a lack of focus on high priority individuals, misrepresentation of the program, and racial profiling concerns.2 53
Pushing this information to the public through a coordinated media campaign
was fundamental to the (trans)local efforts. ICE responded by pushing out
publicity of their own, refuting the claims made by the "Uncover the Truth"
campaign.25 4 The public debate fed into the strength of the (trans)local campaign as advocates called ICE's attempt to refute merely spin in the face of
truth.2 5
Organizers were committed to distributing the documents widely for use
in addressing localities' specific issues. As an advocate explained, "one of
the cool things about that campaign was that there was like a million different
local campaigns, but people [were] all collaborating.'' 256 As documents were
released, the communications team, made up of a couple of organizers, would
pitch the story to an identified reporter as an exclusive, help draft the press

249. Interview 5 with Jordan, Attorney, Non-Profit Immigrant Rights Organization (Oct. 17, 2019)
(transcript on file with authors). Interview with Sydney, supra note 177.
250. Interview 2 with Jordan, supra note 131.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253.
CTR. FOR CONST. RIGHTS, BRIEFING GUIDE TO "SECURE
COMMUNITIES" ICE'S
CONTROVERSIAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM NEW STATISTICS AND INFORMATION REVEAL
DISTURBING TRENDS AND LEAVE CRUCIAL QUESTIONS UNANSWERED, (July 30, 2010), https://ccrjustice.

org/files/Secure%20Communities%20Fact%2OSheet%2OBriefing%20guide%208-2-2010%2OProduction.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8VSW-FWWJ] [hereinafter BRIEFING GUIDE TO "SECURE COMMUNITIES"].
254.

U.S. IMMIGR. CUSTOMS ENF'T., SECURE COMMUNITIES: SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT (Aug.

17, 2010), https://www.aila.org/infonet/ice-issues-secure-communities-fact-sheet
[https://perma.cc/
386F-3X96] [hereinafter ICE, Setting the Record Straight]. While the government pushed this
document out in the hopes of clearing up any confusion, it did the opposite and was later taken down by
ICE due to their shifting position.
255. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Agency's Spin Cannot Obscure the Truth About
the "Secure Communities" Program: Rights Groups' Advocacy Leads to Critical ICE Admissions and
Breakthroughs Related to the Flawed Program, UNCOVER THE TRUTH (Sept. 1, 2010), http://
uncoverthetruth.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/CCR-NDLON-Cardozo-Response-to-ICE-Spin-9-1-

10-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/FL3C-LWBL].
256. Interview with Josh, supra note 194 ("Well the cool thing I remember about that campaign, or
one of the cool things about that campaign, was that there was like a million different local campaigns but
people are all collaborating so there were meetings with local police and local sheriffs at which people
would use ICE [inaudible] so if you would meet with the sheriff and you would say, look, you know, 'ICE
sold this program to you as a program to get at convicted criminals but we have this FOIA and we're still
getting information,... but from what we know, 50% of the people who are arrested from your jurisdiction have never been convicted with anything more serious than a traffic offense.' ...
[I]t sort of set up
some antagonism with ICE and ICE had misrepresented the program to them."); see also Interview with
Sydney, supra note 177.
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release, and create talking points to be shared with localities.2 57 At the local
level, every coalition was autonomous and could pursue its own strategies,
but groups often asked for a draft press release and talking points from the
national team.25 8
The (trans)local campaign took care to connect with local government officials that later served as critical allies in successful local campaigns. 259 The
"inside/outside" strategy, which was not used at the national level, proved
effective on the local level. 260 "The goal was to speak not only from outside
of the government institutions, but also from within, and make sure we identified the best messenger in each instance [to] legitimate the underlying concerns."26 Having local law enforcement officials speak authoritatively about
community policing and public safety proved to be a particularly effective
example of the campaign's use of "insiders." 262
The campaign to dismantle S-Comm had a clear and consistent message
that never wavered, in contrast to the government's message that continuously shifted.263 The shifting positions played into the anti-S-Comm narrative
that the government was hypocritical, at the least, and perhaps even intentionally misleading. 264 The anti-S-Comm advocates were always out front
shaping the narrative, while the government reacted inconsistently and ineffectively. Advocates created connections with reporters and got them

257. Interview with Blake, supra note 133 (describing how organizers just do whatever it is that
needs to be done. "At times I am a communications person, other times I get supplies, other times I am on
the group, other times doing mailings whatever is needed"); see also Interview with Sydney, supranote
177.
258. Interview with Sydney, supranote 177.
259. Id. (explaining that "the most ardent supporters [were] people with immigrant, activists, or labor
backgrounds." For example, in New York, an immigrant and former SEIU organizer Melissa Marcieto
was one of the biggest supporters of the legislation resisting S-Comm. In San Francisco, the main sponsor
of the TRUST Act was a gay rights activist. In Chicago, the campaign connected with Chuy Garcia, an
immigrant from Mexico with an organizing and local political background).
260. Interview with Casey, Chief of Staff, City Councilperson (Jan. 6, 2020) (transcript on file with
authors) (Chuy Garcia's Chief of Staff) (Chicago and Cook County Commissioner Chuy Garcia was a
prime example of working from the inside as well as the outside.); see also Interview with Sydney, supra
note 177.
261. Interview with Sydney, supranote 177.
262. Id. (explaining that Sheriff Michael Hennessey of San Francisco was a critical partner in the
fight against S-Comm. He participated in a briefing hosted by Cardozo but the organizers strategically did
not put NDLON's name on the event because the briefing was directed at state and local elected officials
and the organizers thought that delivery of the message from the Sheriff was more effective.).
263. Interview with Kai, Attorney on NDLON FOIA Case (Nov. 4, 2019) (transcript on file with
authors) [hereinafter Interview with Kai] ("the Obama administration [sic] trying to be friendly and
'appear like they were doing the right thing sometimes made them appear hypocritical."); see also
Interview with Sydney, supra note 177.
264. Letter from Rep. Zoe Lofgren to Charles K. Edwards, Acting Inspector General, U.S. Dept. of
Homeland Security and Timothy Moynihan, Asst. Dir., Office of Professional Responsibility, Immigr.
and Customs Enf't (April 28, 2011), http://uncoverthetruth.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Letter-toDHS-OIG-and-ICE-OPR-re-SComm-Opt-Out-Investigation-4.28.11.pdf [https://perma.cc/G5LX-UHUJ]
(stating "[h]aving conducted with my legal staff an initial review of the documents [related to the
deployment of S-Comm] that have been made public, I believe that some of these false and misleading
statements may have been made intentionally, while others were made recklessly, knowing that the
statements were ambiguous and likely to create confusion.").
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involved early as issues were developing and continued to foster those relationships by updating reporters regularly. 265
The organizers used two narratives as mobilizing tools. The first narrative
was designed to use Arizona and Sheriff Arpaio as a foil. Organizers urged
states and localities to distinguish themselves from Arizona and Maricopa
County by passing local ordinances that separated police and ICE collaboration. 266 It was challenging to explain 287(g), S-Comm, and the devolution of
immigration enforcement to the public, but it was much easier to persuade
localities not to replicate the approach of Maricopa County and Sheriff Joe
Arpaio. 267 An advocate explained, "if you have that contrast, or that analogy,
to what's happening in Arizona with the sheriff actively going out and humiliating and racially profiling Latinos, ... that's more tangible. People understand that [better] .'268 The ability to use Arizona as a foil proved an effective
tool. For example, when the District Council for the District of Columbia
(DC) was debating legislation to limit police-ICE partnerships, people in the
room were chanting "No More Arizona's.'' 2 69 Once Arizona passed SB 1070,
the state became a pariah in the new era of immigration federalization, and
demonizing Arizona motivated other localities to act. 270
265. Interview with Taylor, supra note 162 ("[Y]ou'll find reporters ... and keep [them] informed
throughout the process. Don't just contact [them] when you have a press release, but just keep being in
[their] ear ... keep that reporter ... always thinking about the issues [so] that they are prolific in what
they write and that they're the first to put out a piece on the issue. [This way] other reporters are basically
just responding to that framing that you've already put out there by working so closely with that
reporter.").
266. Interview with Josh, supra note 194 ("I guess it was like 2010 when Arizona had just passed SB
1070 and there was a sort of surge in opposition to 1070 and at the same time, the local campaign staff of
Secure Communities were starting and there was a very stark mention of the DC folks that I remember
that was like 'DC is not Arizona.' And I have a clear memory of sort of this framing of like Arizona is
going one way but like all these other places are going to go a different way and the way we are going to
convey that message of get[ting] local players to say 'We're not that, we're not Arizona, we're not
Arpaio, so we're not going to participate with ICE."'); see also Interview 7 with Jordan, supra note 147
("And in solidarity with Arizona, you have organizers in other parts of the country working with local
governments, distinguishing themselves from Arizona and fighting on the local front.").
267. Interview 7 with Jordan, supra note 147 (noting the downsides to using Arizona and Sheriff
Arpaio in this way. "You know, that, that cuts a little bit both ways ... There also was a little bit of a cost
of kind of us contributing to kind of nationalizing the campaign against Arpaio, of kind of like normalizing, normalizing him too. Like so, I mean, on the one hand, it was a benefit because it created a contrast it
became sort of personification of what we were saying police should not become. The negatives were that
we kind of normalized him. I mean, raising his notoriety created a sort of de-sensitivity to him.");
Interview 5 with Jordan, Attorney, Non-Profit Immigrant Rights Organization (Oct. 17, 2019) (transcript
on file with authors) [hereinafter Interview 5 with Jordan].
268. Interview with Taylor, supra note 162 ("And it's just, you know, it goes back to the civil rights
movement lessons, right? Make things [as] stark as possible and make the contrast, the injustice as clear
as possible in order to get people to care and to take action. For Secure Communities, because it's behind
the scenes, right, it's this thing that happens, you know, behind closed doors in a jail where they take a fingerprint and then send to multiple databases where it gets to DHS, except not particularly tangible or compelling to the public.").
269. DC district Council Today Unanimously Introduces Legislation to Limit Police-ICE
Partnerships. Chants of "No More Arizona's!!!" UNCOVER THE TRUTH (May 4, 2010), https://
uncoverthetruth.org/category/media/press-releases/page/8/
[https://perma.cc/5UYC-NV56]. See also
Interview with Sydney, supra note 177.
270. Interview with Blake, supra note 133 (explaining, "In solidarity with Arizona, organizers in
other parts of the country started working with local governments, distinguishing themselves from AZ
and fighting on the local front."); see also Interview 7 with Jordan, supranote 147.
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Instead of simply pushing back, the second narrative that gained traction
provided an alternative formative vision.2 71 Local campaigns started in proimmigrant communities were labeled "beacon" localities.2 72 The contrast
between "hot spots," such as Arizona and "beacon" localities, such as DC,
provided another way to organize (trans)locally and an identity narrative
around which to construct an emergent national message.
D.

Using Social Science to Support Utilitarian,Public Safety Narrative

NDLON's role was to "frame the overall public message and create talking
points to be adopted by others."2 73 Three possible messaging options were
identified, but only the utilitarian, public safety argument proved viable. To
advance the utilitarian narrative, the advocates needed objective support for
two critical claims. The first claim was that the immigrants most subjected to
S-Comm are not, in fact, serious offenders, but instead, innocent immigrants
or even US citizens.2

74

The government's FOIA disclosures allowed advo-

cates to collaborate with researchers at the University of California, Berkeley
Law School, to examine the demographics of Secure Communities enforcement priorities.2 7 The study's findings supported the advocates' narrative by
showing that "well over half of those deported through Secure Communities
had either no criminal convictions or had been convicted only of very minor
offenses, including traffic offenses and that 3,600 US citizen were arrested by
ICE through S-Comm (1.6% of the cases analyzed).' 2 76 The report concluded

271. Interview 5 with Jordan, supra note 267 ("And then, and then this is the thing, the point that,
that I guess sometimes often get[s] lost, I mean, we really did sort of develop a theory that we needed sort
of an inverse Maricopa County and Arizona SB 1070, and we needed to start to do the, you know, have the
sort of what we call them 'hotspot locations' Phoenix and the beacon locations in California and
Washington, DC. And when I talk about how we were pitching things to grant makers, that was it. It was
sort of like, 'Like it or not, we're in this era of new immigration federalism, and you need to be sort of on
both sides of the extremes. You need to be rushing to the gunfire, and, and then, and then we also need to
be developing a formative kind of opposite, counter bearing examples.' And that was the idea.").
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Interview with Taylor, supranote 162 (describing that the data was used to work with social scientists to create support for advocacy).
275.
AARTI KOHLI, PETER L. MARKOWITZ & LISA CHAVEZ, SECURE COMMUNITIES BY THE NUMBERS:
AN ANALYSIS OF DEMOGRAPHICS AND DUE PROCESS at 3, THE CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN INSTITUTE ON
LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY, (Oct. 2011), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Secure_Communities-by_

the_Numbers.pdf [https://perma.cc/TTT7-MV57] [hereinafter KOHLI, MARKOWITZ & CHAVEZ, SECURE
COMMUNITIES BY THE NUMBERS]; N. WAHAB, RIGHTS WORKING GROUP, FACING THE TRUTH: RACIAL
PROFILING ACROSS AMERICA 7 (2010).
276.
KOHLI, MARKOWITZ & CHAVEZ, SECURE COMMUNITIES BY THE NUMBERS, supra note 275 (find-

ing, "that approximately 3,600 United States citizens have been arrested by ICE through the Secure
Communities program; more than one-third (39%) of individuals arrested through Secure Communities
report that they have a U.S. citizen spouse or child, meaning that approximately 88,000 families with U.S.
citizen members have been impacted by Secure Communities; Latinos comprise 93% of individuals
arrested through Secure Communities though they only comprise 77% of the undocumented population
in the United States; Only 52% of individuals arrested through Secure Communities are slated to have a
hearing before an immigration judge; Only 24% of individuals arrested through Secure Communities and
who had immigration hearings had an attorney compared to 41% of all immigration court respondents
who have counsel; Only 2% of non-citizens arrested through Secure Communities are granted relief from
deportation by an immigration judge as compared to 14% of all immigration court respondents who are
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that S-Comm implementation targeted racial minorities and that those
wrapped up in the complex system were rarely provided legal advice or due
process protections.277
The second claim was that S-Comm decreased community safety because
the immigrant community was less likely to seek police assistance for fear of
immigration repercussions. 2 78 Advocates understood that to reach the middle,

they needed a narrative around community policing and trust in the police. 279
To create this narrative, NDLON built off collaborative relationships forged
with police around 287(g) advocacy. 280 The 2008 collaboration with the
Police Foundation, and the connections made during that time, were used to
galvanize sheriffs and police that were opposed to using local resources
to support immigration enforcement. 281 NDLON went back to the Ford
Foundation seeking funds to conduct a study about public safety in the context of S-Comm. 282 Advocates believed that the veneer of a social science
study helped lend credibility to the claims being made by advocates and were
challenging for the government to rebut. 283 Using these connections, a study
was commissioned to examine the link between S-Comm adoption and public safety. 284 The study, funded with money from the Ford Foundation, was
designed to explore whether police involvement in immigration enforcement
made communities more or less safe. 285 Among the study's conclusions was

granted relief; and [a] large majority (83%) of people arrested through Secure Communities [are] placed
in ICE detention as compared with an overall DHS immigration detention rate of 62%, and ICE does not
appear to be exercising discretion based on its own prioritization system when deciding whether or not to
detain an individual.").
277. Id. at 13.
278. Interview 4 with Jordan, supra note 215. One clear example of how this narrative was the only
one adopted by immigrant rights advocates came out in the advocacy around the passage of California's
TRUST Act (Sanctuary policy). The California Trust Act/Truth Act Advocacy (SB CA 1078) was the
strongest state level sanctuary policy and the speech on the floor of the legislature was only about the
safety issue-there was no civil rights or normative arguments about criminalization of immigrants. While
the government said that the program was designed to target serious criminal offenders, one of the ways
that the advocates undermined S-Comm was to show that serious offenders in fact were only a very small
portion of those being detained under S-Comm. In fact, a large percentage of those being detained were
immigrants charged with very minor offenses.
279. Interview 3 with Jordan, supra note 195 (explaining that this idea of capturing the middle was
long understood in the campaign against S-Comm as well as in the sanctuary movement).
280. See infra notes 281-86.
281. Interview 7 with Jordan, supranote 147.
282. Id.
283. Id. (explaining that the idea for the study came during a meeting with one of the Ford
Foundation senior program officers as they were discussing how to address the question of public safety
related to S-Comm).
284. Interview 2 with Jordan, supra note 131 (identifying Linda Lake from Policy Link and Nik
Theodore, Professor, Urban Planning & Policy, University of Illinois at Chicago, as critical collaborators.
The Co-Executive Director of NDLON, Pablo Alvarado, met Linda Lake at a previous conference and
talked about the possibility of future collaboration and the S-Comm study made that possible.).
285. NIK THEODORE, DEP'T OF URBAN PLANNING AND POLICY UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT CHICAGO,
INSECURE COMMUNITIES: LATINO PERCEPTIONS OF POLICE INVOLVEMENT IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT

(MAY 2013), https://www.policylink.org/sites/default/files/INSECURECOMMUNITIES_REPORT_
FINAL.PDF [https://perma.cc/VE5E-ASE4] (establishing that "the survey was designed to assess the
impact of police involvement in immigration enforcement on Latinos' perceptions of public safety and
their willingness to contact the police when crimes have been committed," and that "[t]he survey was
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that in communities with S-Comm, forty-four percent of undocumented
immigrants were less likely to contact police officers for fear that police officers would use these interactions as an opportunity to inquire into their immigration status or that of people they knew. 286
E.

Opt-In, Opt-Out Confusion Supports Narrativeof Government as
Deceptive

The roll-out of S-Comm was fraught with inconsistent messaging to the
public and differing expectations internally between DHS and ICE, both of
which fed into the anti-S-Comm narrative. From late 2009 to October 2010,
ICE publicly represented that S-Comm was "voluntary" and presented localities the opportunity to "opt-out" of program participation. 287 The internal
documents reveal several underlying issues that appear to have led ICE to
launch the program by means of voluntary participation. First, on legal
grounds, ICE was concerned that mandatory compliance with S-Comm
raised Tenth Amendment concerns. 288 Second, while representations were
made that the system was "technologically ready" for full deployment early
in 2010, a decision was made to wait until 2013 to mandate full compliance
to get staffing and other resources in place. 28 9 Finally, ICE hoped that providing states and localities an opportunity to opt out would encourage voluntary
participation and minimize opposition. 290
The launch appeared flawed from the beginning as the messaging ICE
pushed to the public did not comport with their own internal messaging.
Publicly, the government described S-Comm as an opt-out or opt-in program,
but internally program participation was described as a "policy decision" that
conducted in English and Spanish by professional interviewers during the period November 17 to
December 10, 2012.").
286. Id.
287. ICE, Setting the Record Straight, supra note 254.
288. ICE FOIA 10-674.0002927. ("SC's position that participation in the 'Secure Communities initiative' is voluntary is supported by applicable case-law. Under the Tenth Amendment, '[t]he Federal
Government may not compel the States to implement, by legislation or executive action, federal regulatory programs.' Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925 (1997)." The memo goes on to make a distinction between program and other government actions such as initiatives, strategies or plans and finds
ultimately "[t]herefore, even though ICE may not truly consider SC a 'program' in the same manner as,
e.g., CAP, a court may find that SC's infrastructure, purpose, and activities mark it a program and, thus,
could find that ICE cannot compel LEAs to participate.").
289. Interview with Sawyer, U.S. Immigr. and Customs Enf't (Jan. 14, 2020) (transcript on file with
authors).
290. ICE FOIA 10-674.0002927. In some of the first internal documents exposing the program's
inconsistencies the government states the following: "LEA participation in SC's current deployment
plan, which runs through 2012, [is] not mandatory. Local jurisdictions inside a State with an MOA with
SC that do not want to participate must formally notify their SIB and ICE (via letter, email or facsimile).
Upon notification, ICE will request a meeting with CJIS, the LEA, and the SIB to discuss the request and
come to a resolution, which may include adjusting the jurisdiction's activation date or removing the jurisdiction from the deployment plan. Because Secure Communities' MOA is with the SIB, and CJIS currently requires an SIB to approve LEA Activation, Secure Communities' current internal position is that
the decision to allow an LEA to 'opt out' rests with the state (i.e. state can veto LEA). Negotiations
between CJIS, SC, and the various states, however, are fluid; therefore, the procedures by which an LEA
may 'opt out' (or even 'opt in') may change soon depending on future negotiations."
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would ultimately require all jurisdictions to participate. 2 91 Additionally, DHS

and ICE were not communicating with each other, and the Department and
Agency had different understandings about the implementation of S-Comm.
Unlike ICE, DHS did not think that there was a commandeering problem.
DHS officials reasoned that since states voluntarily submit fingerprints to the
FBI, the federal government has control over the fingerprints. 292 Once under
federal control, DHS believed that they could share this information with
other federal agencies, obviating the need for MOAs. 293
Internally, DHS officials did a lot of "head scratching," wondering why a
written agreement was required. 294 Originally, DHS assumed that the MOAs
were used simply to share information about how the process would work. 295
Despite the belief that MOAs were unnecessary, one DHS government official believed that "somebody at a key point in the implementation said, well,
let's just use as a [prior] model, and the agreements used for [the] 287(g)
[program] were modified to fit S-Comm even though the government did not
believe that implementation required agreement on both sides. 2 96 This left

DHS officials in a quagmire. On one side were states and localities that
wanted to opt-out publicly, leaving DHS to navigate the question of the program as optional or mandatory. On the other side were states and localities
that wanted to sign onto the program but needed the political cover of a "federal mandate." 297 In retrospect, DHS officials admitted that they were "not
2 98
tracking the issue that closely.''
With confusion abound, on July 27, 2010, Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren
sent a letter to United States Attorney General Eric Holder and Secretary of
Homeland Security Janet Napolitano seeking "a clear explanation of how
local law enforcement agencies may optout of Secure Communities by having the fingerprints they collect and submit to the SIBs checked against
291. ICE FOIA 10-674.0002927 (claims it is a "policy decision" and technologically ready now but
will wait until 2013 until all will participate
regardless of desire. "According to SC, however, Assistant
Director David Venturella and the SJIC Director met last week and reached an agreement by which CJIS
Will send ICE, starting in 2013, all fingerprint requests from any LEAs that do not participate in SC. This
information-sharing ability is technologically available now; however, for policy reasons and to ensure
adequate resources are in place, SC and CJIS have currently chosen to wait until 2013 until sharing info
without state/local participation.").
292. Interview with Avery, supranote 164 (explaining that once the states voluntarily submit the fingerprints to the FBI, the fingerprints are "federally possessed," and they can share the information with
other federal agencies without running afoul of anti-commandeering concerns).
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id. (describing the MOA's as a way of sharing information about the process, and what gets triggered and what the government will do with the information).
296. Id.
297. Id. (stating that "[s]ome local politician didn't want to have to sign on because of the local
options ... sometimes governors, sometimes mayors, sometimes police chiefs, depending on the structure
locally, and once it started to become a controversial issue ... we'd hear from some of those governor's
offices asking 'why are you putting us in .. . the position where we have to sign on and agree to it? You
know, you should just go ahead and do it. It's just a federal function.' There was a lot to that.").
298. Interview with Sam, supra note 180 (explaining, that the letter comes from Lofgren to Sec.
Napolitano's executive secretary who sends it back to ICE for a reply. It goes to the office of the general
counsel and there was insufficient monitoring of the response).
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criminal, but not immigration databases." 299 On August 10, 2010, before the
Secretary replied, FOIA documents were released 00 creating "[w]idespread
confusion ... about how jurisdictions can choose not to participate in SComm." 30 1 In response, a week later, ICE publicly released a memo detailing
the opt-out process that included formal notification and follow-up meetings
to address any issues. 30 2 ICE expressly stated that "removing [a] jurisdiction
from the deployment plan" was an option.303
On September 7, 2010, Secretary Napolitano replied to Congresswoman
Lofgren by describing the steps that must be taken by a locality that does not
wish to participate in the Secure Communities deployment plan, explaining
that "[i]f a local law enforcement agency chooses not to be activated in the
Secure Communities deployment plan, it will be the responsibility of that
agency to notify its local ICE field office of suspected criminal aliens."30 4
As one former highly ranked government official said, "after Secretary
305
Napolitano sent out the reply, all hell [broke] loose."'
The first effort to officially "opt-out" was backed by the organizing efforts
of the anti-S-Comm coalition in Washington, DC. Organizers hoped to capitalize on the outsized impact that could be gained through access to The
Washington Post, a national news outlet. 306 Strategically, organizers hoped
that local victories would generate press and provide a roadmap for other
localities to do the same.30 7 That same month, advocates in San Francisco
(SF) capitalized upon a good relationship with the Sheriff, who himself
devised a strategy to "opt out" of S-Comm publicly. 308 The SF Sheriff,
Sheriff Hennessey, directed the Attorney General to renegotiate the contract
299. Letter from Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren to AG Eric Holder and DHS Secretary Napolitano
dated July 27, 2010, http://uncoverthetruth.org/resources/docs-reports/july-27-2010-letter-fromrepresentative-zoe-lofgren/ ("I am writing to follow up on recent conversations that I have had with each
of you regarding the current deployment of ICE's Secure Communities program. As we discussed, Secure
Communities is a voluntary program that relies upon the resources of both of your agencies in order to
provide State, local, and federal law enforcement agencies with information related to the immigration
status of persons booked into our nation's jails and prisons.... Please provide me with a clear explanation
of how local law enforcement agencies may opt out of Secure Communities by having the fingerprints they
collect and submit to the SIBs checked against criminal, but not immigration databases.").
300.

BRIEFING GUIDE TO "SECURE COMMUNITIES," supra note 253.

301. Id. at 3 (explaining that the desire not to participate in S-Comm is "due to concern about how
the program will impact community policing initiatives and public safety.").
302. ICE, Setting the Record Straight, supra note 254.
303. Id.
304. Letter from Sec. Napolitano to Rep. Lofgren (Sept. 7, 2010), http://crocodoc.com/yzmmKP
(stating, "[a] local law enforcement agency that does not wish to participate in the Secure Communities
deployment plan must formally notify the Assistant Director for the Secure Communities program. The
agency must also notify the appropriate state identification bureau.. .. If a local law enforcement agency
chooses not to be activated in the Secure Communities deployment plan it will be the responsibility of the
state agency to notify its local ICE field office of suspected criminal aliens.").
305. Interview with Sam, supra note 180.
306. Interview with Sydney, supra note 177.
307.

TOOLKIT FOR

ADVOCATES,

UNCOVER

THE

TRUTH,

http://uncoverthetruth.org/wp-content/

uploads/2010/09/S-COMM-Toolkit-07-08-2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/WE2W-YZLY]; see also Interview
with Sydney, supra note 177.
308. Interview 2 with Jordan, supra note 131; Michele Waslin, Counties Say No to ICE's Secure
Communities Program, But is Opting Out Possible? IMMIGRATIONIMPACT.COM (Oct. 1, 2010),
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with ICE as a mechanism to unlock local jurisdictions' ability to opt-out. 309
Using ICE's own language as a tool, Sheriff Hennessey sent the request publicly, and ICE responded that state officials, as opposed to local sheriffs, had
to make the formal request. 310 The state of California, in turn, denied the
Sheriff's request generating considerable confusion about whether opting-out
was possible. Sheriff Hennessey renewed his request relying upon the express
process outlined by Secretary Napolitano on September 7, 2010.311 Santa
Clara and Arlington counties followed and voted to opt-out of S-Comm on
the same day. 312
ICE officials were concerned about a "domino effect" where one county's
"opt out" would lead to many others, 313 while at the same time keeping an
eye on "difficult interoperability deployment locales" that ICE officials
deemed reluctant to participate.314 To counter this possibility, ICE hired a
global public relations and digital marketing agency focused on crisis communications, brand marketing, and social media to lead messaging efforts to
maintain a positive image for the program.3" But, consistent messaging
https://immigrationimpact.com/2010/10/01/counties-say-no-to-ices-secure-communities-program-but-isopting-out-possible/#.Xj2wC2hKg2w [https://perma.cc/92JZ-HR94].
309. Interview 4 with Jordan, supra note 215.
310. ICE, Setting the Record Straight, supra note 254 (stating that "[i]f a jurisdiction does not wish
to activate on its scheduled date in the Secure Communities deployment plan, it must formally notify its
state identification bureau and ICE in writing (email, letter, or fax). Upon receipt of that information, ICE
will request a meeting with federal partners, the jurisdiction, and the state to discuss any issues and come
to a resolution, which may include adjusting the jurisdiction's activation date in or removing the jurisdiction from the deployment plan."); see also Interview 2 with Jordan, supra note 131 (explaining that ICE
sent the head of Secure Communities (or the assistant head) to San Francisco to meet directly with the
Sheriff).
311. Letter from Sheriff Hennessey to California Atty. Gen. Brown, Exec. Dir. of Secure Cmtys.,
Mr. David Venturella, and Deputy Dir. of Secure Cmtys., Mr. Marc A. Rapp (Aug. 31, 2009).
312. Arlington and Santa Clara Join SF in Demanding to Opt Out of Flawed ICE Program, ASIAN
AMERICANS ADVANCING JUST. (Sept. 30, 2010), https://www.advancingjustice-alc.org/newsandmedia/
arlington-and-santa-clara-join-sf-in-demanding-to-opt-out-of-flawed-ice-program/
[https://perma.cc/
FM2B-73NF]; see also Interview with Sydney, supra note 177 (explaining that when Santa Clara and
Arlington County opted-out of S-Comm on the same day, Sept. 28, 2010, the government recognized they
had a big problem).
313. ICE FOIA 10-2674.0003245 ("The domino effect is starting. I spoke with Mr. Beiers, Chief
Deputy County Counsel for San Mateo this morning and hopefully answered all of his questions. He
asked for some reading material and sample messages they will be receiving. I also spoke with Marin
County Juvenile Probation yesterday and they were quite agitated about the program being 'forced' on
them and why the Chief Probation Officers were not invited to the outreach. I told him I would be happy
to come speak to him so I will work on arranging it. I'm guessing this is just the tip of the iceberg....").
314. ICE FOIA 10-2674.001812, Email from Dan Cadman to Marc Rapp and Vincent Archibeque titled "Strategy for difficult interoperability deployment locales" (Nov. 9, 2009) (exposing what ICE refers
to as "difficult interoperability deployment locales").
315. ICE FOIA 10-2674.0004996, Email from Senior VP at Fleishman-Hillard to Randi Greenberg
about postings of letters by "deportation Nation" on government's position on opt-out (Sept. 20, 2010)
("Randi, just identified that our 'friends' from Deportation Nation have posted the letters sent from DOJ
and DHS to Rep. Lofgren regarding 'opting out.' Wanted you to have this ASAP so there are no surprises.
The posting online of the letters reinforces the current 'opt out' policy and adds more pressure to when we
announce the new policy, as now there are two separate documents posted online that reflect the current
policy. We might want to revisit what tactics should be undertaken when that policy is announced, likely
on October 6th. As you know, I am still an advocate of some kind of online release of the policy so that it
too comes up when reporters and others begin searching. I'd rather the stories at least include our reasoning as to why the change and not just the position of the Deportation Nations of the world. Free to discuss
at your convenience.").
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appeared elusive. Even an official from the FBI's Criminal Justice
Information Services Division (CJIS), who assumed the program was mandatory, was confused after reading Secretary Napolitano's letter, stating in an
email that "reading the response alone would lead one to believe that a site
can elect never to participate should they wish (at least it reads that way on
my small [Blackberry] screen)." 31 6
Understanding that voluntary participation across the board was unlikely,
ICE started to reframe the meaning of "opt-out," explaining that information
sharing between the federal agencies was mandatory, but states and localities
retained the ability to opt-out of receiving information back on any
matches. 317 As one advocate explained,
I think [ICE] wanted to give the illusion of choice and they were hoping no one would exercise it. Maybe they were initially correct because
the immigrant rights movement was so singularly focused on federal
answers. But the local campaigns cropped up all over and started to
change things. [Advocates] were not just protesting on the streets but
were talking to local officials that had the power to actually change
things and this is when I think things started to shift. 318
Internal emails make it clear that in September 2010, ICE planned to move
from optional to mandatory S-Comm participation, and they were trying to
figure out how to match the media presence of the S-Comm detractors, who
were identified in emails as "the Deportation Nations of the world." 319 On
September 9, 2010, ICE asked attorneys to gather support to reverse policy
and mandate participation by state and local governments.3 2 Specifically,
Beth Gibson, ICE Assistant Deputy Director, directed ICE attorneys to
"rewrite" an earlier memo that had supported opt-out and raised constitutional concerns about making S-Comm mandatory. 321 ICE employees shared

316. FBI-SC-1719.
317. ICE FOIA 10-2674.0005131 (May 20, 2010) (Marc Rupp in briefing the House Judiciary
Committee explains ICE's intent: "As far as the intent we are trying to make it clear that there is no
direct information-sharing happening between local law enforcement and ICE, but rather between ICE
and CJIS which is already federally mandated. Additionally, we want to demonstrate the immigration
response "shared" back to local routes through CJIS and the states, thereby providing the opportunity for
locals to opt-out. ICE would ideally like to receive any prints transmitted to CJIS, again highlighting limited or no change to current operating procedures. We are open to all suggestions for how to convey those
messages, as currently there seems to be some confusion ... .You are able to opt out of this at this point if
you are a local government.").
318. Interview with Sydney, supranote 177.
319. ICE FOIA 10-2674.0004996, Email from Senior VP at Fleishman-Hillard to Randi Greenberg
about postings of letters by "deportation Nation" on government's position on opt-out (Sept. 20, 2010).
320. See e-mail from Beth Gibson, Assistant Deputy Dir., U.S. Immigr. and Customs Enf't, to David
Venturella, former Assistant Dir., U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf't (Sept. 9, 2010, 7:40 AM), http://
uncoverthetruth.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/ICE-FOIA-10-2674.0002997-0003001.pdf.
321. A Briefing Guide to the Secure Communities October 2, 2010 "Mandatory Memo," UNCOVER
THE TRUTH 1 (2012), http://uncoverthetruth.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/1-9-12-Briefing-Guide-Oct2-Mandatory-Memo.pdf; Nat'l Day Laborer Org. Network v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf't, 827 F.
Supp. 2d. 242, 258-59 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); see also ICE FOIA 10-2674.0003726, Email from Sec. Chief,
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frustration about the lack of clarity and necessary information as they tried to
bring localities onboard. 32 2 In one email exchange between ICE employees,
one writes,

"I have a silly question[-]and I ask only because you've [had numerous] conversations with Randi on this issue. Is there any reason we
don't say NO or YES on whether a LEA agency can opt out? I understand the answer is No, but wanted to know the latest and greatest
reasoning."3

While ICE employees were working with some willing state participants,
they were getting frustrated with the "constant pressure from the NGOs and a
lack of clear opt-out messaging or federal mandate."3 2 4
High-level correspondence within ICE-between Beth Gibson, Assistant
Deputy Director of ICE; David Venturella, Executive Director of Secure

Communities; and Peter Vincent, Principal Legal Advisor for ICE-evidences
the Department's attempt to retroactively establish "legal support for the
'mandatory' nature of participation by 2013."325 As late as September 29,
2010, despite messaging help from a public relations firm, S-Comm employees could not answer the question of whether a local government could opt out
of participation. 326 On October 1, 2010, Beth Gibson expressed concern about

Enforcement. L. Sec., Office of the Principal Legal Advisor, to redacted recipients (Sept. 29, 2010, 3:22
PM) (on file with authors).
322. ICE FOIA 10-2674.0195612 (Sept. 29, 2010) (ICE S-Comm Regional Coordinator did not have
access to the Congresswoman Lofgren's letters and dialogue with Napolitano, while the local governments seemed to have what was needed to support opting out (e.g., Allegheny Co., PA and Multnomah
Co., OR): "This is the second time I've seen a message referencing the S1-Congresswoman Lofgren dialogue. [Redacted] of CJIS referred to it the other day in an email discussion about going forward with activation in Allegheny County Pennsylvania. Shouldn't we be given a copy of said letter, so we can be
guided accordingly? Apparently, any number of other parties are privy to it.").
323. E-mail from [redacted] to [redacted] (provided from Secure Communities: Communications
and Outreach Office: Blackberry) (Sept. 29, 2010)).
324. ICE FOIA 10-2674.0195612 (Sept. 29, 2010) ("The Oregon SIB is supportive of SC, but they
are getting frustrated with the constant pressure from the NGOs and a lack of clear opt-out messaging or
federal mandate.").
325. E-mail from Beth Gibson, Assistant Deputy Dir., U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf't, to David
Venturella, former Assistant Dir., U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf't (Sept. 9, 2010, 7:40 AM), http://
uncoverthetruth.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/ICE-FOIA-10-2674.0002997-0003001.pdf. In these email exchanges, Beth Gibson, David Venturella, Peter Vincent, and unknown ICE officials, including the
Director of Enforcement and Litigation in the Office of the Principal Legal Advisor, go back and forth,
trying to figure out who should and how they will gather "the legal support for the 'mandatory' nature of
participation in 2013." Id. On September 29, 2010, Beth Gibson writes, "In terms of specific meeting
get backs OPLA is gathering the legal support for the 'mandatory' nature of participation in 2013
SC is drafting revised language to describe the shift from the current 'voluntary' formula to the 2013"
formula." Id.
326. ICE FOIA 10-2674.0005515 (Sept. 29, 2010). The "to" and "from" in the e-mails are redacted
from the record, but the text of the e-mails still clearly illustrate that internally, as of September 29, 2010,
ICE employees could not simply answer "yes" or "no" to the opt-out question. Even with help from the
public relations firm, the questions did not provide an easy yes/no answer.

From: [mailto: [redacted]]
Sent: Wednesday, September 29, 2010 9:27 AM
To: [redacted]

Subject: RE: Opt Out Q&A
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an anticipated article by The Washington Post that would "keep the heat
on.327 On that same day, The Washington Post reported that ICE "now says
that opting out of the program is not a realistic possibility[-]and never
was."328 It was a day later, on October 2, 2010, that Riah Ramlogan, Deputy
Principal Legal Advisor, sent a memo to Beth Gibson, Assistant Deputy
Director for ICE, presenting legal arguments to support the position that participation in Secure Communities would be mandatory in 2013. This memo
directly contradicted the initial memo issued on the same question in 2008.329
While ICE agreed to meet and negotiate the timing of S-Comm implementation at the local level, the agency asserted that since the program ultimately
involved information sharing between federal agencies, localities did not
have an option regarding participation. 330 ICE removed the "opt-out" instructions from its website in October 2010, when Secretary Napolitano began to
contradict her earlier representation, stating that "we do not view this as an
opt-in, opt-out program." 331

I have a silly question[ ]and I ask only because you've had numerous conversations with Randi on
this issue. Is there any reason we don't say NO or YES on whether a LEA agency can opt out. I understand
the answer is No, but wanted to know the latest and greatest reasoning. Secure Communities:
Communications and Outreach Office: Blackberry.
In response, this e-mail was sent:
To:
Subject: RE: Opt Out Q&A
That's not a silly question at all. In this case, it's not a yes or no answer because yes, they can opt of
receiving the IDR, but no they can't opt out of having fingerprints checked against IDENT by 2013.
However, we're also about to have a meeting with the SF Sheriff so we don't want to totally pre-empt that
meeting. So the first question here attempts to address the opting out question by explaining that yes they
can opt out of the IDR. The second question gets to the heart of the issue which is ok well does opting out
then mean that their prints don't get checked against IDENT ... there we're pretty straightforward in that
they will still be checked, noting that this program has proven its value and that Congress directed us to
go after criminal aliens, which is what we're doing. Then the third question takes it that next step to get to
what if they don't want to give you their prints. We could actually reorder that one to put the last couple
sentences at the beginning. Long story short. We're trying to be sensitive, at least until we talk to SF.
Ideally, we would be able to give them a yes or no.
327. E-mail from Beth Gibson, Assistant Deputy Dir., U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf't, to Peter
Vincent, former Principal Legal Advisor, Office of the Principal Legal Advisor; & David Venturella, former Assistant Dir., U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf't (Oct. 1, 2010, 5:39 AM), http://uncoverthetruth.org/
wp-content/uploads/2011/02/ICE-FOIA-10-2674.0002997-0003001.pdf ("I expect the WP article today
to keep the heat on this issue. Any sense of eta?").
328. Shankar Vedantam, No Opt-Out for Immigration Enforcement, WASH. POST (Oct. 1, 2010),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/30/AR2010093007268pf.html
(including
a comment from an anonymous senior ICE official, who claimed, "Secure Communities is not based on state
or local cooperation in federal law enforcement." The only way out of S-Comm would be for local officials to
refuse to send fingerprints to another federal agency, but "[s]tate and local law enforcement agencies are
going to continue to fingerprint people and those fingerprints are forwarded to the FBI for criminal checks.
ICE will take immigration action appropriately.").
329. See ICE FOIA 100-2674.0010795, Memorandum from Riah Ramlogan, Deputy Principal Legal
Advisor, U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf't, to Beth Gibson, Assistant Deputy Dir., U.S. Immigr. & Customs
Enf't, (Oct. 2, 2010) https://epic.org/privacy/secure-communities/ice-secure-communities-memo.pdf
("Based on applicable statutory authority, legislative history, and case law, we conclude that participation
in Secure Communities will be mandatory in 2013 without violating the Tenth Amendment.").
330. See Shankar Vedantam, Federal Immigration Program Is Applied Inconsistently in Region,
WASH. POST (Feb. 26, 2011, 7:28 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/
02/26/AR2011022603582.html.
331. Ren6e Feltz & Stokely Baksh, ICE Attributes Record Deportation Levels to Secure
Communities, DEPORTATION NATION (Oct. 6, 2010), https://web.archive.org/web/20101014021156/
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In retrospect, despite the concerted time and effort spent internally strategizing how best to message S-Comm to the public, the Department only managed to create more confusion. 33 2 ICE officials blamed political actors that
"got more defensive and gun shy and [tried to] control [the messaging] and
[it] didn't help." 333 Congresswoman Lofgren accused the Secretary of misleading her, 334 and congressional staff confirmed that there was a perception
in Congress that DHS/ICE was "shifting perspectives on the program and
was lying." 33 5 The lack of clarity and shifting positions only fed into the SComm detractor's narrative of government duplicity. Even a high-ranking
DHS official described that there was "deep mistrust in the [D]epartment and
336
... [the] whole thing felt duplicitous."
F.

Advocacy After MandatoryS-Comm

In the face of mandatory compliance at the federal level, advocates shifted
focus to state and local levels.3" While some state and local advocacy was
already underway or well developed, the federal government's clear
http://www.deportationnation.org/2010/10/ice-attributes-record-deportation-levels-to-securecommunities.
332. ICE FOIA 10-2674.0003849.
I wanted to inform you of some recent happenings at SC. There has been a lot of media attention
recently in California, specifically the San Francisco Bay Area regarding a jurisdiction's ability to "optout" of participating in Secure Communities. While we still believe a jurisdiction can "opt-out" of receiving the second response containing immigration related information, we've been asked to clarify our
stance on a jurisdiction choosing not to participate at all-meaning fingerprint submissions do not get sent
from CJIS onto DHS/IDENT. ICE and CJIS are working together to draft a proper response to this question that will be shared with US-VISIT as soon as we're ready.
333. Interview with Sawyer, supranote 289.
334. Interview with Sam, supra note 180 ("At some point the White House under the pressure from
the advocacy groups got involved and wanted to conduct a review of the program. Despite our frustrations
with ICE, despite with what we viewed as a massive gross mismanagement by ICE, despite the ridiculous
self-inflicted confusion regarding . . . whether it was a mandate or not or voluntary or compulsory program, as far as the states were concerned, we conducted our own review at the Department with the
Secretary and concluded, [that] [t]his program was essential to accomplishing the larger policy goals [of]
the Obama administration, which is to transition the agency to one that focuses on public safety.").
335. Interview with Quinn, supra note 188 (Chief Counsel, H. Judiciary Subcomm. on Immigration
and Citizenship) ("ICE was just lying to us. Later we found out that they were knowingly lying to us and
deliberately lying to us.").
336. Interview with Sam, supranote 180.
337. Despite a concerted shift to the state and local levels, NDLON did not give up on federal pressure. NDLON circulated a petition to the Assistant Director of S-Comm and Secretary Napolitano renewing the request that states and localities retain the ability to opt out; see ICE FOIA 10-2674.0006032, Email to Marc Rapp (Oct. 15, 2010) (sender information has been redacted). "Marc, NDLON (and other
orgs) are circulating an online petition (http://action.altoarizona.com/p/dia/action/public/?actionKEY=
4383 [https://perma.cc/A5JA-X8X6]) to send to Napolitano requesting that localities be able to opt out of
SC. We have developed a set of Talking Points to help POA with any responses they may receive
regarding this. If you have a moment to review what we have drafted, I'd like your thoughts or edits if
you have any. Includes talking points to respond to questions about petition to make S-Comm [o]pt[] out.
" In response, ICE prepared to respond to anticipated publicity; see ICE FOIA 10-2674.0006573 (Oct. 15,
2010), in which ICE is trying to get approval for responding with talking points to the NDOLON petition
they need approval from CJIS. ICE wanted to make sure to get a timely response since the petition was
out and would likely get some press: "Susan, Concerning the petition and the relevant [t]alking point
language you are running by CJIS; can you ask that we receive their comments/approval by COB
Monday October 18th. The issue is timely, since the petition is out and will most likely generate some
press. Kind regards, Secure Communities, ICE desk."
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pronouncement of mandatory compliance fed the sanctuary city rebellion.
Ordinances in the District of Columbia, Santa Clara, California, and Cook
County, Illinois, declared that their respective law enforcement officers shall
not enforce any immigration detainers without a written agreement from the
federal government promising to pay the full cost of the detainer.338 Chicago
passed a "Welcoming City" anti-detainer ordinance that barred compliance
with detainers, except in cases involving major crimes, outstanding criminal
warrants, or gang members.3 39 States such as California 4 ' and Connecticut 3 4 1

sought legislative solutions-known as TRUST Acts-limiting state obligations to comply with federal immigration detainers.3 42
In April 2011, disturbed by DHS's shift in position as exposed through the
now publicized FOIA documents, Congresswoman Lofgren requested an
investigation into any misconduct, including possible violations of criminal
law.3 43 As sanctuary advocacy continued on the state and local levels, ICE

338. Phil Mendelson, Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary, Report on Bill 19-585, "Immigration
Detainer Compliance Amendment Act of 2012," at 6, 11-12 (2012) (noting that the District of Columbia
bill requires Department of Correction holds pursuant to ICE detainers to be executed only where ICE
agreed to reimburse the Department); Santa Clara, Cal., Policy Res. 2011-504, 2011 Bd. of Supervisors
(Cal. 2011) (resolving to decline compliance with immigration detainers unless the federal government
agreed to pay the costs of detention, and then only if the prisoner were convicted of a serious crime and
not a juvenile); COOK COUNTY, ILL., CODE § 46-37(a) (2011).
339. CHI., ILL. MUN. CODE § 2-173-042(c) (2012). Press Release, City of Chicago, Mayor Emanuel
Introduces Welcoming City Ordinance (July 10, 2012), https://www.chicago.gov/city/en/depts/mayor/
press room/press releases/2012/july_2012/mayoremanuel_introduceswelcomingcityordinance.html
[https://perma.cc/3DGU-9XS7] (claiming that it would "prevent law abiding Chicagoans from being
unfairly detained and deported").
340. The California "TRUST (Transparency and Responsibility Using State Tools) Act," aimed at
limiting the State's compliance with federal immigration detainers, was signed into law on October 5,
2013. See Assemb. B. 4, 2013-2014 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013) (codified at CAL. GOv'T. CODE §§ 7282,
7282.5
(West 2014)), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/13-14/bill/asm/ab_0001-0050/ab_4_bill_
20130624_amended_senv97.pdf [https://perma.cc/RV8N-EWLE]; see also AB-4 State Government:
Federal Immigration Policy Enforcement, CAL. LEGIS. INFO., http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/
billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201320140AB4 [https://perma.cc/4LY8-A38G] (last visited May 17,
2014) (providing the bill's history).
341. In June 2013, the Connecticut General Assembly passed, and the Governor signed into law, a
bill that will expand the limitations on detainer compliance beyond the Department of Correction to other
state and local law enforcement agencies. H.B. 6659, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2013) (codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-192(h) (2014)), http://www.cga.ct.gov/2013/act/pa/pdf/2013PA-00155ROOHB-06659-PA.pdf [https://perma.cc/MRE4-QQ8J].
342. For examples of similar legislation proposed in other states, see ICE Enforcement and Removal
Operations Weekly Declined Detainer Outcome Report for Recorded Declined Detainers Feb 11 - Feb
17, 2017, Section III: Table of Jurisdictions that have Enacted Policies which Restrict Cooperation with
ICE, https://www.ice.gov/doclib/ddor/ddor20l7_02-11to02-17.pdf. In Florida, the latest attempts to pass
a Trust Act were SB 1674 and HB 1407, which both died in committee on May 5, 2017. Previous
attempts to pass similar legislation to HB 767 and SB 730 died in committee in 2013. In Massachusetts,
the most recent attempts were made during the 2015-2016 legislative session via bills S.1258 and H.1228.
Both were unsuccessful. Previous attempts (Bill S.1135 and H.1613) were also unsuccessful.
343. Letter from Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren to Charles K. Edwards, Acting Inspector General,
Dep't of Homeland Sec. (Apr. 28, 2011), http://big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/LofgrenFollowUp.pdf
[https://perma.cc/65B6-VUE6] ("In recent months, it appears that Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) personnel and contract staff may have made
false and misleading statements to local governments, the public, and [m]embers of Congress in
connection with the deployment of the Secure Communities program. In response to a Freedom of
Information Act request, ICE and the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) have released many
thousands of pages of documents, including internal e-mails and memoranda. Having conducted with my
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was still searching for "statutory underpinnings" to support the mandatory
nature of the program344 and combatting negative publicity.345 On May 9,
2011, an ICE whistleblower sent a letter to Congresswoman Lofgren stating
"that confusion over opting out of Secure Communities has arisen ...
because of the government's vacillation, policy shifts and inconsistent public
stance.' 3 46 Sufficiently concerned over the issues raised by the ICE whistleblower, on May 17, 2011, Congresswoman Lofgren requested that the DHS
Office of Inspector General (OIG) expedite the investigation. 347 The OIG
ultimately issued two reports, the latter of which concluded
We did not find evidence that ICE intentionally misled the public
or States and local jurisdictions during implementation of Secure
Communities. However, ICE did not clearly communicate to stakeholders the intent of Secure Communities and their expected participation... . As a result, [three] years after implementation began,
Secure Communities continues to face opposition, criticism, and resistance in some locations. 348
In 2013, DHS and ICE shifted leadership. John Morton left as the Director
of ICE and was replaced by Acting Director John Sandweg. Jeh Johnson
replaced Janet Napolitano as Secretary of DHS. 349 In light of ongoing criticism of Obama's record on immigration enforcement, even after Director

legal staff an initial review of the documents that have been made public, I believe that some of these false
and misleading statements may have been made intentionally, while others were made recklessly, knowing that the statements were ambiguous and likely to create confusion.").
344. ICE FOIA 10-2674.0176067, E-mail from Riah Ramlogan to Bill Orrick and Peter Vincent
(May 9, 2011) (requesting a meeting between DOJ and ICE to clear up continued questions on the mandatory or opt-out nature of S-Comm). They are looking to find "statutory underpinnings" that were previously provided to Beth Gibson with the October 2010 memo.
345. ICE FOIA 10-2674.0158366, Barbara Gonzalez, Press Secretary of ICE, writes
"I know these meetings can be a bit hostile, but the community appreciates when we show up.
I've attended these local meetings and the response has been good because they appreciate our
willingness to speak. Do we know if media will be present?" Gary Mead, Executive Associate
Director of Enforcement and Removal Operations of ICE, writes, "At first we thought this was
going to be NGO's meeting with LEAs on the problems with SC. If that was the case I was
inclined to attend to support the LEAs with the facts on SC. If this is just a community meeting
with no LEAs present, I am having second thoughts. What do you think?" Beth Gibson writes,
"Not going to go if the media is there: 'I am happy to go if media is not present."'

346. Letter from Dan Cadman to Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren (May 9, 2011) (on file with authors).
347. Letter from Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren to Charles K. Edwards, Acting Inspector General,
Dep't of Homeland Sec. (May 17, 2011), http://big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/LofgrenFollowUp.pdf
[https://perma.cc/65B6-VUE6] (In support of her request, Congresswoman Lofgren cited a letter from a
former contractor who served as an ICE Regional Coordinator within the S-Comm program that raised
questions about staff responsibility for misleading statements).
348.
DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 0IG, COMMUNICATION REGARDING PARTICIPATION IN SECURE
COMMUNITIES 1 (June 2014), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2012/OIG_12-66_Jun14.pdf [https://
perma.cc/TCB3-RSUL].
349. Seung Min Kim, Johnson OK'ed for Homeland Security, POLITICO (Dec. 16, 2013), https://
www.politico.com/story/2013/12/jeh-johnson-department-of-homeland-security-senate-101213
[https://
perma.cc/QQP9-BLMD].
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Morton's memoranda specifically limited interior enforcement priorities,35 0
pressure remained on the Administration to take further action. Secretary
Johnson wanted to take a different approach and "appear more progressive
on immigration." 35 1

In November 2014, in what advocates believe was an intentional move
designed to quiet the sanctuary city revolt, 5 2 Secretary Johnson issued a
memorandum ending S-Comm and creating the Priority Enforcement
Program (PEP). 35 3 Several of the themes employed by advocates were proffered as reasons for ending the program. At the time, Secretary Johnson noted
that S-Comm "has attracted a great deal of criticism, is widely misunderstood, and is embroiled in litigation;3 5 4 its very name has become a symbol
350. Memorandum from John Morton, Homeland Sec. Assistant Sec'y, to All Ice Employees, Civil
Immigration Enforcement: Priorities for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens, (June 30,
2010),
www.ice.gov/doclib/news/releases/2010/civil-enforcement-priorities.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
B9WK-VA57] (explicitly limiting interior enforcement priorities to people with criminal convictions,
recent arrivals, and immigrant fugitives (those who failed to comply with removal orders); Memorandum
from John Morton, ICE Dir., to All Field Office Dirs., All Special Agents in Charge, All Chief Counsel,
Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the
Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens (June 17, 2011), https://www.ice.gov/
doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/S4QJ-722T].
351. Interview with Sam, supranote 180.
352. Interview 3 with Jordan, supranote 195.
353. Id. (explaining that "Secretary Johnson wanted to implement it himself when he became
Secretary. . . I think [he] wanted to .. . try to reset Secure Communities himself thinking [that] the brand
was so ruined. And [we] came up with the ... Priority Enforcement Program"); U.S. Immgr. and Customs
Enf't, Priority Enforcement Program, https://www.ice.gov/pep
[https://perma.cc/55YF-E9GR]
(explaining that PEP differs from S-Comm in that "PEP focuses on targeting individuals convicted of
significant criminal offenses or who otherwise pose a threat to public safety. Under prior policy, detainers
could be issued when an immigration officer had reason to believe the individual was removable and fell
within one or more enumerated priorities, which included immigration-related categories and having
been convicted of or charged with certain crimes. Under PEP, ICE will only seek transfer of individuals
in state and local custody in specific, limited circumstances. ICE will only issue a detainer where an
individual fits within DHS's narrower enforcement priorities and ICE has probable cause that the
individual is removable. In many cases, rather than issue a detainer, ICE will instead request notification
(at least 48 hours, if possible) of when an individual is to be released. ICE will use this time to determine
whether there is probable cause to conclude that the individual is removable.").
354. The litigation referred to in the memorandum related to detainers issued by ICE that federal
courts routinely found violated the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas Cty.,
No. 3:12-cv-02317-ST., 2014 WL 1414305, at *1 (D. Ore. Apr. 11, 2014) (holding that the county violated the Fourth Amendment by relying on an ICE detainer that did not provide probable cause regarding
removability); Morales v. Chadbourne, 996 F. Supp. 2d 19, 29 (D.R.I. 2014) (concluding that detention
pursuant to an immigration detainer "for purposes of mere investigation is not permitted"); see also
Moreno v. Napolitano, Case No. 11 C 5452, 2014 WL 4814776 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2014) (denying judgment on the pleadings to the Government on the Plaintiffs' claim that ICE's detainer procedures violate
probable cause requirements); Gonzalez v. ICE, Case No. 2:13-cv-0441-BRO-FFM, at 12-13 (C.D. Cal.
July 28, 2014) (granting the Government's motion to dismiss, but allowing Plaintiffs to file an amended
complaint and noting that plaintiffs "have sufficiently pleaded that Defendants exceeded their authorized
power" by issuing "immigration detainers without probable cause resulting in unlawful detention");
Villars v. Kubiatoski, Case No. 12 CV 4586, 2014 WL 1795631, at *10 (N.D. Ill. May 5, 201 4) (rejecting
dismissal of Fourth Amendment claims concerning an ICE detainer issued "without probable cause that
Villars committed a violation of immigration laws"); Galarza v. Szalczyk, Civ. Action No. 10-cv-068 15,
2012 WL 1080020, at * 14 (E.D. Penn. Mar. 30, 2012) (denying qualified immunity to immigration officials for unlawful detention on an immigration detainer issued without probable cause), rev' d and
remanded on other grounds, 745 F.3d 634 (reversing district court's finding of no municipal liability);
Uroza v. Salt Lake City, No. 2: 11 CV713DAK, 2013 WL 653968, at *6-7 (D. Utah Feb. 21, 2013) (denying dismissal on qualified immunity grounds where plaintiff claimed to have been held on an immigration
detainer issued without probable cause). Cf. Makowski v. United States, No. 12 C 5265, 2014 WL
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for general hostility toward the enforcement of our immigration laws." 5 5
While FOIA litigation was not directly named, the strategy that was devised
deftly exploited the documents obtained through such litigation. The idea
that S-Comm undermined community policing was directly referenced when
ICE leadership stated that the PEP "must be implemented in a way that supports community policing and sustains the trust of all elements of the community in working with local law enforcement." 356 Efforts to organize states and
localities also appeared to weigh-in on the Secretary's decision. Specifically,
the memorandum stated, "Governors, mayors, and state and local law
enforcement officials around the country have increasingly refused to cooperate with the program, and many have issued executive orders or signed laws
prohibiting such cooperation." 3
Advocates posit that S-Comm ended as a result of a confluence of events.
S-Comm was synonymous with distrust, 358 and the window for CIR was
closed, negating prior assertions that increased enforcement was a necessary
trade-off for CIR. And importantly, the timing gave rise to beliefs that PEP
was an intentional way to quiet the sanctuary city revolt that was underway. 359 With these concessions to the advocates, the government could say,
"we did things for you and now we need your help to quiet the sanctuary city
rebellion.''360
PEP permitted states and localities to negotiate cooperation guidelines and
to notify ICE of release dates instead of holding individuals using
detainers. 361 PEP appears to have succeeded in obtaining support from many
states and localities. At the end of Fiscal Year 2016, DHS announced that
twenty-one of the twenty-five largest jurisdictions that previously declined
the largest number of detainers were cooperating with ICE through PEP. 362
In January 2017, newly inaugurated President Trump announced the resurrection of S-Comm in an early executive order in what would be a series of
such orders reimagining immigrants' rights and migrants' vulnerability to

&

1089119, at **10 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (concluding that plaintiff stated a plausible false imprisonment claim
against the United States where he was held on a detainer without probable cause).
355. Memorandum on Secure Communities For Thomas S. Winkowski Acting Dir. U.S. Immigr.
Customs Enf't, Megan Mack Officer Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, and Philip A. McNamara
Assistant Sec'y for Intergovernmental Affairs, From Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec'y DHS, at 1 (Nov. 20,
2014),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_secure_communities.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K2X6-HELA].

356.
357.

Id.
Id.

358. Id. ("But the reality is the program has attracted a great deal of criticism, is widely misunderstood, and is embroiled in litigation; its very name has become a symbol for general hostility toward the
enforcement of our immigration laws.").
359. Interview 3 with Jordan, supranote 195.
360. Id.
361. Randy Capps, Muzaffar Chishti, Julia Gelatt, Jessica Bolter & Ariel G. Ruiz Soto, Revving Up
the Deportation Machinery, Enforcement and Pushback under Trump, MIGRATION POLY INST. (May
2018) at 18-19.
362.

DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, DHS RELEASES END OF YEAR FISCAL YEAR 2016 STATISTICS

(Dec. 30, 2016), www.dhs.gov/news/2016/12/30/dhs-releases-end-year-fiscal-year-2016-statistics
[https://perma.cc/324L-66L8].
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punitive detention in and removal from the United States. 363 On January 20,
2021, President Biden, on the afternoon of his inauguration, issued an executive order terminating S-Comm once again and promising a re-evaluation of
ICE enforcement priorities.3 6 4
V.

AN INNOVATIVE APPROACH

TO

MOVEMENT LAWYERING

In this final Part, we share what we learned from the in-depth examination
of one loosely structured model of how lawyers, organizers, activists, clients,
and political actors worked together to change an immigration enforcement
program and organize a movement. Instead of finding a model of movement
lawyering that is easily adaptable in other contexts, what we discovered was
the very opposite. We found that two necessary components of a successful
effort to forge social change are flexibility and adaptability in the face of radically uncertain challenges wrought by dynamic, dispersed, and similarly
recursively self-reconstructing power structures. This finding steered our
conclusion away from a specific "new model" and towards a "new approach"
to movement lawyering that is rooted in discrete themes. This Part will identify these themes and draw upon them to offer some preliminary underlying
theories.365
The themes that emerged from the case study confirm much of the efficacy
of the variously named movement lawyering models we described above.
While these models of movement lawyering are accurate, important, and
insightful, we find them incomplete. They fail to fully describe all that made
the lawyers we studied critical agents of a larger movement enterprise. First,
lawyer accountability and effectiveness are enhanced when lawyers, organizers, activists, and clients together build a modular strategy from the ground
up through recursive, interactive, and synergistic play among tools, roles,
institutions, and resources. Second, leading with humility366 enables all participants to bring their expertise to the table for equal consideration in a nimble, ever-evolving strategic discussion. Third, we find that change must occur
within the relationships among the legal institutions, lawyers, movement
leaders, and the communities they represent through legal storytelling,

363. Exec. Order No. 13768, Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States, 82 Fed.
Reg. 8799 (Jan. 30, 2017) (stating, inter alia: "The Secretary shall immediately take all appropriate action
to terminate the Priority Enforcement Program (PEP) described in the memorandum issued by the
Secretary on Nov. 20, 2014, and to reinstitute the immigration program known as "Secure Communities"
referenced in that memorandum.").
364. Exec. Order No. 133993, Revision of Civil Immigration Enforcement Policies and Priorities),
86 Fed. Reg. 7051 (Jan. 25, 2021).
365. A second article that delves deeply into theoretical underpinnings of our observations is in
progress.
366. "Humility," as used herein does not connote undue deference or servility; instead, humility or
"humble" as we describe it, resonates both in notions of respect for expertise borne of the lived experience
of others and the limits of lawyers' roles and patient determination in the face of obstacles to change for
marginalized groups. This sense of humility requires boldness, an experimental ethos, and a taste for
risk-taking under conditions of uncertainty.
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mobilized citizens, and organized efforts that channel community priorities. 367 This approach to movement lawyering addresses the accountability
and efficacy questions together by reflecting inward toward nurturing relationships 368 and outward to solidarity-building storying. 369 Finally, we find
that an intentional approach to power that is jointly constructed by lawyers,
organizers, and impacted communities was vital to shared commitment, mutual respect, and effective strategic decision making. This approach appreciates the dynamic, emergent, recursively self-organizing power systems and,
in response, conceives of similarly dynamic and emergent strategies to affect
power, and identifies leverage points where lawyers can sometimes promote
change.
Our work is designed to build upon the foundational literature focused on
client-centered lawyering as well as more recent movement lawyering work
that is wary of legalism, invested in multi-modal problem solving, and
respectful of the power of movements. We contribute additional layers, and
perhaps some conceptual detail, to an existing theoretical framework. The
social change efforts we observed can best be described as fractal-infinitely
complex patterns that are self-similar across different scales and created by
recursively constructing a process in an ongoing feedback loop. 370 Change
occurred within a complex system through interactions of multiple factors at
different levels and on different timescales. 371 The recursive nature of the
strategy employed in this context implies that actors responded to, or even
created, similar feedback loops that led to common structures, habits, incentives, and challenges. In this sense, a social movement is a learning organization that nurtures feedback loops in a way that is familiar to anyone who has
participated in a law school clinical program or an organizer's training program. To create a more concrete picture of the dynamic we describe, we offer
the following description of how the lawyers we met operated-in conjunction with the movements of which they formed a part-simultaneously at the

367. Interview with Alvarado, supra note 35; Ashar, Movement Lawyersfor ImmigrantRights, supra
note 13.
368. Interview with Alvarado, supra note 35; Ashar, Movement Lawyersfor ImmigrantRights, supra
note 13 (reframing the role of attorneys and clients through the introduction of client-centered lawyering).
See BELLOW & MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS, supra note 29, at 35-70 (encouraging reflection on
the appropriate role of the lawyer in relation to the client); BINDER ET AL, LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS, supra note 29 (articulating a "client-centered" vision of lawyering and techniques for students to adopt).
For an argument that relationships with client constituencies are not critical to movement lawyering so
long as lawyers can piggy-back off of organizers' preexisting relationships, see Ashar, Movement
Lawyers for Immigrant Rights, supra note 13, at 1504. Professor Ashar characterizes the effort as a retreat
(at least temporarily) from the legal professions' social engineering project, id. at 1491, while others see
it as a supportive and necessary stage in the development of that project.
369. ROBBINS ET AL., YOUR CLIENT'S STORY, supra note 30; Miller, Telling Stories, supra note 30;
Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives, supranote 30.
370. See What are Fractals?, FRACTALFOUNDATION.ORG, https://fractalfoundation.org/resources/
what-are-fractals/ [https://perma.cc/4A4R-ZS5G] (explaining that fractals are images of dynamic
systems that are driven by recursion).
371. See e.g., Linda B. Smith & Esther Thelen, Dynamic System Theory, in ADVANCES IN CHILD
DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR (2019).
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micro, or client-centered lawyering; the meso, or campaign; and the macro,
or organizational, layers during this campaign.
A.

Micro Level: Client-CenterLawyeringfor the Situation

On the micro level, all of the lawyers involved in the campaign employed
a client-centered framework.37 2 As one of the lawyers on the team stated, the
[C]ampaign was one example of lawyers and organizers working very
well together because it was clear from the beginning that the whole
point of the FOIA [request and litigation] was to support the organizing
and there was a lot of respect between the particular attorneys who
were working on it, and the NDLON organizer [as well as] other local
organizers.373
The legal team's goal, from the beginning, was to develop a legal strategy
to support the organizational strategy.37 4 The team agreed that they would
make decisions based upon "[w]hat would be of greatest utility for the movement and ... the organizing." 375 Understanding that FOIA litigation is a limited tool that cannot enjoin the program or substantively challenge the
program, 376 the lawyers knew that the lawsuit would only be as good as the
underlying information obtained and the creative ways organizers could then
use that information to push the movement.
As the documents were released, organizers and lawyers worked together
to identify documents that would be most helpful for the organizing
efforts. 377 Lawyers then drafted "practice advisories" for organizers with
372. Interview with Kai, supra note 263 (NDLON, as a client, had a clear idea of what the relationship would look like).
373. Interview with Josh, supra note 194 ("I think everybody went into it with a framework of working really collaboratively and so I remember it as a positive little lawyering-organizer collaboration and
one in which everyone [], like the lawyers, organizers, were all pretty clear idea that the litigation was
like one tool that [we] were trying to use in this campaign which the goal which was to get out of SComm. So, there was like really open communication and stuff I haven't seen on subsequent FOIAs.
Like, like we get facts and so like the legal team would get documents and sent them immediately without
even reviewing ourselves to sort of figured out, which ones pertain to which jurisdiction, farm of out, give
the Chicago people the Chicago documents, the San Francisco people San Francisco documents, and
everyone review[ed] them on their own and then sort of like come together and say what we had, what
folks had found. So, it was like a very, a lot of openness that like everybody was sort of in it together and
supporting each other.").
374. Interview with Taylor, supra note 162.
375. Id.
376. Interview with Emerson, Attorney on NDLON FOIA Case (Dec. 10, 2019) (transcript on file
with authors) [hereinafter Interview with Emerson]; Interview with Parker, Attorney on NDLON FOIA
Case (Dec. 10, 2019) (transcript on file with authors) [hereinafter Interview with Parker]; Interview with
Josh, supra note 194 (stating, "I think it's probably because the campaign was designed from the beginning with organizers and lawyers all having an equal role and also because there was like a very clear
campaign goal and it was a goal that like definitely couldn't be achieved by the lawyers alone because it
was a FOIA case it wasn't like litigation to you know, enjoin Secure Communities. It was FOIA and the
power of litigation was limited in the FOIA and everybody thought and understood and further, there
wasn't that feeling that sometimes develops of 'Okay, the lawsuit's going to solve the problem' or
something.").
377. Interview with Jamie, supra note 205.
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each new batch of FOIA documents that would include highlights of the
impactful documents that might catch media attention. 378 When helpful, conference calls were scheduled to bring together organizers from across the
country so that the legal team could share information about the important
documents. 37 9 There was an initial decision that lawyers would field press
calls, but very soon into the case, a strategic decision was made to push those
calls through to organizers. 380 Enacting what we refer to as their catalytic
function, 38 1 lawyers described their role in this case at times as an intermedi-

ary, a person who translated what was going on in the litigation to organizers
and then communicated the priorities of the organizers and advocates to the
legal team. 382
On the micro level, the case study provided an opportunity to examine the
difference, if any, between private pro bono lawyers, so-called movement
lawyers, and public interest lawyers in their relationships with organizers, the
campaign, and the larger movement. As the FOIA litigation got underway,
novel issues around electronic-discovery (e-discovery), as well as large document production, led the team to seek pro bono assistance from a private
firm.383 The organizers and clients saw the private firm lawyers as a way to leverage those within the establishment to support the movement. 384 The
private lawyers were specifically selected for their expertise with e-discovery. 385 At first glance, the case appeared to present a dry FOIA issue, but the
judge assigned to the case was "the preeminent judge in the country on e-discovery," and the private lawyers knew that the judge "would not be afraid to
issue groundbreaking rulings." 386 The possibility of "moving the law on
FOIA" was enough to motivate the private lawyers to jump in. 387 These
378.
379.
380.

Interview with Josh, supranote 194.
Id.
Id.; Interview 3 with Jordan, supra note 195.

381. JONAH BERGER, THE CATALYST: HOw TO CHANGE ANYONE'S MIND 6 (2020) [hereinafter
BERGER, THE CATALYST] (explaining that "reactions usually require a certain amount of energy ...
[Catalysts] speed up the process. But rather than upping the heat or adding more pressure, they provide an
alternate route, reducing the amount of energy required for reactions to occur.").
382. Interview with Josh, supra note 194 (stating, "I feel like I did a lot of the, or some of the work
of, like translating what was going on in the litigation to the organizers and advocates, making sure all the
organizers and advocates understood what was going on in the litigation, communicating to the legal
team what the priorities were of the organizers and advocates. So almost sort of like the intermediary
between the two groups, I would say, which is cool, because I subsequently like, start[ed] doing more litigation. And I always miss I feel like there should always be someone like that on litigation, like a lawyer
or someone whose job is to do the non-litigation parts of the litigation because when you're doing them
yourself, it's like you finish the brief and you just collapse. You don't really have the time to make sure
that you're communicating what's going on to the organizers and advocates as well as you should and so I
feel like it was really great that I had that time and space to like play that role on the campaign.").
383. Interview with Kai, supra note 263; Interview with Jamie, supranote 205.
384. Interview 3 with Jordan, supranote 195.
385. Interview with Parker, supranote 376.
386. Id. ("[H]aving the case assigned to Judge Scheindlin was the trigger." The lawyers knew "based
on the judge's writings that she would be much more hands on and she might be willing to make groundbreaking rulings." This presented the opportunity to create law that was much broader than the issues of
disclosures required in this case.).
387. Interview with Emerson, supra note 376 (explaining that there was a conflation of what had
been happening to data and information which had been percolating in not only the FOIA space but in
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private lawyers were able to leverage relationship, network, and credibility
advantages in service of the organizing campaign. In turn, this transformed
technical FOIA litigation into a celebration, and the dynamic tension that
mapped emergent, self-recreating power identified critical junctures where
the pro bono lawyers' intervention could vitalize the campaign.
The pro bono lawyers spoke enthusiastically about their experience
because "[they] were making real change-and it is not that often that we get
to make real change." 388 While generally they viewed the attorney-client
relationship in this case similarly to their private clients, they identified some
distinctions. 389 With "regular clients [we] are the hired gun to win the case.
Here, winning the case was important, but it was more important to keep up
the narrative."390 The goal was to constantly churn the information to further
the narrative that the government was not transparent.391 The advocates used
every court appearance as an opportunity to further the narrative, and each
court ruling exposed the government's lack of transparency which fed the
narrative that the program was misleading. 392
The pro bono team characterized the FOIA clients as "savvy" because, in
part through coordinated demonstrations, they were able to use the media to
further a narrative that ultimately made people care about what the FOIA litigation was revealing about the program.393 From the perspective of the pro
bono lawyers,
[T]he connection to the community organization and the connection to their
broader goals ... it worked seamlessly how we learned and moved the ball
forward for their aims [and] is something that you know we don't see in ordinary corporate rulings. So, the way the legal rulings weaved into the advocacy, that wove into the press and how all of those things were used
together to achieve our client's aims-which overall was about their advocacy for their clients, their constituencies-I think this was different from
what we ordinarily see, and something that what we learned from them in
terms of how the pieces fit together beyond just the law.394

the ability to get the information to advocates and have the open information needed to challenge the program whatever it may be. It turned out that getting the information in this case was what changed things.);
Interview with Parker, supra note 376.
388. Interview with Parker, supranote 376.
389. Id. (explaining that the attorney client relationship was similar in that the client gets to dictate
the direction of the litigation); Interview with Emerson, supra note 376.
390. Interview with Parker, supranote 376.
391. Id.
392. Id. (stating, "every [court] ruling said [the government] needed to be more transparent and
[release] documents and the documents showed that [the government was ] not transparent the constant
narrative of the program and Obama not being transparent [fed the narrative that if they were transparent]
people/states/localities would not be signing MOA.").
393. Id. (stating "[a]t every ruling they would do a press release and the press were there for every
ruling and then once they got the documents they would do a press release and it was a constant flow of information to the press.").
394. Interview with Emerson, supra note 376 ("It was eye opening in terms of how they worked with
the advocacy organizations in terms of how what we were doing was directly impactful on their advocacy
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The attorney-client relationship was tested at a critical moment in the case
when the opportunity to create precedent appeared but conflicted with the clients' need to get the information as quickly as possible. 395 The government's
initial document production came in the form of a large file that, according to
396 Another lawyer
one of the lawyers, "was basically a bunch of junk."'
described the initial production as
[I]f someone took a box of paper and threw it up in the air and then
assembled it and gave it to you, you can't use that. You don't know
what goes with what, you can't you have [] authenticity, you can't validate it, you can't find the things you need. You can't say, I know that
this document said this. 397
The Plaintiffs sought access to the "metadata," the underlying information
about the documents. 398 While metadata issues were considered by courts
previously, that consideration occurred in the reverse context, with the federal government seeking specific metadata from private individuals or entities. 399 In this case, the judge issued a ruling placing the same burden, this
time on the government, to produce the requisite metadata. 400 "When Judge
Scheindlin's ruling came down, [the] ... reverberations around the e-discovery community and frankly, in the government, were tremendous.'' 4 01 The
lawyers understood that "it would have taken ... years to get the rest of the
and it certainly dictated our strategy and we won the case but the case was not what the goal was, the goal
was to get information about SC and to change it and that is what they did.").
395. Id. (stating, "[i]t was the only right thing to do for their clients that absolutely needed the information sooner rather than later.").
396. Interview with Parker, supra note 376 ("When they produced it, they produced it and it was basically a bunch of junk. And I was shocked because I never [] knew that they would do this but what they
produced was a lot of email, it was basically a, it's almost like paper, it was a PDF, but it was like paper,
you've got a box of documents, and it was lots of the emails. And then in the email, you would see that
there were attachments, but we didn't have the attachments. And then farther along in the box, in essence,
there would be [inaudible] Word documents or whatever, like an agenda or a draft of a document, and we
had no way of connecting it to the email. So we can say, for our purposes, Janet Napolitano got this email
that had this attachment, and this is why it's so important. We couldn't do that.").
397. Id.
398. Id. (describing "[a]nd so what the metadata does[ ]I mean metadata is basically information
about the document. So, like [Parker] said, you know, who authored it? What's the title of the document,
not inside it, but the name of that file, who was it sent to, who did it to go to, what were the dates, and
things like that. But also level of searchability. So if you get big masses of documents, it's much harder to
find what you need if you can't search it. And you have to go through one by one, right? And so the first
thing they gave us was information that was not usable. We couldn't have, you couldn't have used it for
advocacy purposes, because you couldn't possibly know what went with what or what the document was.
Right?").
399. Id. (describing, "[typically] the government is suing you know corporations, right? ... And the
government asks for this all the time, right? They want the metadata, they want it in a certain format, they
actually say, when you give it to us, you have to actually produce the documents, you know, from a technological perspective, in very distinct ways, right. And one of the things that [Judge Scheindlin] found
amusing or ironic, when we said we literally said, we want to exactly what the FCC and the DOJ ask of..
. corporate America ... her ruling was basically, yes, you have to do that. The problem was the government ... could not comply, like literally they could not comply because their processes were not designed
that way for them to actually do that.").
400. Id.
401. Id.
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data because [the government] would have fought that ruling tooth and nail
and we would have had to appeal it multiple times." 40 2 Instead, the parties
agreed collectively to allow the judge to withdraw her order in exchange for
certain metadata that the plaintiffs requested. 403 The pro bono lawyers were
clear that while the victory would have been fun, it would have been detrimental to their client's goal. In this way, it was not a hard call, even if it was
personally disappointing. 404
The case study also provided the opportunity to examine the foundational
experiences of the lawyers we encountered. It seemed to us that they were
both humble in their assessments of the role of law in movements for social
change and confident in their abilities to sit at the table with experts and
impacted people and contribute to discussions of policy, politics, media
approaches, organizing strategy, and stories. They seemed to have an overall
understanding of their role in the campaign and the larger movement and listened hard to others. Indeed, they understood the role of organizers, workers,
social scientists, and activists and respected each one's skills, relational networks, values, conceptual understandings of power, relationships, and stories. We did not expect but found that almost every lawyer involved had a
formative experience in a law school clinic or externship in a sophisticated
movement practice. Except for the pro bono lawyers, the lawyers working on
the campaign had law school clinical experiences. With one exception, each
of the lawyers talked about how their clinical experience shaped their concept
of the role of lawyers. We believe that law school clinics foster the combination of accountability and efficacy questions that enable law students to see
critical discourses put into practice while working with marginalized individuals, groups, and communities. Our hope for legal education moving forward
is that the combination of lawyers with clinical experience, well-versed in
critical theory,405 well-endowed clinical fellowship programs focused on the
development of broad concepts of lawyering, and an emphasis on notions of
storying fostered in some legal writing curriculums, will create the conditions
in which novel approaches to lawyers' work might thrive.
We understand that, as clinicians, we might be predisposed to find our
theory in the data, as opposed to grounding theory in the data presented.
However, it seems apparent to us that the social movement lawyers we

402. Interview with Parker, supranote 376.
403. Id. (stating that "the metadata we got eventually . . . was the result of an order from Judge
Scheindlin that then the parties agreed collectively to allow her to withdraw... [we agreed to this] because
[it was] in the interest of our clients, it would have taken us years to get the rest of the data, because they
would have fought that that ruling tooth and nail and we would have had to appeal it multiple times. And
so we ... backed off, [and] they agreed to give us certain metadata to avoid a larger ruling that would hurt
them at the appellate level.")
404. Id. (explaining "It was not a hard call, personally disappointing, but ultimately, [we] are representing a client and that was the best result and so you do what the client says.").
405. Cummings, Movement Lawyering, supra note 8, at 1581-85 (explaining that the critical theory
including professionalism and constitutional law texts shares the praise or blame depending upon the
situation).
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visited exhibited a humbleness, yes, but also a confidence in skills and cleareyed assessment of structures of power and the limits of the law, along with a
commitment to finding ways of working with, and in, movements that do not
recreate the hierarchies of domination, oppression, or fecklessness that have
occasionally infected earlier descriptions of movement lawyers' work. 40 6
B.

Meso Level: Lawyeringfor the Campaign

At the meso, campaign level, lawyers operated as an important part of an
overall effort, neither leading the campaign nor acting subservient to it, but
engaged with full agency in planning strategies, implementing tactics, and
reflecting on action to renew the process. The campaign relied upon lawyers'
FOIA litigation, with even preliminary motion practice often accompanied
by mass demonstrations, to uncover opt-out opportunities, which were then
used to pressure local authorities to resist mandatory implementation. This,
in turn, fed into a powerful narrative of a program founded on deception that
undermined local law enforcement and community building.
There was a consistent theme of humility (exhibited by lawyers) and a
willingness to do whatever was needed to serve the larger collective goal. 407
From the organizer's perspective, lawyers are one of their greatest tools.4 08
"Organizers' jobs are to be in service of community and make a way out of
no way.'' 4 09 But organizers also acknowledged the differences that made their
relationships challenging at times. One organizer described the
[P]otential rub between lawyers and organizers comes from the inversion of certain 'traits. '410 I think one of the tensions is ... wanting to
have agency and wanting to be a partner in strategy, and not wanting to

406. Id. at 1691-95. We understand that we are not the first to note that movement lawyering combines a critical look at law's potential for change with a client-centered approach developed in clinical
practice over the past thirty years.
407. To some extent, substituting the campaign and, at the macro level, the movement itself, as the
client allowed these lawyers to maintain their self-professed client-centered focus while negotiating
some might say skirting the critiques that client-centeredness tends to atomize disputing. This also
allowed lawyers to substitute a movement leader for the traditional lawyer in dominating the members
and detour from scrutiny of systemic power structures to overweening navel gazing. See Bezdec, Silence
in the Court, supra note 53, at 539. Robin West, The Zealous Advocacy of Justice in a Less than Ideal
Legal World, 51 STAN L. REv. 973, 974 (1998); see generally Paul R. Tremblay, CriticalLegal Ethics, 20
GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 133, 143-44 (2007); Julie D. Lawton, Who is My Client? Client-Centered
Lawyering with Multiple Clients, 22 CLINICAL L. REv. 145 (2015).
408. Interview with Blake, supra note 133.
409. Id. ("I think, organizers, we understand ourselves as doing whatever it is needed to build the
power of the group to get us towards the goal. And so, you know, in my, in my time I've been a bookkeeper, I've been a grant writer, I've been an organizer, I've been a communications person, I've been a
facilitator, I've been a strategic planner. Because in our tiny grassroots groups ...
there isn't a distinguishing between roles, and what we do. And, what, I think there's an ethos for organizers of being in
service of community and figuring out, making a way out of no way. And so, the legal work and the role
of the lawyers in all of that feels like one more tool in our tool belt ... Today, it might be a direct action;
tomorrow, it might be a FOIA discovery claim; the day after that it might be a lawsuit under the
Administrative Procedures Act. But all of these things are just tools and tactics that we're deploying in
service of the strategy and in service of kind of a longer goal.").
410. Id.
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just be objectified in that way of being told what to do. And ... that
isn't to create a hierarchy of the organizer as the decider and everybody
else is there to do what they're told. It's just saying that, strategy is
about deploying whatever resources and tools we have access to, and
each of us with a specialty is there to lend our specialty in service of
the collective. 41
According to this organizer, the training that lawyers (and politicians)
receive is the inverse of what helps movements.

.

[T]here are certain traits that ... are inverted ... where part of the training seems to be that you are there to be the smartest in the room, to be
the one who knows best, to be the one that helps save [others]...
[T]hat's where it can be like a little bit of a culture clash of deciding
things. 412

Another way that lawyers and organizers noticed the potential clash stems
from their respective senses of time.413 Organizers can be impatient and desire
to move quickly to support organizing efforts on the ground that are changing
by the moment. 4 14 Lawyers have a much slower sense of time as litigation
moves at a different pace. 415 On different levels, lawyers are said to misunderstand the organizers' imperative to move "at the speed of trust" in taking the
time necessary to build a self-reinforcing, sustainable, organized movement.
While there were conflicts at times between the lawyers and organizers, 4 16
there was also close collaboration. 41 Lawyers described the working

411. Id.
412. Id.
413. Interview with Sydney, supranote 177.
414. Interview with Blake, supra note 133; Interview with Jake, Immigrant Rights Community
Organizer (Feb. 12, 2020) (transcript on file with authors); Interview with Sydney, supra note 177.
415. Interview with Sydney, supra note 177. One of the lead organizers is now a lawyer and can see
the stark contrast around time: "Looking back now in my role as an attorney one year seems like a really
short amount of time, but when I was an organizer that felt incredibly long."
416. Interview with Josh, supra note 194 (stating, for example, "[t]here would be times when the
legal team thought it would be helpful to have an action, like a public action that would coincide with
something happening in the litigation like filing a motion or something like that. And the organizers
would feel like it wasn't actually .. . didn't make sense for their local goals. You know what I mean? So,
there was like a little tension there, I guess it was like, everybody had too much to do, so it was like, 'Why
do we have to drop everything and like, plan a rally just because you're filing a motion? That doesn't necessarily make sense?' But I feel like people were generally pretty open about that. They'd just talk about
it, figure it out."); Interview with Jamie, supra note 205 ("I think there were these moments where the
organizers were like, you know, I think in the preliminary injunction hearing, like a judge did not care
about [our organizer's] testimony. But it was important, I think, from a, from a mobilization perspective,
to have her testify. And so, you know, I think for people in the audience that day, some of the organizers,
maybe not NDLON so that other people were like, yeah, like, you know, that's like, [our organizer] was
testifying, she's like, she's our people and she was the one up there telling the judge what's going on.
And, you know, there was clearly some resistance from the judge on about like, putting her on as a witness
at all like, what was the relevant and so for them, for people in the audience, for community members and
organizers to see like lawyers pushing back against a judge that made, and I don't know that it was persuasive at all or really made a difference but she did allow us to put the testimony on.").
417. Interview with Josh, supranote 194.
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relationship as a truly equal partnership among affected community leaders,
organizers, and lawyers.
[I]t seems like organizations are either structured where lawyers sort of
lead the way, or alternatively, there are very few lawyers and they just
sort of do discrete tasks that the organizers or advocates ask them to
do. I think the Secure Communities campaign was truly [equal] from
the beginning, like the litigation resides together with organizers and
advocates. And that's very explicitly understood by everybody as one
part of the strategy to achieve some bigger goal that can't be achieved
through the litigation alone. And I feel like that gives lawyers the
humility that they sometimes don't have and the organizers effective
ownership of the litigation that sometimes is missing. 418
Because of the way S-Comm was strategically, silently, and slowly being
rolled out in states across the county, advocates initially did not know much
about the workings of the program. The FOIA litigation, which advocates
refer to as "advocacy through inquiry," was designed to obtain information
about the program. The lawyers and advocates understood that the information's value was dependent upon the organizers' abilities to utilize it effectively. At the same time, the litigation was a tool for organizing media
strategies. The lawyers and organizers used every opportunity in the litigation
to bring publicity to the issues. Press were kept in the loop on an ongoing basis and were aware of each motion filed in the case and each government disclosure. This was a tool that the organizers could use to galvanize their
respective local campaigns. Litigation was designed to serve the intermediate
objective of "advocacy through inquiry" and supported the overall frame of
dominating and restructuring the narrative-front-end advocacy for the
Plaintiffs to define the narrative and back-end narrative for the Respondents
who tried to justify decisions or switch prior decisions.
Litigation, and for that matter, the lawyering role in general, were geared
toward enhancing so-called indirect effects such as media coverage, public
attention, coalition building, political pressure, and bending the overall cultural fabric. Although litigation's direct effects were instrumentally designed
to support indirect effects, the strategy was by no means incidental or
unplanned. It was evident that the Administration was driven to change more
based on media attention and, to a lesser extent, local politics, than by the
prospects of carrying out, much less losing, in litigation. Government officials explained that, from their perspective, the FOIA litigation was "irrelevant." From an internal government perspective, the litigation was a waste of
time and money, and the modalities that impacted government decision making were the media and concerns being raised at the congressional, state, and

418.

Id.
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local levels. A review of the FOIA documents reveals that DHS legal resources were used internally as the government tried to figure out the best way to
publicly present the program. 419
By contrast, we found that even if the actual direct consequence of
responding to a FOIA request did not impact the government's actions, the
documents and information unearthed through the FOIA litigation were the
very foundation of success with the media, law enforcement, and other legislators (federal, state and local)-the very things that even DHS officials concede made the difference. The lawyers we spoke to were more than willing to
fulfill traditional lawyering roles in support of campaigning and organizing
goals, understanding the relationships between the immediate product of their
actions, the campaign, and the larger movement. The legal work was
designed to support the organizing, but lawyers worked collectively to coordinate moves and roles in litigation, media, social science reports, direct
actions, political influence, and even overall organizing goals. Indeed, even
large-firm corporate lawyers enthusiastically embraced their place at the table
of movement advocacy. In this, they were hardly alone.
What impact did "traditional" lawyering have on government decision
making? The answer to this question depends upon perspective and an understanding of the goal of the litigation. Lawyers inside the Obama administration claimed that the FOIA litigation itself did not directly play a big role in
shaping the government's response. 420 Instead, hearing from state and local
officials and members of Congress was instrumental in rethinking the program and deciding how to respond. 41 Another DHS official explained that
the FOIA litigation did not impact the government's decision making, 422
whereas the media and input from Congress made great impacts. 42 As one
DHS official explained,
419. Peter S. Vincent, Principal Legal Advisor, Office of the Principal Legal Advisor (OPLA) for U.
S. Immigr. and Customs Enf't, U.S. Department of Homeland Security was asked to spend time and
resources on the legal question of mandatory participation in S-Comm; see ICE FOIA 10-2674.0002998.
("OPLA is gathering the legal support for the 'mandatory' nature of participation in 2013" and "Peter, I
understand Director Morton asked you to pull together a binder of the legal underpinnings.") Other email
correspondence illustrates DHS's effort to find legal support for the desired position. "As we continue to
refine our implementation strategy, Mr. Venturella has asked us to look into a legal mandate, provision,
law, etc. that would allow ICE/DHS to request fingerprint information from the FBI for law enforcement
and/or criminal justice purposes, regardless of whether states and locals can opt in or out." ICE FOIA 102674.0011149-0011151, Email from Randi Greenberg, Secure Cmtys, Dir. of Outreach and
Communications, ICE to [recipient redacted] (Aug. 2, 2010).
420. Interview with Sam, supranote 180.
421. Id.
422. Id. (stating, "I could care less about the FOIA case, I mean really could care less about the
FOIA case. What scared me was, this program was important for everything we're trying to accomplish.
How can you ICE needed this program to transition to a public safety organization that you got 9000
agents, they're, they're immigration enforcement agents only, we have to do something with them. We
can't tell them as much as the advocates would like to stay at home and do the New York Times crossword
puzzle, instead of going out. And so, if we've got to, if we've got to deploy these 9000 agents, which we
are legally required to do, let's deploy them and give them the tools focused on the population we want,
and the single best place to do that is in jails and prisons. It still is.").
423. Id. (stating, "[m]edia, absolutely. The New York Times editorial page was killing us.
Absolutely... [l]etters from congressman, angry, ... the advocates are out there lobbying members of
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I'd wake up every morning and ... [the] first thing [I do] is just double
check the New York Times to make sure there isn't some story about
ICE in there, that I'm going to get a call from the White House in five
minutes. You know, but I hate to say it, the FOIA suit did not move the
needle. But on ... this issue, advocacy was the most important, then
media.

4 24

Notwithstanding their protestations to the contrary, our review of the
FOIA production clearly demonstrates that officials were deeply concerned,
even obsessed, with media reports of what the FOIA litigation revealed.
More to the point, the FOIA litigation directly informed the advocacy which
officials claimed turned the tide against S-Comm.
C.

Macro Level: Lawyeringfor the Movement

NDLON organizing-visionary, Pablo Alvarado, 425 told us that taking down
S-Comm, while important in itself to members, was, from the start, part of a
larger narrative of shared identity and struggle at the heart of persistently
innovative organizing.42' At the macro level, lawyers were more or less
active in selecting among and spreading the gospel of dispersed action strategies and storylines. These strategies and storylines were crafted into an
overall narrative that developed into what University of Washington sociologist Margaret Levi calls "communities of fate,"42 and what we describe as a
melding of the "organizer's story" with the "lawyer's story." All lawyers we
talked to-no matter how they identified in terms of lawyering style or how
invested they were in constructing an overall narrative of shared identity and
struggle that could sustain a movement-told us that they understood the
contributions of their work in constructing this overarching narrative, and, to
a person, told us how much they enjoyed having a place at the table in building that narrative.
NDLON has long operated on a model of distributed, emergent, (trans)
local, integrated organizing for social change. NDLON links member-led autonomous workers' centers together, providing support and coordination.
The organization culls from the work of multiple experiments in advocacy in
real time and scales up at national and international levels, as appropriate.
Congress. That's effective, the media is effective, and just direct advocacy with the White House [was]
effective. You know, all of it was effective, honestly, litigation was the least effective. Litigation just
didn't move, doesn't move the needle. It was everything else that moved the needle . . . [when the
Secretary has members] of her own party mad at her ... and blaming her for things. All of that very effective ... you can't have Senator Durbin think the [Secretary] is a problem. You just can't have that.").
424. Id.
425. The description is ours. Mr. Alvarado is the co-executive director and a founder of NDLON
among other impactful projects.
426. Interview with Alvarado, supra note 35.
427. See John A. Ahlquist and Margaret Levi, IN THE INTEREST OF OTHERS: ORGANIZATIONS AND
SOCIAL ACTIVISM 8, 26 (2013) (explaining that when we share a common fate, we are called to engage in
concerted action for a shared remedy that binds us together).
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NDLON, its member organizations, and members structure their organizing
work this way to capitalize on their own power and change power dynamics
at different levels of society.
In this emergent, nimble, multidimensional, integrated, (trans)local, and
humble-in-legal-judgment-but-involved-in-organizing model, lawyers compressed the accountability and efficacy domains in a problem space.428 The
power of narrative and storytelling formed the core of the campaign in the
same way that it forms the core, and perhaps the periphery as well, of lawyering. 429 In the campaign we studied, advocates, organizers, and lawyers working together created the narrative, and the government was left to react. In
turn, the government's often awkward reactions were used to further develop
the contours of the story. In particular, instead of trashing the indeterminacy
and accountability costs of rights talk,430 rights talk was effectively used by
organizers and lawyers to build an identity-based movement that connected
the most alienated with larger impacted communities and movements. 431
Law talk enabled a vocabulary for shared injustices and identities to inspire
and sustain collective action. 432 The very indeterminacy of rights talk allowed
for disparate factions and individuals to sustain the movement despite often
intense fractionalizing pressures. Indeterminacy provided a narrative umbrella under which different factions could place their own stories, further
their own interests, and unite despite the remaining differences among
them. 4

33

Advocates understood that to topple S-Comm, they had to create a compelling narrative that focused on government deception instead of the deportation of criminal aliens, which would have been impossible to fight. Advocates
428. The S-Comm campaign is a particularly striking example of this fractal geometry of organizing,
recreating, enforcing and expropriating repertoires of contention in different contexts. in support of immediate institutional effects which recursively support and are supported by the larger organizing
missions.
429. Martha Minnow, Stories in Law, in TELLING STORIES TO CHANGE THE WORLD 249, 257 (Rickie
Solinger, Madeline Fox & Kayhan Irani, eds., 2008). We take no position, here at least, in the disputes
over whether storytelling is the basis of all human thought, the basis at least for thinking about big, fuzzy
problems implicating meaning and understanding in human action, or just the mode by which lawyering,
among other endeavors, proceeds. Compare Roger C. Schank & Robert P. Abelson, Knowledge and
Memory: The Real Story, in KNOWLEDGE AND MEMORY: THE REAL STORY (Robert S. Wyler, Jr., ed.,
1995); ROGER S. SCHANK, TELL ME A STORY: NARRATIVE AND INTELLIGENCE (1995) with Minow,
Stories in Law, supra (summarizing Hannah Arendt's use of narrative to lend meaning to human actions)
and ROBBINS ET AL., YOUR CLIENT'S STORY, supra note 30 (employing storying as a tool for lawyering).
430.
STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS 86-87 (1974).
431. Interview with Alvarado, supra note 35.
432. Lauren B. Edelman, Gwendolyn Leachman & Doug McAdam, On Law, Organizations, and
Social Movements, 6 ANN. REV. L. & Soc. SCI. 653, 664 (2010).
433. Compare POLLETTA, IT WAS LIKE A FEVER, supra note 28 (finding that the indeterminacy of
storying in organizations provides room in which factions of movements can cohere despite differences),
with LESLIE R. CRUTCHFIELD, HOw CHANGE HAPPENS: WHY SOME SOCIAL MOVEMENTS SUCCEED WHILE

OTHERS DON'T 103-18 (2018) (finding every social movement that the author's group had studied had
been wrought by conflicts over credit, funding, personalities, ideologies, relationships, and/or tactics) and
NICHOLLS, IMMIGRANT RIGHTS MOVEMENT, supra note 116, at 191-93 (discussing conflicts between
national and local immigrant rights organizations and among national organizations that were dividing
immigrant rights movements in Los Angeles and across the United States during the first reign of SComm discussed in this Article (roughly 2008-2014)).
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intentionally shifted the narrative, even changing the name to get rid of the
words "secure" and "communities," to one of government deception, or at
the least ineptitude, that led to the deportation of "innocent" immigrants.
Because the advocates were the first to create the narrative, the government
was left to react and combat the image that it had been lying about the program's scope and implementation.4 34 Advocates also reframed the narrative
about safety by creating and publicizing studies that showed non-dangerous
immigrants were being deported and that the use of local law enforcement to
carry out immigration laws actually created less secure communities. 435
Once again, the government was on the defensive, trying to convince local
and state officials that this program was easy to implement, would concentrate on dangerous criminals, and would not undermine community policing
in their communities.
Strategic utilization of the press was key from the beginning. Immigrant
rights advocates, and the government, in response, attempted to use the press
to spin their respective messages. 436 A review of the FOIA documents demonstrates that a huge amount of time was spent by ICE, in particular, and the
434. Opinion and Order, NDLON et. al v U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency et. al.
No 10-CV-3488 (S.D.N.Y July 11, 2011) per Scheindlin, J. slip. op. at 32. Judicial findings only supported the advocates' position finding that "there is ample evidence that ICE and DHS have gone out of
their way to mislead the public about Secure Communities" and "whether participation in the program is
mandatory or voluntary."
435. The first claim relates to who was being deported. The government's justification for S-Comm
was rooted in the claim that the program was designed to deport dangerous, criminal immigrants.
Advocates working closely with local communities knew this assertion to be false. Instead, they reported
that the majority of individuals picked up by ICE either were charged with a minor criminal offense, such
as a traffic violation, or no criminal offense at all. If advocates relied upon their assertion against the government's assertion without concrete evidence, the government's narrative would prevail. Understanding
this, advocates and lawyers used the records obtained through the FOIA litigation to conduct a social science study that exposed the program's practice of deporting those with little or no criminal history. The
second claim addressed, through social science study, the question of whether S-Comm was actually making communities safer or undermining community policing. Advocates and lawyers built off relationships
developed in 2008 through strategic advocacy with the Police Foundation. Thinking broadly back in
2008, advocates knew that local law enforcement would be part of the government's immigration
enforcement tools. The 287(g) program was used to deputize local law enforcement as immigration officers and advocates understood that this trend was not going away. Having identified potential allies back
in 2008, lawyers were able to strategically engage sheriffs and local police who they believed would be
sympathetic to their concerns. Using funds provided by the Ford Foundation, the advocates and lawyers
designed a study to flip the government narrative on its head. Instead of S-Comm making communities
safer, the study showed that using local police as immigration enforcement officers undermined public
safety. With these two narrative threads in their favor, advocates could design a media campaign to undercut the government's fundamental assertions about S-Comm.
436. An illustrative example occurred when the FOIA litigation was filed. The day the litigation was
filed, the Uncovering the Truth on ICE and Police Collaboration Campaign began a week-long effort of
rallies and press conferences in fourteen cities to denounce an ICE-Police collaboration program that
rights groups said could have dangerous and disastrous effects on community safety. See Ctr. for Const.
Rights, National Day Laborer Organizing Network (NDLON) v. US Immigration and Customs
Enforcement Agency (ICE), https://ccrjustice.org/home/what-we-do/our-cases/national-day-laborerorganizing-network-ndlon-v-us-immigration-and-customs/ [https://perma.cc/RHM5-BC5F]. Two days
later, an ICE memorandum on a media counter-offensive against NDLON, scheduled for April 26-30,
2010, was leaked. The memorandum included the targeted placement of opinion-editorials in "major
newspapers in the right cities where protests are planned." On the day of the launch, ICE Assistant
Secretary John Morton placed opinion editorials in Atlanta, Georgia; Miami, Florida; and Morristown,
New Jersey all sites of the campaign. See id.
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Administration in general, on how to respond to the media attention that the
campaign had generated. In terms of dedicated hours, agencies spent most
time dealing with media reports, responding to media, and actively configuring policy in anticipation of media coverage. While publicity was garnered
around the filing of the complaint and subsequent action on the case, the
media coverage was not designed to focus on whether litigation was successful. In fact, some scholars submit that the real value of litigation strategies
(win or lose) is in their power to frame media accounts. 4 r This certainly
played out in this context.
(Trans)local organizing, distributed organizing, emergent strategy, and
integrative movements were all employed in diverse, developing coalitions
of organizations, roles, and institutions. 43 8 The campaign was striking in both
equality of roles and fluidity of expertise. There was horizontal equalityacross levels of organization nationally and locally, in terms of political,
social science, media, legal, labor, organizers, and day laborers-and vertically-among local autonomous centers of activities and national coordinating social movement organizations. This flexible, adaptive, and coordinated
network of loosely-coupled organizations bound by strong relationships and
authentic communication proved effective in the near-term goal of changing
a pernicious federal government policy. The approach also strengthened ties
binding the network together and individuals' ties to that network by realizing the power of collective action around a shared identity. Efficacy thus is
enveloped in the notion of accountability. There is reason to suspect, from
our limited data, that accountable structuration439 will be more effective.
That is because accountability might change the terms of efficacy and
because the kinds of accountable structures employed in the campaign are
likely to be better at solving the kinds of complex social problems that challenge the best movement lawyers.
Visionary and ruthlessly effective organizers, such as NDLON's Pablo
Alvarado, taught us that it was possible to seek to win based on legal discourse's ability (or potential) to expose existing power relations and provide

437. Roy B. Flemming, John Bohte & B. Dan Wood, One Voice Among Many: The Supreme Court's
Influence on Attentiveness to Issues in the United States, 1947-1992, in LEVERAGING THE LAW: USING
COURTS TO ACHIEVE SOCIAL CHANGE 53-54 (David A. Schultz, ed., 1998).
438. Interview with Alvarado, supra note 35. See BROWN, EMERGENT STRATEGY, supra note 35
(describing ground-up emergent strategies and tactics in movement organizing and fractal structures in
construction of social movement organizations involving similar structures at different levels of planning); JANE F. MCALEVEY, NO SHORTCUTS: ORGANIZING FOR POWER IN THE NEW GILDED AGE 187-89
(2016) (describing versions of integrated, whole-person, and whole-community organizing in the
Chicago Teachers' Strike and Smithfield Foods organizing campaigns and distributed organizing in flat
organizations in which diverse roles are horizontally and vertically integrated in Make the Road, New
York's organizing model, including that organization's role in the anti-S-Comm campaign); see also
GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS, supra note 45 (discussing the author's work with and organization of
Make the Road, New York).
439.
GIDDENS, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY, supra note 27 (explaining that the term 'Giddens'
connotes the idea that individual or organizational autonomy is influenced by the structures in which it is
exercised, but at the same time, the exercise works to construct those structures).
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stories that can congeal incipient identities. Moreover, accountable lawyering
models were effective in securing immediate institutional relief, too.4 4 0
Think of how this immigrant rights community came together to conduct this
campaign. Local workers highlighted stories of the increasing use of local policing to detain contingent workers and their missing colleagues. National
organizers and advocates recognized the phenomenon and planted the seeds
of a campaign against S-Comm while working at a focused gathering of
national experts. Emerging from discussions among local and national leaders was an imagined network of local campaigns to opt out of S-Comm, each
based on local contexts and power relationships. A focused FOIA initiative
was used to inform the campaign but also served as a vehicle around which to
coalesce, forge new relationships, involve diverse voices in the conversation,
gain media attention, and embarrass the government. The information
obtained and the relationships developed garnered energy for locally autonomous opt-out campaigns. These local opt-out campaigns, in turn, provided
energy, leaders, personalities, attention, and a concise enough theory of the
case to support a national movement to constrain S-Comm. As the movement
grew, more localities sought to opt out, bringing additional media attention
and eventually the effective end of S-Comm (for a time).
The campaign against S-Comm did not happen in isolation. The efforts at
CIR revealed splintering within the larger immigrant rights movement. In a
strategic effort to win bipartisan support for CIR, national immigrant rights
organizations were willing to trade stepped-up enforcement for the hope that
Republicans would be swayed to support CIR. Despite continued concessions
on enforcement, efforts at CIR were never realized. The S-Comm advocates
were skeptical of the national model that they saw as far removed from the
people most impacted, caught up in establishment democratic party politics,
and providing too much deference to President Obama. The S-Comm advocates, organizers, and lawyers, instead engaged in a sophisticated, coordinated strategy to leverage political pressure at state and local levels to
influence national policy in a way recommended by community-lawyering
models. 441 Electoral issues at the local and state levels were part of the strategy of S-Comm opposition groups. 442 Lawyers worked flexibly with communities as clients, co-constructing lawyering roles in ways that

440. Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Functions of Law, 144 U. PENN. L. REv. 2021, 2021
(1996) ("We are all Expressionists part of the time. Sometimes we just want to scream loudly at injustice,
or to stand up and be counted. These are noble motives, but any serious revolutionist must often deprive
himself of the pleasures of self-expression. He must judge his actions by their ultimate effects on
institutions.").
441. Ashar, Movement Lawyers for ImmigrantRights, supranote 13, at 1497.
442. See ICE FOIA 10-2674.0006599, Email from Special Assistant to the Sheriff in SF and the
Special Assistant to the California Attorney General (Sept. 29, 2010) (wanting to hold off and have the
meeting after the election because "Secure Communities is being tainted by politics because
the California Attorney General, the mayor of SF and the DA of SF are all running for state office.").
The email also said that they would make it clear that it was the SF sheriff who was requesting that the
meeting be delayed if they got requests, including from immigrant groups and the press.
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simultaneously supported community priorities and empowered community
leaders.
Because the S-Comm campaign had organizers and advocates across the
country, they were ever aware of what was happening on the ground in different localities. They were poised to use this information to their advantage in
creating another successful aspect of the campaign. They utilized the draconian provisions of Arizona SB 1070 and Sheriff Joe Arpaio's discriminatory
actions as a foil in other localities. They pushed localities known to be sympathetic to immigrants to adopt policies opposite of those being adopted in
Arizona. These localities, known as "beacon cities," provided a contrast to
the more restrictive policies being implemented in Arizona and other more
conservative cities.
D.

A (Very) PreliminaryTheory Arisingfrom this Case Study

The lawyers we studied not only aspired to but inhabited the characteristics
and roles attributed to movement lawyers. They were appropriately skeptical
of the efficacy of litigation to directly produce legal change but appreciative
nevertheless of the adjacent indirect effect of litigation. In this case study, the
indirect effects of litigation changed narratives and, in turn, relationships that
impacted the ways affected communities negotiated the moment. Decidedly
humble in their roles in relation to organizers, lawyers understood organizers
as doing the heavy lifting of social change. Nevertheless, these lawyers were
assertive at the tables where organizing was imagined, and organizers, activists, and other movement actors listened hard to what the lawyers had to say
in mapping the contours of entrenched power and in investigating leverage
points for concerted action.
Such a fluid, multidimensional, adaptive community effort in which
impacted groups were heavily represented and listened to led to effective immediate institutional gains in this instance. We suspect that in any complex
human endeavor governed by entrenched narratives such as rules or institutional exigencies, impacted individuals will have insights on efficacy-as
well as accountability-which effective professionals should heed.443
Critics of law as a modality for social change deride law as ineffective
because legal change only codifies social change already wrought through
other means. 444 Worse, elite lawyers tend to rip the core that animates
more effective and more democratic social movements, translating systemic oppression into causes of action already deemed remediable by legal
institutions. 44 5 Ultimately, we admit that law's power, such as it is, rests on
its elite-centered legitimacy, and seeking redress through law entails

443.
444.
445.

White, Sunday Shoes, supranote 88.
Cummings, Social Movement Turn in Law, supranote 8, at 393.
Id.
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further retrenching law's legitimizing machinery.44 6 In some instances, a lawyer's work might provide language to change social narratives, provide
affected groups with dignity-enhancing recognition and offer meaning to
individual parties. 7 Litigation might even create issues (win or lose) that
social movements can use to enhance organizing, attract public attention, and
force opponents into the open.44 8 But ultimately, while lawyers might try to
transcend or extract themselves from liberal institutions and the patterns of
thought that sustain them, part of their strength is the ability to situate grievances within and outside of the system.44 9
Lawyers in our small sample negotiated this divide between law and politics, and legitimacy and insurrection, by sharing a vision of how power is
exercised with the organizers and affected communities with whom they
worked. The lawyers we met worked side-by-side with organizers and activists. Their humility was not realized in subservience. Together, they mapped
dynamic, self-sustaining, emergent, and dispersed power and imagined
equally dispersed, emergent, adaptive strategies to affect power relations.
Lawyers' investment in mapping power fostered an ability to envision leverage points where lawyers' skills, networks, and legitimacy could be utilized
simultaneously at micro, meso, and macro levels. A table full of individuals
with diverse outlooks on a common problem led to visionary explorations of
the problem and better selection devices for the solutions that emerged from
it. 450

A diverse group of advocates and activists trying out different strategies
and coordinating what works is an optimal strategy for exploring any aleatory
problem space, but it is especially critical in dealing with complex adaptive
systems, such as those faced by marginalized groups in law and (or as) politics. 451 In such a system, the institutions and roles that comprise it are changing in reaction to what activists and movement lawyers are doing. In this
way, the already hostile ground beneath activists' feet is constantly

446.

Id. at 371. See MICHAEL

W.

MCCANN, TAKING REFORM SERIOUSLY: PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC

INTEREST LIBERALISM 200 (1986).
447. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK, supra note 20, at 10.

448. Catherine Albiston, The Dark Side of Litigation as a Social Movement Strategy, 96 IOWA L.
REV. BULLETIN 61, 63 (2011); MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK, supra note 20, at 139.
449. Austin Sarat and Stuart Scheingold, Cause Lawyering and the Reproduction of Professional
Authority: An Introduction, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITIES 9 (Austin Sarat and Stuart Scheingold, eds., 1998); See also Scott Cummings, Puzzle of
Social Movements, supra note 8 at 1159 (referring to movement liberalism's failure to transcend the
divide between politics and law, and concluding that movement liberalism, evadesreckoning with the
underlying normative question of when, courts and lawyers should be leaders in social movements?).
450. The logic is more evolution than physics; we can expect to produce a trajectory rather than a
typology. See FRITJOF CAPRA AND UGO MATTEI, THE ECOLOGY OF LAW: TOWARD A LEGAL SYSTEM IN
TUNE WITH NATURE AND COMMUNITY 22-29 (2015).
451. See Smith, Order for Free, supra note 28; STUART A. KAUFFMAN, REINVENTING THE SACRED:
A NEW VIEW OF SCIENCE, REASON AND RELIGION 270-73 (2008); GREEN, HOW CHANGE HAPPENS, supra

note 31, at 112-34; Lubet, Professionalism Revisited, supra note 53.
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churning. 452 Lawyers can learn from organizers who have accepted this proposition and incorporated it into their working lives. 4 3 It would hardly be surprising to find that, while organizers taught lawyers about power mapping and how to
affect power relations, lawyers were vital in identifying institutions and roles that
had prevented change and adept at mapping the institutional history of what kept
a dysfunctional power structure in place. 454 Together they drew a more complete
picture of the power structures the movement sought to change.
Rather than seeking spots in which to lead or follow on social movements, lawyers acted more like the vision of catalysts set forth by Jonah Berger: "[R]ather
than increasing the frequency of [molecular] collisions, as adding energy does,
catalysts increase their success rate. [Catalysts encourage] reactants to encounter
each other at the right orientations for change to occur."4
Lawyers, prominently sitting at the table mapping emergent power, offered
valuable input on why the change that activists sought hadn't already been
realized. This input included assessing how lawyers' own roles, including
their role in sustaining legal institutions, reinforce existing power relations.
Understanding these power relationships was core to understanding the system they sought to change. 456 In the absence of this critical understanding,
any effort at change would likely have been impaired.457
In the process of jointly mapping power relations, lawyers of all stripes
and organizers became willing to concede that power might be the emergent
residue of the interactions between dispersed institutions and roles acting independently in identified problem spaces. In this view, as one organizer told
us, dispersed power requires dispersed action, so you won't find a linear solution to a non-linear problem. You have to think non-linearly and plan
holistically. 458

452.

SCOTT E. PAGE AND JOHN H. MILLER, COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS: AN INTRODUCTION TO

COMPUTATIONAL MODELS OF SOCIAL LIFE 213-27 (2007) (explaining that one strategy, often optimal, to
manage complex adaptive systems such as law, social conditions, economies, or organizations is to balance excavation or action with distributed experimentation and inquiry).
453.
MICHAEL J. PAPA, ARVIND SINGHAL AND WENDY H. PAPA, ORGANIZING FOR SOCIAL CHANGE:
A DIALECTICAL JOURNEY OF THEORY AND PRACTICE 233-37 (2006); BROWN, EMERGENT STRATEGY, Su-

pra note 35, at 44-121; GREEN, How CHANGE HAPPENS, supra note 31, at 9-28.
454. Perhaps lawyers have are peculiarly adept due to their origin stories in two of the more robust,
entrenched and dysfunctional institutions in society today: the bar exam and United States legal education. These origins, along with lawyers' socialization in the legal profession-which is itself concerned
with dealing with entrenched historical contingencies-has left lawyers uniquely well-qualified to identify
these power dynamics.
455. BERGER, THE CATALYST, supranote 81, at 6 n.l.
456. GREEN, How CHANGE HAPPENS, supra note 31, at 240 (advising activists to spend more time
understanding the systems of which they are a part and less on planning actions to affect such systems to
be effective agents of progressive social change).
457. Id. ERIC LIU, YOU'RE MORE POWERFUL THAN YOU THINK: A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO MAKING
CHANGE HAPPEN 31 (2017) (pointing to systems justification theory as support for the idea that legitimacy
is a story that power tells itself that it deserves power; the powerless tell a contrasting legitimacy story
about their own lack of power and the justness of power over them. Lawyers' tools were effective in
upsetting such feedback loops by forced outing of power systems' contradictions).
458. Interview with Alvarado, supra note 35.
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The contours of the problem space from which legally robust power structures emerge might be imagined, in lawyering's discourse, in terms of
Galanter's case congregations (the institutions, roles, habits, relationships,
and communicative practices of a particular legal community over time), 45 9
Halliday and Karpik's Legal Complex (denoting the legal occupations which
mobilize on a given issue at a given historical moment, usually through collective action that is enabled through discernible structures of ties among different roles in law), 460 or the emergent order arising from the interactions of
institutions, roles, rules, and ideologies in space known as assemblage
theory. 461 In each instance, an inclusive space is envisioned in which order
might arise in the absence-or even in contravention462-f central control
or determinate rules. Over time, relationships, practices, and communications
structures build an emergent order that might be altered, exploited, or
exposed-or out of which a subversive order, itself emergent or planned,
might arise. 463

No matter which formulation is imagined, and we favor the more complete
assemblage theory, the extant order is sustained with all its contradictions
and redundancies. That is, the assemblage that implemented and sustained SComm also identified why S-Comm had not yet been abolished or changed.
Like Berger's catalysts, the lawyers we met added value to social movements
in, among other qualities and actions, understanding the language of, and
threats to, entrenched power structures. The power structures were comprised
of loosely-coupled institutions and roles, rules and ideologies, and habits and
intentions. These dynamics played out through relationships and stories told
in the elite spaces where power is enjoyed.
However clearly case congregations, the legal complex theory, or assemblage theory describe the problem space of the corridors of power, none of
these theories gives either the movement lawyer or progressive organizer a
hint as to how to change the products of dispersed exercises of power. 464
Complexity theory might.

459. Mark Galanter, Case Congregations and Their Careers, 24 L. & SoC'Y REV. 371 (1990).
460. Lucien Karpik & Terence C. Halliday, The Legal Complex, 7 ANN. REV. L. & Soc. SCI. 217
(2011).
461. Jason Dittmer, Geopolitical Assemblages and Complexity, 38 PROGRESS IN HUM. GEO'Y 385,
387 (2013); MANUEL DELANDA, ASSEMBLAGE THEORY (2016); MANUEL DELANDA, A NEW PHILOSOPHY
OF SOCIETY: ASSEMBLAGE THEORY AND SOCIAL COMPLEXITY (2006).
462. See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON,
DISPUTES (1994).
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463. Brian Z. Tamanaha, Law's Emergent Phenomena: From Rules of Social Intercourse to Rule of
Law in Society, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 1149, 1150 n.6 (2018) (doubting the applicability to complexity
theory to law because of the difficulty of imagining the fitness landscape in play, at least if to construct it
one will be called upon to separate law from society). We would not seek to cleave the fitness landscape
in this way.
464.

LUCIEN KARPIK, TERENCE HALLIDAY & MALCOM FEELEY, The Legal Complex and Struggles

for Political Liberalism, in FIGHTING FOR POLITICAL FREEDOM: COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF THE LEGAL
COMPLEX AND POLITICAL LIBERALISM 3-4 (Lucien Karpik, Terence Halliday & Malcom Feeley, eds.,
2007) (explaining that the concept of the legal complex holds no explanatory power for so-called cause
lawyers).
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Complexity theory seeks to discover regularities across instances in which
order emerges without or against centralized control. Complex adaptive systems are made up of many actors that adapt to each other without any overall
plan or ruler. Anthills, patterns of famines, stock markets, and the brain's
emergent consciousness are examples of complex adaptive systems. Legal
systems are complex adaptive systems, as are social movements. 4 65
Complexity theory teaches us to look for hidden sources of order in physical, biological, and social systems. 466 It also provides a theoretical basis for
the robustness of emergent order, warning us that too-heavily ordered systems might be fragile and subject to unexpected non-linear change, while
chaotic systems might tend to be attracted to particular patterns of orders. 467
Although change is not perfectly predictable, it might still be manageable.
And among the ways to ride the wave of social change is to introduce shocks
to the system, to imagine possible reactions to different stories in a kind of
narrative game-theoretic fashion. We observed lawyers, organizers, and
advocates introducing diverse voices to reveal wide arrays of options and a
triage method to choose, assess, and select from grassroots-generated
tools. 4 68 Throughout, the group selected many different moves-vigorously
reflecting on-the-fly on the impact of each and sharing the results widely for
application in other areas and contexts. 4 69
Complexity theory identifies paths of agents' communication and mutual
adjustment-in social systems, through story. Above, we identified two central tropes: the lawyer's story that atomizes conflict and individualizes remedies, and the organizer's story, what the sociologist Margaret Levi calls
"communities of fate," erecting a community that shares a common fate
which calls for concerted action for a shared remedy binding the newly-constructed community together. 470 Complexity theory gives the language of lay

465.
STUART A. KAUFFMAN, REINVENTING THE SACRED: A NEW VIEW OF SCIENCE, REASON AND
RELIGION 268-70 (2008); see generally COMPLEXITY THEORY AND LAW: MAPPING AN EMERGENT

JURISPRUDENCE (Jamie Murray, Thomas E. Webb & Steven Wheatley, eds., 2019).
466.

GRAEME CHESTERS & IAN WELSH, COMPLEXITY AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS:

MULTITUDES AT

THE EDGE OF CHAOS 100-102 (2006).
467. Id.
468. If this reminds the reader of their clinical experience in law school that is exactly how it struck
us and led us to inquire further.
469. See e.g., Interview with Sydney, supra note 177 (describing the way work was pushed out for
wider application across the country, "And as I mentioned, D.C. became the first city to opt out. So, then
we took what worked in D.C. and then spread the word, [inaudible] calls, we were traveling all over the
place and like holding trainings like that tool kit I just sent to you guys, that's something we did shortly
after I think the D.C. victory and continued to like push this information out all over the country and to
not just educate people but also give them like very concrete ideas on how to build local campaigns. And
then organizing like a national day of action, whether that was the launch or when we had like the release
of the documents, I think in August, the first batch was like an August 2010. I remember having a major
briefing and then like material that we prepared for local group so that they can go have press conferences
again in front of their like local city council and be like, essentially lobbying days will go and push this information forward and get a lot of local press as well.").
470. See JOHN A. AHLQUIST & MARGARET LEVI, IN THE INTEREST OF OTHERS: ORGANIZATIONS AND
SOCIAL ACTIVISM 8, 26 (2013). Such stories might, for example, invoke a common enemy, a shared
threat, a mutual plight or collective identity.
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power structures context to identify inflection points where legal skills or legitimacy might be useful. In this way, there was a place in the overall effort
to end S-Comm for lawyers acting in varied roles at the micro, meso, and
macro levels identified earlier.
At the micro level, lawyering for the situation, lawyers with immigration
expertise were brought into various localities to support local efforts to optout of S-Comm. For example, in DC, the first city to opt-out of S-Comm,
"lawyering was key in [meetings with the city council] ... [and the] local
coalitions that formed all over the country would always have a lawyer at
these meetings to explain to the council members and elected officials how
[things] worked." 471 City and county officials had "so many legal questions
and honestly, even though [the organizer could have] answered these questions, there was something, it gave, you know, the authority of someone who
has a legal degree." 472 Organizers used the name "trophy lawyers" to refer to
lawyers who came in and out of local campaigns to lend expertise on a particular, narrow issue. 473 This micro-level lawyering was coupled with the mesolevel lawyering that focused on the FOIA litigation. The FOIA litigation
team was comprised of lawyers steeped in FOIA and relevant immigration
litigation. 474 The campaign was able to leverage the relationships and legitimacy of pro bono lawyers, who well understood and enjoyed their place in
the campaign and the overall movement. On the macro level, the lawyers for
the campaign, in turn, worked to fashion stories that would be understood by
movement activists and lawyers who maintained their subversive purity
while leveraging the talents and establishment credibility of expert pro bono
lawyers operating at other levels.
Placing these three layers on top of each other, the different scales of social
change worked together to create a movement strategy that encompassed an
emergently constructed "community of fate." By trying out different tactics
with different players in different contexts, the overall movement developed
an advocacy strategy, derived through evolutionary dynamics of dispersed
strategies and selection mechanisms, that resulted in the termination of SComm. The relationships and narratives that incited the movement continue
to inspire and bind immigrant workers' movements to this day.

471. Interview with Sydney, supra note 177.
472. Id. (explaining that recognizing the authority that a law degree provided is "probably why I
went to law school.").
473. Id. (describing that "at the local level ... local groups would often have an attorney that was
part of the coalition ... [These lawyers] were not involved in the litigation of the FOIA.").
474. The litigation team included lawyers from the Center for Constitutional Rights, an organization
with a mission to "stand with social justice movements and communities under threat fusing litigation,
advocacy, and narrative shifting to dismantle systems of oppression regardless of the risk." Mission and
Vision, CTR. FOR CONST. RIGHTS (Oct. 18, 2018),CTR. FOR CONST. RTS https://ccrjustice.org/home/whowe-are/mission-and-vision [https://perma.cc/RW6T-SHSP]. The Cardozo Immigration Justice Clinic also
represents immigrant community-based organizations on litigation and advocacy projects. See
Immigration Justice Clinic, CARDOZO LAw, https://cardozo.yu.edu/immigration-justice-clinic [https://
perma.cc/2TZB-8S4A] (last visited Feb. 24, 2021).
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CONCLUSION

This case study posits an innovative approach for collaborative work
between lawyers, organizers, activists, and clients moving forward. In this
context, we found that lawyers and activists built a modular, emergent strategy from the ground up through recursive, 475 interactive, and synergistic play
among tools, roles, institutions, and resources. Traditional legal interactions
and discourse were constitutive elements in an array of which the movement's relationship with legal rules, roles, and institutions were a byproduct.47 6 Lawyers were intentionally deployed at strategic moments on the
micro (client-centered lawyering for the situation), meso (lawyering for the
campaign), and macro (lawyering for the movement) levels. The strategy
was fluid and adapted as the campaign progressed. Standing shoulder to
shoulder, on equal ground, each participant brought their expertise and skills
to the table, creating an interactive and synergistic environment to challenge
institutional power.

475. The idea being that social movements, institutions, and law all change and are changed in the
process, even as each constructs the assumptions on which each is built. See ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE
CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY, supranote 27.
476. See MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK, supra note 20; POLLETTA, IT WAS LIKE A FEVER, supra note
28; Smith, Order (for Free), supra note 28.

